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Defense Digest

After Further Review: Manufacturers & Sellers Incidental Contacts and their Impact on Venue

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

Key Points:

  • A manufacturer and seller of retail goods should seek a transfer of venue if their online sales in the plaintiff’s selected forum generate limited revenue for the company.
  • The mere act of online sales in a Commonwealth forum does not give rise to laying venue where these sales occur – the actions of the manufacturer or seller must also be deemed continuous, habitual, and systemic in that venue.
  • Where a manufacturer or seller has no physical presence in the forum – such as brick‑and‑mortar locations, in‑state sales representatives, or the licenses and authorizations required to conduct business in Pennsylvania – it may possess a strong basis for arguing that venue is improper.

In today’s world of online advertisement and sales, manufacturers and sellers are seemingly serving forums at an increasing level. This trend is here to stay, as consumers across the nation and Commonwealth are adapting to, and addicted to, the ease of online shopping. As discussed below, the capacity to sell goods online has resulted in an ever-evolving, liability concern: forum shopping and unfavorable venues.

While online shopping may be a boon for the consumer, it raises concerns for manufacturers and sellers of goods. Mainly, how does the nature of a manufacturer’s and seller’s online presence impact its prospective liability in forums across the Commonwealth? After all, the reality of serving consumers in Philadelphia County or Lackawanna County creates a range of exposure more dire than, say, Clinton County or Columbia County. The nature of online sales was recently addressed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Watson v. Baby Trend, Inc., 308 A.3d 860 (Pa. Super. 2024). While the purchase involved in Watson occurred in a retail store – Babies “R” Us – in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, the nature of the manufacturer’s online sales formed the basis of the plaintiff’s decision to select the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas as the forum to file suit.

The Watson case was brought as a result of the plaintiffs’ infant daughter dying of asphyxiation while sleeping in a car seat manufactured by the the defendant, Baby Trend. An amended complaint was filed in October of 2021, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, bringing products liability/strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty claims against Baby Trend. Later that month, Baby Trend filed preliminary objections, asserting that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas was not the proper venue for suit.

Baby Trend argued Philadelphia was an improper venue as it did not own real estate in Philadelphia County, the car seat was not purchased in Philadelphia County, the tragic incident itself did not occur in Philadelphia County, and, most importantly, Baby Trend did not conduct substantial, continuous, and systemic business activities in Philadelphia County.

In this regard, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas analyzed Baby Trend’s sales data under the well-established “quality-quantity” venue test. As noted in previous Superior Court precedent, “[a] business entity must perform acts in a county of sufficient quality and quantity before venue in that county will be established.” Zampana-Barry v. Donaghue, 921 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis added).

Baby Trend’s business model is largely to sell its goods through big-box retailers, such as Walmart and Target. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas determined that roughly 99% of its sales occurred through big-box retailers. While it did have an online presence, this only comprised 1% of its sales revenues. The plaintiffs attempted to use Baby Trend’s online sales in Philadelphia County as proof that their acts were of a sufficient “quality and quantity” to justify their selected venue. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ultimately rejected this argument, sustaining the defendant’s preliminary objections, and transferred suit to Bucks County in August of 2022. As a result of that decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court narrowed its review of the trial court’s decision by further analyzing Baby Trend’s sales data and its applicability to the “quality-quantity” test. The Superior Court described the 1% of online sales directed to Philadelphia County consumers as incidental and de minimis. Thus, the quality prong was not satisfied. This is a big takeaway as it provides manufacturers with a clear-cut data point as to what kind of impact their online sales will have in relation to the forum they may expect to be haled into.

Further, the Superior Court reasoned that the quality-quantity test was not satisfied because Baby Trend did not own real estate in Philadelphia; did not have a place of business there; did not employ sales representatives there; did not own licenses, authorizations, or registrations from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and was not registered as a foreign corporation for the purpose of doing business in Philadelphia. Thus, the court determined that Baby Trend’s contacts in Philadelphia did not support suit in the forum because the evidence suggested that its contacts with Philadelphia were incidental by nature and would not be seen as continuous, habitual, or regular.

The Honorable Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas relied on Watson in a case currently being handled by our Scranton, PA office. While our preliminary objections to venue were overruled in that matter, Judge Nealon based his decision on the fact that an individual defendant had been properly named – making venue proper under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(a)(1). However, in his decision, Judge Nealon cited Watson as authority on proper venue, ultimately reasoning that the parties would have been directed to engage in venue discovery – as they did in Watson – to properly determine if the defendant’s actions in Lackawanna County were continuous, general, or habitual. See Celli v. Endless Mountains Extended Care, LLC, 2024 WL 4182838 (C.P. Lacka. Sept. 12, 2024).

Thus, Watson serves as a significant Pennsylvania decision for determining proper forum/venue for cases brought against manufacturers and sellers. Plaintiffs often seek to establish venue in plaintiff-friendly forums, aided by tenuous connections to the forum. However, Watson provides the defense bar with a myriad of arguments to combat these efforts, particularly in the context of retail liability.

John works in our Scranton, PA office. He can be reached at (570) 496-4640 or JPKelly@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.