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Defense Digest

Court Affirms Strong Liability Protections for Rideshare Companies Under Florida Law

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Sophia E. D. Philor

Key Points:

  • Florida law treats rideshare drivers as independent contractors when statutory conditions are met.
  • The law in effect on the date of the accident controls liability analysis. 
  • Isolated complaints and traffic citations are generally insufficient to prove negligent hiring. 

A Florida appellate court recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lyft, highlighting the liability protections available to rideshare companies under Florida’s Transportation Network Company statute. In Abner v. Lyft Florida, Inc., 422 So.3d 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, held that Lyft could not be held liable for injuries caused by one of its drivers, rejecting claims for both vicarious liability and negligent hiring and retention.

The case arose from an accident on July 5, 2017, where a Lyft driver collided with a motorcyclist, causing serious injuries. At the time, the driver was providing a prearranged ride through Lyft’s digital platform. The injured motorcyclist’s guardian sued both the driver and Lyft. While claims against the driver were settled, the claims against Lyft continued.

The plaintiff argued Lyft was responsible in two ways: the driver was acting as Lyft’s employee or agent at the time of the accident, and that it was negligent in hiring and retaining the driver. Lyft moved for summary judgment, relying on Florida’s Transportation Network Company statute, section 627.748, Florida Statutes (2017), which had taken effect just days before the crash.

The plaintiff argued the statute should not apply because the driver had been approved to drive for Lyft before it went into effect. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Florida law applies the statute in effect when the cause of action accrues. In negligence cases, that is the date of the accident. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sheffield, 266 So. 3d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Since the accident occurred after the statute became effective, the statute governed the claims against Lyft.

Under section 627.748(9), a rideshare driver is considered an independent contractor, not an employee, if certain conditions are met. These conditions include allowing drivers to set their own hours, permitting work on competing rideshare platforms, not restricting other business or employment, and confirming independent contractor status in writing. Lyft presented evidence that these conditions were satisfied, including the driver agreement and testimony from its corporate representative.

The plaintiff argued that the driver did not qualify as an independent contractor because the agreement allegedly limited other work. The court disagreed, finding that the agreement only limited the driver’s activities while actively providing rides through the Lyft platform. Outside of those times, the driver remained free to pursue other employment or business activities. The agreement explicitly confirmed the driver’s discretion to work or not work. The court noted this is consistent with prior Florida cases recognizing rideshare drivers as independent contractors. McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225-226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

Since the driver qualified as an independent contractor, Lyft could not be held vicariously liable for the driver’s alleged negligence. Florida law generally holds that companies are not responsible for the negligent acts of independent contractors when they do not control how the work is performed. Stander v. Dispoz-O-Prods., Inc., 973 So. 2d 603, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

The plaintiff also claimed Lyft was directly liable for negligent hiring and retention, citing a speeding citation, a reckless driving citation, and two negative passenger complaints. The court found this evidence insufficient. Under the statute, disqualification is triggered by certain criminal convictions, and not merely by citations. The driver’s reckless driving incident was only a citation, and a single moving violation did not meet the statutory threshold for disqualification. The passenger complaints were similarly inadequate: one was a vague two-star review with no explanation, and the other involved a single passenger reporting unsafe driving. Given the hundreds of rides the driver had safely completed, the court considered this evidence isolated and minimal.

The limited evidence led the court declining to broadly define negligent hiring claims against transportation network companies. Instead, it resolved the case narrowly, emphasizing judicial restraint. The court explained that if evidence is insufficient to survive a directed verdict at trial, it cannot survive summary judgment. CG Tides LLC v. SHEDDF3 VNB, LLC, 388 So. 3d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021).

For insurance professionals, Abner v. Lyft Florida, Inc. reinforces the protections Florida law provides to transportation network companies. It highlights the importance of applying the law in effect on the date of loss, confirming independent contractor status, and assessing the sufficiency of evidence for negligent hiring claims. It also demonstrates how Florida’s summary judgment standard can resolve weak claims early, reducing exposure and defense costs. The appellate court ultimately affirmed summary judgment in Lyft’s favor.

Sophia works in our Fort Lauderdale, FL office. She can be reached at (954) 233-3026 or SEPhilor@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.