Professional Liability

Our defense team successfully obtained dismissal of a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) perceived disability claim, alleging COVID-19 to be a disability under this statute. This employment discrimination claim involved a matter of first impression in New Jersey. A former employee filed suit asserting perceived disability discrimination under the NJLAD. The plaintiff alleged he was wrongfully terminated based upon his employer’s perception that he had COVID-19. We filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, asserting the complaint did not set forth a cause of action as COVID-19 is not a recognized disability under the NJLAD. The court granted our motion and agreed that COVID-19 is not a disability under the NJLAD and, therefore, could not be the predicate for a perceived discrimination case. 

In a case where we represented an insurance broker, a Federal District Judge from the Southern District of West Virginia granted our motion to dismiss and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff was a women’s fashion and accessory boutique. The suit arose from a dispute over the plaintiff’s insurance coverage for damages it sustained while being ordered to close by West Virginia’s COVID-19-related orders. The insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, and, thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the carrier. The broker filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims plead against it, including bad faith, West Virginia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the counts of bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices Act, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient allegations to support such claims. The court further explained that the plaintiff alleged very few facts specific to the broker and that the allegations plead did not support any unreasonable conduct by the broker, which is required to establish bad faith or deception. For similar reasons, the court held that the plaintiff’s estoppel claim failed. The plaintiff alleged the broker advised that they would have coverage as a result of the COVID-19 orders. The court found that the plaintiff failed to allege how it relied on those representations or how that reliance was detrimental. The alleged representations occurred months after the plaintiff accepted the policy and did not appear to have any impact on the plaintiff’s request for payments from its insurance carrier. Finally, the court explained that the plaintiff failed to identify any West Virginia authority to establish a breach of fiduciary duty against the broker. Regardless, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege that it requested specific coverage before the broker procured the policy.

Our defense team was successful before the New Jersey Appellate Division. The plaintiff is a former employee of a non-profit agency that provides services to disabled individuals. She filed suit against her former employer and its manager, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. As discovery progressed, thousands of pages of discovery were exchanged, which demonstrated that legitimate, long-standing performance deficiencies were the actual basis for her termination. The defendants filed for summary judgment prior to the end of the discovery period, and the Law Division granted the motion, finding no reason not to grant the immediate dismissal, especially as the plaintiff failed to even respond to the statement of material facts. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the court affirmed the dismissal, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that the motion judge engaged in a subjective analysis of the facts and thereby made factual findings on disputed issues, and that the motion judge erred by granting the motion before discovery was complete. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, with any degree of particularity, that further discovery would supply the missing elements to her cause of action. The court further found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of gender discrimination or workers’ compensation retaliation given the unrebutted facts provided by the defendants. 

We obtained the dismissal of a former employee accused of trademark infringement. A spray foam insulation company brought a claim for trademark infringement against a former employee. The plaintiff claimed that it had used the mark in connection with its business for over eight years, thereby establishing secondary meaning of the mark in connection with spray foam insulation in the New Jersey market. The plaintiff further alleged the defendants used the mark in marketing and promoting their competing spray foam insulation business in New Jersey. There was no valid claim against our client as there were no facts pled to support the threshold issue, that the plaintiff held a protectable mark. The complaint pled only conclusory allegations that the mark had secondary meaning, and there were no allegations that our client had any interest in the allegedly offending mark.

The lawsuit was brought by 54 condominium unit owners of a 608-unit, age-restricted planned development against the homeowner’s association board, the property manager and the sponsor/developer, for the early transfer of control of the condominium association. Dismissal of the board and the property manager was granted in what was properly a unit owner-sponsor/developer dispute over control of the association. The unit owners alleged that the sponsor/developer was no longer offering new units for sale; rather, they were only renting units, thereby triggering the turn-over provisions in the by-laws. No claims against either the board or the property manager were properly pled in the complaint. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed as to both.

The plaintiff filed suit against her employer, a governmental agency, alleging she was subject to discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) based upon her disability and that she was subject to retaliation for filing a previous discrimination suit. She further asserted aiding-and-abetting claims against fellow employees. The case was dismissed via summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division accepted our argument that the failure to move the plaintiff to a position she desired did not constitute an adverse employment action or failure to accommodate as she suffered no adverse effect on her salary or benefits, and did not materially alter her working conditions. Further, the court addressed concerns the plaintiff’s physician had expressed when she sought the accommodation, even though she was not transferred to a position in which she preferred to work, and agreed the claims were properly rejected by the trial Judge.

