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Defense Digest

Redefining the Scope of the Ongoing Storm Rule: What Recent New Jersey Appellate Division Decisions Tell Us About the Future of the Doctrine

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023

June 1, 2023

Key Points:

  • The New Jersey Ongoing Storm Rule may be a defense for contractors of commercial landowners in negligence actions.
  • Snow and ice removal contractors should consider amending their contractual agreements with commercial landowners to protect themselves from liability during an ongoing storm.
  • Contractors should be aware of the exceptions announced in the Pareja holding.

The landscape of premises liability law is evolving in New Jersey. For example, the Ongoing Storm Rule, adopted in 2021, was recently interpreted in two unpublished Appellate Division decisions that provide clarity on the direction the rule is headed. Relevant to this article, those decisions extend the rule to protect snow and ice removal contractors who service a property during an ongoing storm. This is important as our clients provide insurance to those types of contractors. Moving forward, those insureds will be able to avail themselves of this defense. It also provides an opportunity for those insureds to review their existing contracts with commercial landowners and consider amending the terms to shield themselves from liability. I explain below. 

By way of brief background, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Ongoing Storm Rule in Pareja v. Princeton Int’l Prop., LLC, 252 A.3d 184 (N.J. 2021). On its face, the rule immunizes “commercial landowners” from negligence if they fail to remove an accumulation of snow and ice during an ongoing storm. This rule is premised on the pragmatic idea that removing snow and ice during an ongoing storm is an “impossible burden” and “categorically inexpedient and impractical.” The court further held that there are two exceptions that could impose a duty under this rule: (1) if the property owner’s conduct increases the risk of injury, or (2) if there is a danger that pre-exists the storm. 

Hanna v. Woodland Community Association, 2022 WL 16984707 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 17, 2022) and Sarro v. Artic Management, LLC, et al., 2023 WL 2566062 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. March 20, 2023) are the cases in which the New Jersey Appellate Division interpreted this rule to immunize snow and ice removal contractors from negligence. The facts in Hanna and Sarro mirror Pareja. In both cases, the plaintiffs fell during a storm and sustained injuries. In both cases, the commercial landowners contracted with snow removal contractors to service their properties. In both cases, the Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of the snow removal contractors based on the “Ongoing Storm Rule.” 

In Hanna, the Appellate Division concluded: “Limiting the ongoing storm rule to commercial landowners but not their contracted snow removal service providers would nullify the import of the Supreme Court’s ruling.” 

In Sarro, the Appellate Division noted: “The court in Pareja recognized removing snow during an ongoing storm is an ‘impossible burden’ and ‘categorically inexpedient and impractical.’ Imposing a requirement on a contractor to remove accumulated ice and snow would likewise be ‘unreasonable.’ Moreover, it would impose a legal duty impossible to satisfy.” 

Thus, Pareja’s progeny give snow and ice removal contractors a defense for alleged negligence during an ongoing storm. Any doubts based on the argument that the New Jersey Supreme Court in Pareja specifically narrowed its holding to only apply to “commercial landowners” does not take into account the procedural context of Pareja, namely, the snow removal contractor in that case was already granted summary judgment at a lower level. As such, the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to address whether the rule extended to snow and ice removal contractors as the contractor was no longer in the case by the time it reached the highest court. Fortunately, the opportunity presented itself in Hanna and Sarro, and doubt can, therefore, be cast aside.

Importantly, a plaintiff may try to circumvent these decisions by arguing that any contract between the contractor and the landowner creates a separate contractual duty to remediate an ongoing storm as opposed to the common law duty discussed above. Therefore, to combat these attempts, contractors should consider amending their agreements to include language that is consistent with the above-discussed rulings. An example would be: “The contractor does not assume any responsibility to perform services greater than that which is the common law responsibility of the landowner.” While not the silver bullet to pierce through any claim based on negligence, this sort of language allows the contractor to argue they are not under a separate contractual duty. In other words, if there is an ongoing storm, the contractor would not be responsible for remediation services until a reasonable time after the cessation of the storm. As such, it may be advantageous for contractors to review their contracts and consider the appropriate changes.

There are several takeaways insurers and insureds should be aware of as a result of these decisions. First, Hanna and Sarro provide support for the premise that snow and ice removal contractors are under the umbrella of protection of the “Ongoing Storm Rule.” Second, snow removal contractors need to consider the exceptions that may still apply and not create any risk of harm prior to the start of a storm, such as failing to remediate left-over ice from a previous storm. Third, a plaintiff may try to circumvent those decisions, but with the right contractual language, contractors and their insurance carriers can preempt any such attempt. Contractors and litigators can expect further refinement of this doctrine, assuming we ever have a snowy winter again. 



 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.