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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Our Product Liability Practice Group

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich

For almost five decades, Marshall Dennehey has maintained an experienced and sophisticated group of trial attorneys involved in product liability litigation. The product liability landscape has evolved continually since first arriving on the scene in the 1970s. In the intervening forty-plus years, we have successfully represented numerous product defendants, as our defense attorneys have kept abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints and, of course, evolving technology. 

The co-chairs of the Product Liability Practice Group, Bradley Remick and Vlada Tasich, have over 50 years of combined experience in handling product liability cases for a myriad of domestic and international product manufacturers, involving virtually every conceivable type of consumer or industrial product. Brad has authored six treatises on Pennsylvania product liability. The demands of a defense product liability practice are such that attorneys must make certain that they are up-to-date on the latest case law. Federal and state appellate and trial court decisions directly impact the defense of product liability defendants. In that respect, we have been at the forefront, providing guidance to clients and collaborating with peers to coordinate broader defense strategies as legal landscapes have shifted in this area of law. 

For example, in 2014 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), upending nearly 40 years of prior strict liability precedent. Under earlier case law, a product was defective if it lacked any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use. Jurors were told that a manufacturer was a guarantor of its product’s safety. Tincher expressly rejected these standards, acknowledged that it was for the jury to decide if a product was unreasonably dangerous, and adopted two alternative standards for demonstrating defect: the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test. While the core legal framework for analyzing if a product is defective changed, many other longstanding product issues were left unresolved; the Tincher court leaving it to future cases where the common law could develop “within the proper factual contexts against the background of targeted advocacy.” The plaintiffs’ bar generally rejected the sweeping nature of the court’s decision, which was a positive development for product defendants. They also influenced efforts by the Pennsylvania Bar Institute to fashion plaintiff-friendly suggested standard jury instructions that, by and large, held on to the principles rejected by Tincher. Marshall Dennehey attorneys were at the forefront of concerted efforts by the defense bar to draft alternative suggested jury instructions that more fairly follow the law. Our trailblazing lawyers, on behalf of our clients, also targeted cases for trial where a number of these alternative instructions were adopted by Pennsylvania courts as more accurate statements of the applicable legal standards post Tincher. 

Our practice group makes certain that our attorneys are keenly aware of legal changes involving product liability. We employ every avenue of defense available to our clients in order to successfully and fairly defend their products before a jury.

Our experienced and sophisticated trial attorneys prepare and handle a variety of complex product liability litigation, including the representation of major product manufacturers, distributors and other manufacturers through insurance carriers. The wide variety of cases and clients we represent evidences the level of experience and sophistication that our clients have come to expect in their defense. Over the years, our attorneys have handled thousands of product liability matters, in all of the jurisdictions to which our regional practice extends.

The practice includes defense of accidents and alleged failures of all types, including, for example:

  • A broad variety of vehicle products including automobiles, motorcycles, recreational vehicles and trucks, as well as the component manufacturers and suppliers for those products.
  • Consumer goods and appliances.
  • Drug and dietary supplements.
  • Combining its resources with its legal and medical malpractice groups, the Product Liability Practice Group defends cases involving pharmaceuticals, biologics, compounding pharmacies and medical devices.
  • Recreational equipment, including helmets and exercise equipment.
  • Industrial and manufacturing equipment of all sorts and all sizes, ranging from small generators to large electrical components that provide electric service to municipalities. 
  • Building equipment and structures, including all the components involved therein.
  • Elevators and escalators.
  • Fire suppression equipment and systems.
  • Mold and contamination issues. 
  • Asbestos and toxic tort claims. 
  • Consumer products of all varieties.

Marshall Dennehey’s product liability practice also includes multi-district litigation, class actions, and commercial claims arising from allegedly poorly performing and/or defective products and/or their components.

The attorneys in this practice group are recognized leaders in this area of the law. They frequently speak at national, regional and local seminars, and they are published in their field. Several have been elected as Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers. Their memberships include: Product Liability Advisory Council, Product Liability Committee of the Defense Research Institute, International Association of Defense Counsel, Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Trial Lawyers of America.

Marshall Dennehey recognizes the advantage available to defense counsel by employing the resources of its clients, who have the best expertise pertaining to their product, and then supplementing that expertise with our extensive expert bank to select the appropriate forensic and/or technical expert. Our entire focus is directed at presenting the product to a jury in a persuasive and understandable manner so as to achieve a defense verdict.

The next decade will surely see further change, as emerging technologies continue to reshape our world and product liability law continues to evolve. Marshall Dennehey remains at the forefront of the current generation of practitioners, and we are poised and prepared to enhance the defense of product manufacturers into the future.

*Brad, chair of the Product Liability Practice Group, and Vlad, co-chair of this group, are shareholders and work in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office. They can be reached respectively at 215.575.2762 or bdremick@mdwcg.com and 215.575.2659 or vxtasich@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.