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Defense Digest

After Further Review: Manufacturers & Sellers Incidental Contacts and their Impact on Venue

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by John P. Kelly

Key Points:

  • A manufacturer and seller of retail goods should seek a transfer of venue if their online sales in the plaintiff’s selected forum generate limited revenue for the company.
  • The mere act of online sales in a Commonwealth forum does not give rise to laying venue where these sales occur – the actions of the manufacturer or seller must also be deemed continuous, habitual, and systemic in that venue.
  • Where a manufacturer or seller has no physical presence in the forum – such as brick‑and‑mortar locations, in‑state sales representatives, or the licenses and authorizations required to conduct business in Pennsylvania – it may possess a strong basis for arguing that venue is improper.

In today’s world of online advertisement and sales, manufacturers and sellers are seemingly serving forums at an increasing level. This trend is here to stay, as consumers across the nation and Commonwealth are adapting to, and addicted to, the ease of online shopping. As discussed below, the capacity to sell goods online has resulted in an ever-evolving, liability concern: forum shopping and unfavorable venues.

While online shopping may be a boon for the consumer, it raises concerns for manufacturers and sellers of goods. Mainly, how does the nature of a manufacturer’s and seller’s online presence impact its prospective liability in forums across the Commonwealth? After all, the reality of serving consumers in Philadelphia County or Lackawanna County creates a range of exposure more dire than, say, Clinton County or Columbia County. The nature of online sales was recently addressed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Watson v. Baby Trend, Inc., 308 A.3d 860 (Pa. Super. 2024). While the purchase involved in Watson occurred in a retail store – Babies “R” Us – in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, the nature of the manufacturer’s online sales formed the basis of the plaintiff’s decision to select the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas as the forum to file suit.

The Watson case was brought as a result of the plaintiffs’ infant daughter dying of asphyxiation while sleeping in a car seat manufactured by the the defendant, Baby Trend. An amended complaint was filed in October of 2021, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, bringing products liability/strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty claims against Baby Trend. Later that month, Baby Trend filed preliminary objections, asserting that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas was not the proper venue for suit.

Baby Trend argued Philadelphia was an improper venue as it did not own real estate in Philadelphia County, the car seat was not purchased in Philadelphia County, the tragic incident itself did not occur in Philadelphia County, and, most importantly, Baby Trend did not conduct substantial, continuous, and systemic business activities in Philadelphia County.

In this regard, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas analyzed Baby Trend’s sales data under the well-established “quality-quantity” venue test. As noted in previous Superior Court precedent, “[a] business entity must perform acts in a county of sufficient quality and quantity before venue in that county will be established.” Zampana-Barry v. Donaghue, 921 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis added).

Baby Trend’s business model is largely to sell its goods through big-box retailers, such as Walmart and Target. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas determined that roughly 99% of its sales occurred through big-box retailers. While it did have an online presence, this only comprised 1% of its sales revenues. The plaintiffs attempted to use Baby Trend’s online sales in Philadelphia County as proof that their acts were of a sufficient “quality and quantity” to justify their selected venue. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ultimately rejected this argument, sustaining the defendant’s preliminary objections, and transferred suit to Bucks County in August of 2022. As a result of that decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court narrowed its review of the trial court’s decision by further analyzing Baby Trend’s sales data and its applicability to the “quality-quantity” test. The Superior Court described the 1% of online sales directed to Philadelphia County consumers as incidental and de minimis. Thus, the quality prong was not satisfied. This is a big takeaway as it provides manufacturers with a clear-cut data point as to what kind of impact their online sales will have in relation to the forum they may expect to be haled into.

Further, the Superior Court reasoned that the quality-quantity test was not satisfied because Baby Trend did not own real estate in Philadelphia; did not have a place of business there; did not employ sales representatives there; did not own licenses, authorizations, or registrations from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and was not registered as a foreign corporation for the purpose of doing business in Philadelphia. Thus, the court determined that Baby Trend’s contacts in Philadelphia did not support suit in the forum because the evidence suggested that its contacts with Philadelphia were incidental by nature and would not be seen as continuous, habitual, or regular.

The Honorable Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas relied on Watson in a case currently being handled by our Scranton, PA office. While our preliminary objections to venue were overruled in that matter, Judge Nealon based his decision on the fact that an individual defendant had been properly named – making venue proper under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(a)(1). However, in his decision, Judge Nealon cited Watson as authority on proper venue, ultimately reasoning that the parties would have been directed to engage in venue discovery – as they did in Watson – to properly determine if the defendant’s actions in Lackawanna County were continuous, general, or habitual. See Celli v. Endless Mountains Extended Care, LLC, 2024 WL 4182838 (C.P. Lacka. Sept. 12, 2024).

Thus, Watson serves as a significant Pennsylvania decision for determining proper forum/venue for cases brought against manufacturers and sellers. Plaintiffs often seek to establish venue in plaintiff-friendly forums, aided by tenuous connections to the forum. However, Watson provides the defense bar with a myriad of arguments to combat these efforts, particularly in the context of retail liability.

John works in our Scranton, PA office. He can be reached at (570) 496-4640 or JPKelly@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.