.

Patricia M. McDonagh

Portrait of Patricia M. McDonagh

Patricia concentrates her practice primarly on insurance coverage litigation and counseling, bad faith litigation, environmental and toxic tort litigation, and appellate practice. She has represented a large number of insurance companies and insurance industry professionals in both first and third party insurance coverage and bad faith matters. Patricia provides coverage opinions and advice to insurance carriers concerning their coverage obligations under insurance policies they issued and which provided CGL, homeowners', automobile liability, UM/UIM, PIP, workers' compensation and/or employer's liability coverage. She has also represented oil delivery companies and other third parties in litigation where they have been asked to assume or share in the costs of state-mandated clean up and remediation of environmental contamination. In addition, Patricia has had a great deal of experience in the defense of general liability, professional malpractice and products liability matters.

In 1990, Patricia graduated magna cum laude from Fairfield University. She then went on to obtain her juris doctor from Villanova University School of Law in 1993, after which she was admitted to the bar in the states of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

After working for another defense litigation law firm in Morristown, New Jersey, Patricia joined Marshall Dennehey in 1997 and practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey, office, where she oversees the bad faith/coverage matters in that office.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1993)
    • Fairfield University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1990)
    • New Jersey, 1993
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Appellate Practice (2026-2027)
      • The Best Lawyers in America® list is published by Best Lawyers®. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Essex County Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
  • Assisted in securing a unanimous 6-0 defense verdict in a New Jersey premises liability case after the jury found no negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that a six-foot drill bit fell from a retail display, causing a concussion, post-concussion syndrome and permanent cognitive impairments. The defense demonstrated that the item was displaced only after an unidentified customer struck the shelving with a shopping cart and that there was no evidence store employees knew or should have known of the condition. Through surveillance video, fact witness testimony and expert evidence, the defense also established that the impact was inconsistent with the forces necessary to cause a concussion and highlighted alternative explanations for the plaintiff's claimed injuries. Following a six-day trial, the jury returned a complete defense verdict, finding the defendant was not negligent.

    Secured a unanimous defense verdict in a premises liability matter involving a national home improvement retailer. The plaintiff alleged that she developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) following a fall in the retailer's parking lot in October 2022. Plaintiff claimed that the incident necessitated significant ongoing medical treatment, including the implantation of a permanent spinal cord stimulator. The plaintiff sought substantial damages, including claims for extensive future medical care. The defense team successfully challenged the credibility of the plaintiff's allegations and expert testimony through rigorous cross-examination and the presentation of defense experts in forensic engineering, human factors, and pain management. The defense also demonstrated that the plaintiff's alleged condition was attributable to pre-existing medical issues rather than the incident at issue. Following a six-day trial, the jury deliberated for just 42 minutes before returning a unanimous verdict finding no negligence on the part of the defendant.

    Secured a no-cause verdict on behalf of a national home improvement retailer in a personal injury action. The plaintiff alleged that on May 20, 2019, she was injured at one of the retailer’s stores when an associate moved a lumber cart, causing a PVC pipe to fall and strike her head and right shoulder. She claimed permanent traumatic brain injury, concussion, and spinal injuries, supported by her orthopedic and neurologic experts. Our defense orthopedic and neurologic experts testified that the plaintiff’s reported symptoms were more consistent with malingering or a somatoform disorder. After a one-week trial and approximately 45 minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found the defendant was not negligent. The last demand was $1.2 million, and the final offer was $100,000.

    Obtained summary judgment in favor of an automobile liability insurance carrier, wherein court upheld carrier's disclaimer of defense and indemnity coverage to its insured in response to personal injury lawsuit brought against insured arising from motor vehicle accident on the basis that insured had made material misrepresentations on his insurance policy application as to where he resided and principally garaged the insured vehicle.

    Successfully represented an insurance carrier in a declaratory judgment action, wherein carrier disclaimed coverage to insured under an automobile liability insurance policy with regard to an underlying personal injury lawsuit brought against insured arising from a motor vehicle accident because insured failed to provide the carrier with notice of either the accident or the resultant lawsuit and which, in turn, substantially prejudiced the insurer.