The plaintiff, who owned his own restaurant business, sustained personal injuries in a car accident while on a business errand. He collected the tortfeasor’s liability limits of $100,000 and then filed underinsured motorist claims with his own insurance carrier that had issued the personal auto and commercial auto policies. The underinsured claims were denied by the carrier. There was no UIM coverage under the personal auto policy because the $100,000 UIM limits equaled the liability carrier’s limits. Further, although the plaintiff had $1 million in UIM limits on his commercial policy, the Mazda he was driving at the time of the accident was not listed on the commercial policy; rather, it was listed on the personal auto policy. The plaintiff then sued the insurance agent and broker who listed the Mazda on the personal rather than commercial policy. He argued professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. Extensive discovery was conducted, including depositions of insurance standard of care experts for each side. The court granted Ray’s motion for summary judgment on several bases: the statute of limitations began to run when the Mazda was first put on the personal auto policy, not when the motor vehicle accident occurred; despite the plaintiff’s and the agent’s friendship and long-standing business dealings, there was not a fiduciary relationship between the agent and insured customer; and the agent’s alleged statement to the plaintiff that he was covered in “every single possible way you can think of” did not amount to a misrepresentation of fact.    

We assisted an attorney and his zoning board clients in having sanctions that had been imposed by a trial court judge vacated. We helped the attorney in obtaining pre-claim assistance coverage from his insurance carrier, and then worked with him to author an appellate brief challenging the sanctions. In an unpublished opinion, the judge writing for the Commonwealth Court agreed with the arguments presented by our team and the client. The Commonwealth Court found that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue sanctions under Section 2503 of the Judicial Code. The Commonwealth Court also found there was no basis to sanction the attorney or his clients under Rule of Civil Procedure 1701, and that the trial court did not provide appropriate due process prior to making a finding of contempt. The trial court’s order for sanctions was vacated.

A FINRA arbitration panel recommended the expungement of a customer complaint relating to allegedly unsuitable investments in oil and gas investments that declined during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic.  

We obtained a dismissal of a consumer fraud class action against our clients, a national firm and its principal, who specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers who are unaware that such lost property exists. The plaintiff brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) and for fraudulent inducement, arguing that the business model was deceptive because consumers could recover their own property without paying for the ease and convenience of having the defendant business work on their behalf.  Not surprisingly, the district court found that the plaintiff’s serial complaints failed to allege anything “more than Defendants’ expertise,” and that there was no factual basis to support the notion that consumers are unduly influenced or misled.  On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, expressly noting that the defendants made no misrepresentation at any time, and the UTPCPL and fraud claims were dismissed as without merit.  DeSimone v. U.S. Claims Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 2556949 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2020), aff’d 2021 WL 1662779 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2021).

The appeal was brought before the Appellate Division, Second Department. The plaintiff was a pedestrian who was struck by a car in the mall parking lot and sued our client, the mall owner. The plaintiff claimed that the parking lot was negligently designed, which led to the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the mall, saying that there was no evidence that the parking lot was negligently designed, or that the design led to the accident. A unanimous appellate court affirmed.

We won summary judgment for a housing authority in a political subdivision matter in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiff sought over $20 million in damages, alleging the housing authority violated the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminatorily blocking funding for, and financing of, 60 units of project-based affordable housing for homeless veterans, most of whom are disabled. The court had previously awarded summary judgment to our client on all but one claim, but ruled that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the plaintiff’s “reasonable accommodation” claim under the ADA and FHA. In an unusual turn of events, the court recently held that it had erred in not granting our previously filed summary judgment on all claims. It, therefore, dismissed all claims against the housing authority.

We obtained a defense verdict following a non-jury trial. This case was brought under Pennsylvania’s Sunshine Act, which governs the meetings of Commonwealth public agencies, including school boards. The plaintiffs were residents of a Centre County school district, and they sued the school board and its president, claiming they violated the Act in the manner by which they conducted public meetings. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the board failed to state with sufficient specificity during the open portion of its meetings the reasons why it was convening privately in executive session, and because the board did not allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its executive session meetings. After trial and post-trial briefing, the court, in a written opinion found for the defendants, concluding the board complied with the Act as it routinely and appropriately announced, in general terms, when it was convening in executive session to discuss contract, personnel and non-litigation legal matters. Finally, the trial court found as matter of law that the board was not required to allow public comment at, or keep minutes of, its work sessions because the work sessions are non-voting meetings at which the board does not “deliberate” or take any “official action,” as those terms are specifically defined by the Act.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a dentist who sold her practice in an employment and contract claim. The plaintiff, also a dentist, was employed by our client. He claimed his contract automatically renewed, and that he was entitled to two years of pay. The plaintiff also claimed he was entitled to be compensated because our client allegedly prevented him from taking records of patients he was treating. The court accepted our argument that the plaintiff waived the extension of his contract, and that the patient records belonged to the practice and the patients, not the plaintiff.

