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Defense Digest

Failure to Join Both Property Owners Leads to Case Dismissal*

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023

December 1, 2023

by Brad E. Haas

*This case has since been reversed on appeal. Please see: How Simone V. Alam Reshaped the Standard for Indispensable Parties in Premises Liability Actions

Key Points:

  • Pennsylvania Superior Court recently held that a plaintiff’s failure to join an indispensable party property co-owner was grounds for full dismissal of his premises liability claim.
  • The case discussed the specifics of proprietary rights and ownership, as two brothers co-owned a property as tenants in common.
  • Plaintiff only named one of the co-owner brothers as a defendant, despite being made aware of the joint ownership.
  • The court held that, under Pennsylvania law, because the claim directly related to the ownership and alleged negligence related to that ownership, both of the owners/brothers were indispensable parties to the matter.
  • Due to the fact that the statute of limitations had passed, the court dismissed the action.

A recent decision by the Pennsylvania Superior Court underscores the importance of having a full understanding of the proprietary rights and ownership of a given property in premises liability suits. In Simone v. Alam, 303 A.3d 140 (Pa. Super. 2023), the Superior Court affirmed a trial court’s granting of a motion to dismiss based upon the plaintiff’s failure to join the co-owner of a property.

The lawsuit stemmed from a fall-down incident at a rental property which was owned and maintained by the defendant, Mohammed Zakiul Alam, and his brother, Mohammed Zafuil Alam. The incident occurred on January 16, 2018. The plaintiff filed her complaint on December 2, 2019, alleging the fall occurred due to an accumulation of ice beneath an outdoor staircase. The complaint named Mohammed Zakuil Alam as the only defendant, and not his brother/co-owner. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant owned, possessed, and controlled the property, such that he was responsible for the defective condition that led to her injuries.

The parties engaged in discovery, including responses to interrogatories and party depositions. Through the responses and the defendant’s deposition, it was made clear that the property was co-owned by the two Alam brothers as tenants in common. Despite this, the plaintiff never sought to amend her complaint.

Following the running of the applicable statute of limitations, on October 7, 2020, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure to Join an Indispensable Party. The plaintiff argued that the co-owner’s absence should not impact the case, emphasizing that he had no possession or control over the multi-tenant rental property. However, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion, holding that the unnamed co-owner/brother was an indispensable party. The plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The question before the Superior Court was: Did the trial court err in dismissing her complaint for failure to join an indispensable party when the absent co-owner merely held a tenant-in-common interest without any possession or control over the property?

The plaintiff contended that the co-owners/brothers were merely tenants in common and that the co-owners’ interest would remain unaffected by a judgment against the unnamed defendant Alam. Additionally, she attempted to argue that there was no specific Pennsylvania case law deeming tenants in common as indispensable parties without exceptions. To support her position, she referenced case law from Washington, which provided that a premises liability action could proceed against the possessor of the premises, irrespective of the absence of the true owner.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court disagreed. The court began its opinion by giving an overview of the relevant proprietary rights involved. In discussing tenancy in common, the court noted that when individuals own property as tenants in common, they own and possess, in equal shares, an undivided interest in the whole property. Regarding those rights as it related to indispensability, the court stated that the legal concept of indispensability is defined by the connection between a party’s rights and the claims of the litigants. It further stated that the rule is not based on administrative convenience, but on the unity and identity of co-owners’ interests. The court discussed the case of Northern Forests II, Inc. v. Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, 29 (Pa. Super. 2015), emphasizing that a party is indispensable when that party’s rights are so connected with the claims that no decree can be made without impairing those rights. The court further noted that Pa.R.C.P. 2227 explicitly states that persons with a joint interest must be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. 

The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that there was no on-point Pennsylvania case law, referencing the case of Minner v. Pittsburgh, 69 A.2d 384 (Pa. 1949). In Minner, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court mandated the joinder of all tenants in common in a negligence action arising from ownership of real estate. The Minner mandate was reinforced in the subsequent cases of Moorehead v. Lopatin, 445 A.2d 1308 (Pa. Super. 1982) and Enright v. Kirkendall, 819 A.2d 555 (Pa. Super. 2003). These decisions emphasized that when a party’s liability stems from ownership of real estate held by tenants in common, all co-owners are required to be joined.

The plaintiff’s case, akin to Minner, involved a liability claim arising directly from the unnamed defendant Alam’s ownership of the premises and allegations of negligence based upon that ownership. The Superior Court held that the fact that the Alam brothers were joint owners as tenants in common rendered the co-owner/brother an indispensable party. Based upon this, it affirmed the decision of the trial court, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim.

*Brad is a shareholder in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at 412.803.2448 or BEHaas@mdwcg.com.


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

 

*This case has since been reversed on appeal. Please see: How Simone V. Alam Reshaped the Standard for Indispensable Parties in Premises Liability Actions

 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.