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of defendant employers and having all claims against them dismissed in civil lawsuits brought against them by their own employees for injuries the employees sustained in the workplace on the basis that there was no evidence to support a finding that the "intentional wrong" exception to the workers' compensation bar applied. In one of these cases, in particular, after successfully in having the plaintiff employee's claim against his employer dismissed, the employee continued to litigate his claim against the remaining defendant, a forklift manufacturer, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in excess of $1 million, which was subsequently affirmed on appeal.

    Obtained summary judgment in favor of a commercial general liability carrier in a declaratory judgment action, successfully limiting the CGL carrier's potential liability exposure in a case involving serious injuries to two plaintiffs as a result of a robbery. Received a favorable ruling from the court that the $100,000 aggregate policy limit, set forth in the CGL policy's Assault & Battery Endorsement, was the applicable liability coverage limit potentially available to the injured plaintiffs under the CGL policy and not the $1 million per occurrence coverage limit, set forth in the policy's Declarations, as was argued by the plaintiffs.

    Successfully defended a CGL insurance carrier in a claim brought against it by the landlord/owner of a warehouse for defense and indemnity coverage as an Additional Insured under a CGL insurance policy issued by the carrier to one of the tenants at the warehouse in a high-exposure property damage loss case arising from a fire on the basis that the landlord did not qualify as an additional insured on the policy pursuant to the Additional Insured Endorsement and the landlord's claim should be a claim against its insurance broker for professional negligence in not procuring the proper insurance coverage requested by the landlord.

    Obtained summary judgment in favor of a subcontractor on an indemnity cross-claim, where the contract at issue, between the subcontractor and the general contractor, did not include the required express language that the general contractor would be indemnified for own negligence.

    • "New Jersey Supreme Court Holds that Evidence of an Insured’s Uncompensated Medical Expenses Falling Between the Insured’s Selected PIP Coverage and the Statutory Maximum PIP Coverage of $250,000 Is Inadmissible," Legal Updates for Coverage and Bad Faith, March 28, 2019
    • "New Jersey Environmental Insurance Law: The Battle Over Coverage Between Insurers and Policyholders, Arising from "Owned Property Exclusion" Clauses in CGL Policies," Defense Digest, Fall 2004
    • "Are E-Mails Privileged?," For The Defense, November 2000

Results

Summary Judgment for Insurer in Complex Coverage Case

We successfully persuaded the court to grant summary judgement on behalf of a major insurer on a complex coverage issue. This coverage case concerned two Virginia personal automobile policies in regard to an automobile accident in New Jersey. The son of a divorced couple sought coverage for an accident he was involved in on a major thoroughfare in New Jersey. At the time of the accident, the son was operating a motor vehicle owned by another Virginia resident, and he had the reasonable expectation that he had permission to operate the vehicle. The accident was very serious, and he sought coverage under both of his parents’ policies. As to the mother’s policy, we convinced the court that the son was not an insured under her policy because he was not so designated on the policy’s declaration page, which was a specific condition of the policy pursuant to Virginia law. As to the father’s policy, once again, we convinced the court that the son was not an insured under this policy given the fact that the mother had sole and exclusive custody under the divorce agreement; thus, the son was not a resident relative of the father’s household. Therefore, neither policy provided coverage for the son, and the insurer was totally dismissed from the case.

Court Agrees Mode of Operations Does Not Apply in Retail Liability Case

We were successful on a motion for summary judgment, thereby barring the application of the mode of operations in a slip and fall case where an alleged partially eaten sandwich was found in the aisle of the retailer. ​The facts indicated that the sandwich came from a fast-food sandwich shop within the premises and was dropped by an unidentified customer, who took the item to go and dropped it in the aisle before the plaintiff fell. The court ruled that the mode of operations did not apply because the aisle, which contained greeting cards and the like, and did not create an extension of the cafeteria within the retailer’s premises. Further, the court ruled there was no nexus to any self-serve component of the fast food restaurant’s business to the area in the retailer’s store proper where the accident occurred.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.