The declaratory judgment complaint was filed against the landlord that leased three quarries to the insured tenant. The landlord sued its tenant for breach of contract and environmental clean-up costs. The landlord sought coverage as an additional insured to the tenant’s CGL policy. The insurer denied coverage. The court granted our motion for summary judgment in favor of the insurer, agreeing that the counterclaims alleged intentional acts that were not occurrences as defined in the policy, nor did the claims fall within the personal or advertising coverage under the policy. The court further held that, even if coverage were found, it is limited to such damage or injury “caused in whole or in part by the insured’s acts or omissions or the acts or omissions of those acting on the insured’s behalf in the performance of its ongoing operations for the additional insureds.” In light of this clear language in the policy, it follows that coverage was denied because the counterclaims were based solely on the acts or omissions of the landlord, not on the acts or omissions of the tenant or those acting on its behalf. Lastly, the court agreed that there would be no coverage available to the landlord as exclusions apply.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a newspaper delivery person’s petition for allowance of appeal on March 30, 2021. The claimant filed a claim petition in 2018, alleging that he suffered serious injuries to his right leg after slipping and falling on ice when he was delivering newspapers. The newspaper asserted that the claimant was an independent contractor. The case was bifurcated to determine whether the claimant was an employee. After fully litigating the issue, the Workers’ Compensation Judge found in favor of the newspaper and found that the case was not so different than the seminal case of Johnson v. WCAB (DuBois Courier Express), 631 A.2d 693 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). The Johnson court held that a newspaper carrier was an independent contractor because the newspaper did not exercise substantial control over his activities. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. After hearing argument and reviewing the parties’ briefs, the Board affirmed the judge’s decision and order. The claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, urging the court to consider the evolving nature of the newspaper delivery business in rendering its decision. The court refused to do so and highlighted the lack of control by the newspaper because there was no prohibition on delivering competing newspapers or enlisting a substitute without prior notice or permission. The Commonwealth Court’s decision, which was issued as a non-precedential opinion, is the latest in an unbroken line of similar cases holding that newspaper carriers are independent contractors.  The claimant’s suit ended when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal.

In a case where we represented an insurance broker, a Federal District Judge from the Southern District of West Virginia granted our motion to dismiss and dismissed the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff was a women’s fashion and accessory boutique. The suit arose from a dispute over the plaintiff’s insurance coverage for damages it sustained while being ordered to close by West Virginia’s COVID-19-related orders. The insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, and, thereafter, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the carrier. The broker filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims plead against it, including bad faith, West Virginia’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty. The court dismissed the counts of bad faith and Unfair Trade Practices Act, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient allegations to support such claims. The court further explained that the plaintiff alleged very few facts specific to the broker and that the allegations plead did not support any unreasonable conduct by the broker, which is required to establish bad faith or deception. For similar reasons, the court held that the plaintiff’s estoppel claim failed. The plaintiff alleged the broker advised that they would have coverage as a result of the COVID-19 orders. The court found that the plaintiff failed to allege how it relied on those representations or how that reliance was detrimental. The alleged representations occurred months after the plaintiff accepted the policy and did not appear to have any impact on the plaintiff’s request for payments from its insurance carrier. Finally, the court explained that the plaintiff failed to identify any West Virginia authority to establish a breach of fiduciary duty against the broker. Regardless, the court found that the plaintiff failed to allege that it requested specific coverage before the broker procured the policy.

Marshall Dennehey and its shareholder, Jonathan E. Kanov, Esq., were successful in a South Florida arbitration representing a prominent Florida real estate developer against construction damage claims brought by a neighboring property’s condominium association. In a final, binding ruling, the arbitrator issued a complete defense verdict, plus an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the developer. The plaintiff condominium association had contended that construction of the developer’s luxury condominium tower caused many areas of their property to be damaged, largely from vibrations/seismic activity during demolition and construction. The plaintiff demanded $1.2 million in damages pursuant to a contract that was entered into by the parties covering the construction activity.   The arbitrator agreed with the defense’s arguments that the “conditions the claimant contends were caused by vibration damage from construction activities are actually age-related deterioration and the result of deferred maintenance. Additionally, there is no evidentiary basis to allocate uncompensated damage associated with the pool and pool deck to the developer, as opposed to preexisting conditions requiring repair and upgrades required for code compliance.” Marshall Dennehey presented highly credible experts and fact witnesses in support of its defense.    Another key to the defense verdict was Marshall Dennehey’s effective cross examination of the claimant’s structural engineering expert on construction vibration/seismic activity data, which formed the crux of their damage claims.

