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Defense Digest

From ‘Brownish’ to Baseless: Florida Court Reinforces Slip-and-Fall Standards

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

Key Points: 

  • Recent case clarifies Florida premises liability law and the burden on plaintiffs under Section 768.0755, Florida Statutes.
  • A plaintiff must establish that a business had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition.
  • A plaintiff needs to demonstrate more than just the presence of a substance—he or she must show how long it was there or why it should have been discovered.

In Duran v. Crab Shack Acquisition, FL, LLC, 384 So. 3d 821 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024), the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant, emphasizing the plaintiff’s failure to establish actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. This case clarifies Florida’s premises liability law and highlights the burden on plaintiffs under Section 768.0755, Florida Statutes.

Factual Background
Jose Duran sued Crab Shack Acquisition, FL, LLC, d/b/a Joe’s Crab Shack, after allegedly slipping on a “brownish” liquid in the restaurant’s dining area. The color and identity of the liquid became a focal point in the case—not because it revealed anything about the restaurant’s conduct, but because it revealed a lack of clarity and specificity in the plaintiff’s evidence. Duran himself referred to the substance only as “brownish,” and no witness could describe it with more detail or identify its source.

There was no evidence of footprints, track marks, or drying patterns indicating how long the liquid had been present. Witnesses did not see the spill before the fall, and Crab Shack employees followed routine inspection and cleaning practices. The plaintiff failed to provide records or testimony showing that inspections had been neglected.

Legal Analysis
Under Florida law, business owners are not strictly liable for invitee safety, but they must maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition. Florida Statute Section 768.0755 requires a plaintiff to prove a business had actual or constructive knowledge of a hazard to recover for a slip-and-fall injury.

The court found no evidence that the restaurant knew about or should have known about the liquid. While constructive knowledge can be proven through circumstantial evidence, such as the substance’s condition or duration, no such evidence existed here. Citing Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) and Encarnacion v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 211 So. 3d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), the court reiterated that merely showing the presence of a substance is insufficient.

The plaintiff’s claim that the liquid originated from employees’ shoes lacked competent evidence. The court also rejected the argument that an employee’s slip after the incident indicated prior notice, as no evidence showed when the liquid first appeared or whether it was visible before the fall.

One of the most important takeaways from this case is the PLUS factor—plaintiffs must provide something more than just the presence of a substance on the floor. Courts require additional proof, such as evidence that the hazard existed for a measurable period or that it had a noticeable, deteriorated condition that should have been detected by ordinary diligence. Without this extra proof, the claim cannot proceed past summary judgment.

Applying Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a), the court emphasized that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists. The defendant met its burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence that the liquid had been present long enough for discovery and remedy. Without conflicting evidence requiring jury determination, the appellate court affirmed summary judgment.

Implications for Florida Premises Liability Law
This decision reinforces the strict burden on plaintiffs in slip-and-fall cases. Business owners must exercise reasonable care, but liability does not attach without proof of actual or constructive knowledge of a hazard. Since 1942, the Florida Supreme Court has been crystal clear -- negligence will not be presumed merely because of the happening of an accident. Defense counsel can cite Duran to argue for summary judgment when plaintiffs fail to provide sufficient circumstantial evidence.

The ruling also underscores the importance of proper training and documentation for businesses. Routine inspections and clear maintenance records significantly strengthen defenses against premises liability claims.

Additionally, Duran highlights the necessity for plaintiffs to provide tangible evidence that a business had a reasonable opportunity to detect and address a hazard. Mere speculation or assumptions regarding a hazardous condition’s duration are insufficient.

The decision also clarifies that an employee’s presence in an area or a general duty to inspect does not create a presumption of knowledge. Courts require affirmative evidence showing that a condition was visible, had been present long enough to be discovered through ordinary diligence, or was recurrent enough to infer constructive notice.

For defense counsel, Duran serves as a roadmap for crafting dispositive motions in similar cases. By emphasizing gaps in the plaintiff’s evidence regarding the hazard’s duration, businesses can successfully argue against liability. Florida courts are likely to continue scrutinizing slip-and-fall claims under this framework, reaffirming the need for concrete evidence.

Key Takeaways for Insurance Professionals

  • Strict Notice Requirement: Plaintiffs must show that a business knew or should have known about a hazard before liability attaches.
  • Speculation Is Insufficient: Assumptions about how long a spill was present will not survive summary judgment.
  • The ‘PLUS’ Factor Matters: Plaintiffs need more than just the presence of a substance—they must show how long it was there or why it should have been discovered.
  • Business Protections: Routine inspections, clear maintenance records, and employee training significantly strengthen defense strategies.
  • Legal Precedent: Plaintiffs must provide tangible evidence that a hazardous condition existed long enough for its discovery—an employee’s presence alone does not establish liability.

Conclusion
The ruling in Duran v. Crab Shack Acquisition, FL, LLC, underscores the necessity for plaintiffs to establish actual or constructive knowledge of a hazard to survive summary judgment. Florida courts continue to require strong evidence rather than mere speculation. The PLUS factor is key—without evidence beyond the presence of a substance, plaintiffs cannot proceed. For business owners and defense practitioners, Duran is a critical case in evaluating and defending slip-and-fall claims under Florida law.

Matthew is a member of our Casualty Department and works in our Orlando, FL office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.