We obtained dismissal of an accounting malpractice claim on preliminary objections in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiffs alleged that their accountant improperly prepared their tax returns—as married filing jointly—and failed to claim business losses, that resulted in an unexpected tax liability being owed. Although the plaintiffs attempted to rely on the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations, the defense successfully argued that the plaintiffs were on notice of the alleged negligence by the time they received the prepared tax returns, and that their failure to investigate potential claims at that time was a failure to exercise due diligence as a matter of law. We further argued that because they were under a duty to investigate earlier, the plaintiffs could not successfully allege that they could not have known of their claims until they hired a tax attorney to investigate. Because the plaintiffs did not bring their negligence claim until more than two years after they received their prepared tax returns, their claims were barred by the Statute of Limitations.

This was the first civil case tried in a U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania since the court closures caused by COVID-19. The plaintiff alleged that the police officer used excessive force in arresting her outside of a bar in the City of York. She filed a Section 1983 civil rights lawsuit, alleging she sustained a traumatic brain injury after the officer threw her head against a brick wall, threw her to the ground and then repeatedly punched her in the face. By utilizing video surveillance footage and several liability and damage experts, we were able to convince the jury that the force used by the officer was reasonable and justified by the plaintiff’s resistance. The jury deliberated for less than 30 minutes before rendering its verdict.

We successfully persuaded the New Jersey Appellate Division to reverse a coverage determination. The original determination had found that the plaintiff was entitled to $500,000 in coverage under her then-boyfriend’s insurance policy, rather than being limited to the $100,000 in her own policy. The Law Division rejected our arguments that the policy did not deem the plaintiff a “covered person” because she was the named insured in her own policy, and rejected the argument that the step-down provision applied. On appeal, the Appellate Division did not agree with us that the Law Division erred in its determination that the plaintiff was a “covered person,” but it did agreed that the step-down provision applied to limit the plaintiff’s recovery to that of her own policy. Cross petitions for review were filed with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which declined to alter the Appellate Division’s decision, resulting in significant savings on the claim for our client.

We successfully defended a local school district in a special education due process complaint by the parent of a former student who was diagnosed with autism, learning disabilities and ADHD. ​The student had graduated from high school, completed all credits and earned a regular diploma. Yet, the parent claimed that while the student was still attending high school, the school district failed to provide the student with sufficient learning support in reading and math, appropriate social skills training, and adequate vocational and transition services to help the student with life after graduation. Also, the parent claimed the school district failed to take appropriate measures to protect the student from alleged bullying by his peers, including fellow members of the varsity football team. The hearing officer found for the school district on all issues and concluded the school district had provided the student with a free appropriate public education during all times in dispute. The hearing officer also found there was no evidence to suggest the school district had failed to respond appropriately to the parent’s and student’s reports of bullying.

We obtained an affirmance by the First District Court of Appeal of a defense verdict in a negligent security action. A chef was taking garbage outside of a restaurant when he was shot and killed. The estate sued our client, the owner of the commercial building and parking lot, as well as the defendants involved in the development, design and maintenance of the retail center. The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of all defendants. The estate then appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in excluding subsequent remedial measure evidence of the installation of lighting, signs and cameras in the parking lot after the shooting. The First District rejected those arguments, and affirmed the final judgments in favor of the defendants.

We successfully defended a civil rights appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The plaintiff filed a federal civil rights complaint against a police sergeant and a local municipality following his arrest and release. The plaintiff was charged with the attempted murder of his wife, who later recanted her statement to police. After the plaintiff was released from custody, he filed suit, claiming that police failed to conduct an adequate criminal investigation into the charges against him. At the district court, it was found that probable cause existed based on information known to officers at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest. Therefore, our defense motion for summary judgment was granted. The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, claiming that the district court failed to weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to him, and ignored relevant evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision finding probable cause.

We successfully persuaded the court to grant summary judgement on behalf of a major insurer on a complex coverage issue. This coverage case concerned two Virginia personal automobile policies in regard to an automobile accident in New Jersey. The son of a divorced couple sought coverage for an accident he was involved in on a major thoroughfare in New Jersey. At the time of the accident, the son was operating a motor vehicle owned by another Virginia resident, and he had the reasonable expectation that he had permission to operate the vehicle. The accident was very serious, and he sought coverage under both of his parents’ policies. As to the mother’s policy, we convinced the court that the son was not an insured under her policy because he was not so designated on the policy’s declaration page, which was a specific condition of the policy pursuant to Virginia law. As to the father’s policy, once again, we convinced the court that the son was not an insured under this policy given the fact that the mother had sole and exclusive custody under the divorce agreement; thus, the son was not a resident relative of the father’s household. Therefore, neither policy provided coverage for the son, and the insurer was totally dismissed from the case.

The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs were the maternal grandparents of two children who were removed from the custody of their parents and placed in foster care. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their substantive and procedural due process rights protected by the 14th Amendment by failing to provide them with custody of the children and notice of court hearings. Addressing an open legal question, the court held that the plaintiffs did not stand in loco parentis to the children and, therefore, did not enjoy 14th Amendment protections. The court dismissed all claims against the county and the individual county employees.

Our appellate attorneys convinced Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal to affirm an administrative law judge’s final order finding a claim compensable under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Compensation Plan. ​A minor child was permanently and substantially brain damaged as a result of his complicated birth. The parents sought compensation pursuant to NICA under protest. The parents contended the brain injury that caused the child’s permanent and substantial mental and physical impairment occurred prior to the statutory period (i.e., during labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital). They claimed the injury occurred in the 34 minutes from when the cord prolapsed at home to when the mother arrived at the hospital, where she ultimately delivered the child via emergency cesarean section. NICA and the hospital argued that the permanent and substantial impairment occurred during the statutory period. The administrative law judge agreed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the final order determining the claim was compensable.

The defense prevailed on a motion for judgment on the pleadings in a declaratory judgment action seeking liability coverage in a catastrophic injury case. ​The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his wife when she veered off the road and struck a pedestrian, nearly killing him. The pedestrian sued the plaintiff in a separate action, alleging he got out of the vehicle, rolled the pedestrian over, saw he was “mortally wounded,” got back in the vehicle, and fled the scene without rendering aid or calling for help. The pedestrian sued the plaintiff for negligently failing to render aid and assistance. The plaintiff brought his declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that he was entitled to defense and indemnity under the liability coverage afforded by his homeowner’s policy. Mike and Julie argued there was no coverage in the first instance because the the insured’s conduct was not “accidental.” Subject to exclusions, the policy provides liability coverage for any occurrence that causes bodily injury. “Occurrence” is defined in the policy to mean an “accident” that results in bodily injury. In addition, they argued that certain exclusions would bar coverage, including an exclusion for bodily injury arising from the “use” of a motor vehicle and exclusions for expected or intended injury and willful or malicious acts. The court agreed and granted final judgment in favor of our client.

We secured a dismissal of a civil rights action against a Pennsylvania children and youth agency and several of its caseworkers and staff attorneys. ​The plaintiff parents brought their five-month-old baby to the hospital with a spiral fracture mid-shaft on his right humerus. The hospital team collectively concluded that the injury was probably accidental in nature, but a nurse reported the injury to the agency, concerned that it might have been caused by abuse. By law the agency is bound to investigate suspected child abuse and did so. A judge approved the request for a safety plan that required a chaperone to be with the parents and child, even in the home, while the merits of the abuse investigation continued. At the end of the investigation, the judge concluded the injury was accidental, and the safety plan was terminated. The plaintiffs then filed an action, alleging the safety plan violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. The federal district court dismissed the case, concluding the plaintiffs’ allegations of interference with the family unit, even if true, do not rise to the level of “shocking to the conscience” necessary for a due process violation. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the nurse’s report of possible child abuse, in conjunction with other evidence to support suspicion of the same, make the defendants’ actions not “shocking to the conscience,” and so no substantive due process claim was stated. Dismissal was affirmed.

The plaintiff brought claims for negligent hiring/supervision, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from an incident where she was allegedly lured to a residential apartment building in New York City under false pretenses and sexually assaulted by the desk security guard in a back room of the lobby. The guard involved was duly licensed and had no criminal history. At trial, he was criminally convicted and sentenced to prison. The plaintiff contended that the guard’s employer was negligent in its hiring of the guard and that it failed to properly supervise his actions at the building, particularly in light of the fact that during the criminal trial, some evidence surfaced that the guard may have committed a similar assault three days earlier while working at another building for a different company. After more than four years of discovery, we moved for summary judgment on behalf of the guard’s employer and the building owners/managers, which was granted, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims in their entirety.