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Michael L. Turner

Co-Chair, Asbestos Litigation Practice

MLTurner@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Michael L. Turner

A senior attorney with 40 years of litigation experience, Mike has tried in excess of 200 jury trials to verdict in the state and federal courts of Pennsylvania, as well as other jurisdictions throughout the United States.

Mike is a former member of the firm's Board of Directors, and as a highly experienced litigator and trial attorney, he represents and defends clients in mass torts cases and complex general liability matters.

Mike began his law career in the Philadelphia District Attorney's office where he served as an assistant district attorney for five years. He then joined the civil litigation firm of Krusen, Evans and Byrne in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. After trying numerous asbestos-related cases, he co­founded the firm of Kelley, Jasons, McGuire & Spinelli in Philadelphia where he focused on the preparation and trial of complex personal injury, products liability, and criminal cases.

    • University of Virginia School of Law (J.D., 1981)
    • Virginia State University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1978)
    • Pennsylvania, 1982
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1982
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit, 1993
    • American College of Trial Lawyers, Fellow, 2019
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Mass Tort Litigation/Class Actions – Defendants (2023-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Criminal Defense: White-Collar (2024-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Commercial Litigation (2026-2027)
    • International Academy of Trial Lawyers, 2023
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2019-2026)
    • American Bar Association
    • American College of Trial Lawyers
    • National Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Moderator, In-House Perspective 2021: Managing Relationships & New Technology From the Inside, Perrin Conference, February, 2021
    • Panelist, Insights on Diversity in the Legal Community, Perrin Conference, November 2016
    • Panelist, Legal Issues Arising in Trial Practice, Lawyers Club Philadelphia, May, 2016
    • How to Retain and Prepare Expert Witnesses, Philadelaphia Bar Institute CLE, March 2015
    • Moderator, Alternatives to Mock Trial: What You Can Learn With Less Cost, Breakout Session, DRI Asbestos Medicine Seminar, November, 2013
    • Panelist, Today's Jury Pool - The Impact of Generation "Y" and the Social Media  Revolution, American Bar Association Litigation Section's Corporate Counsel CLE Seminar, February, 2013
    • How To Conduct Effective Opening And Closing Statements, American Bar Association Section of Litigation, National Conference for the Minority Lawyer, 1999 
    • Seminar, Direct and Cross Examination, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 1989 
    • Director, Univest Bank 
    • Past President, Germantown Branch Board of Settlement Music School 
    • Past President, Center City Crime Victim Services Board 
    • Defended a local corporation in a case where plaintiff, a carpenter, was electrocuted while setting up scaffolding around defendant's electrical generators. Plaintiff, who was 33 at the time of his injury, suffered closed head injuries and was unable to return to work. Plaintiff's medical bills totaled $750,000. His past and future lost wages were in the millions, and his settlement demand was in excess of $3.5 million. After a six-week jury trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, the jury awarded plaintiff $750,000 in damages. 
    • Defended a local insurance agency in a case where plaintiff, an automobile repair shop owner, alleged our client negligently failed to provide him with the proper mix of insurance coverages, including underinsurance coverage. Plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident caused by an individual who had minimal insurance coverage. Plaintiff's medical bills exceeded six figures and his alleged economic losses exceeded seven figures. After a six day trial in the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia, the jury found that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
    • Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict was granted after a three-week jury trial in federal court in Philadelphia. Represented a corporation that at one time manufactured and sold bathtub inserts to hotels throughout the United States. Plaintiff alleged he pulled the grab bar on a bathroom insert which broke, causing him to fall out of the tub, injuring his back, hips, shoulders, and legs and permanently disabling him. Plaintiff's defective design and manufacture claim was dismissed as to the defendant as a result of successor liability arguments. 
    • Defended a national fast food retailer in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. Plaintiff alleged negligent hiring, negligent retention, and failure to properly supervise. The co-defendant employee falsified his employment application and failed to disclose that he had been convicted of armed robbery. He thereafter allegedly told one of his supervisors at the fast food establishment that he had a criminal record. Months later, co­defendant employee brought a gun to work and showed it to several of his co-workers during their shift. At the end of his shift, co-defendant employee shot and wounded two of his co-workers and killed two other co-workers in a field about 300 yards from defendant's retail establishment. This case settled for a confidential amount on the day of jury selection. 
    • Tried to verdict a one-week reverse bifurcated jury trial in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, where seven mesothelioma cases were consolidated for trial. Two of the plaintiffs were living and five were deceased. Defendants did not contest the diagnoses of mesothelioma or that exposure to asbestos caused the mesotheliomas. Defendants also did not present any medical evidence in the damage phase of the trial. In five of these cases, the jury returned verdicts in the low five figures. In the other two cases, the jury returned verdicts in the low six figures. Defendant was able to settle all of these cases based on the low Phase I verdicts and avoid a Phase II liability trial. 
    • Tried a group of 26 asbestos cases to verdict before a jury in an eight-week trial in state court, Baltimore, Maryland. The plaintiffs' diseases included lung cancer, asbestosis, mesothelioma, colon cancer, and kidney cancer. In all of these cases, plaintiffs presented medical evidence that their injuries were caused by occupational exposure to asbestos. Defendant presented evidence that the plaintiffs' diseases were not caused by asbestos but other causes, including smoking. Defendants received outright defense verdicts in 14 of these cases and minimal verdicts in nearly all of the remaining cases. 
    • Represented a contractor that allegedly installed asbestos-containing pipe covering. Plaintiff alleged his mesothelioma was caused by exposure to the asbestos-containing products of various defendants. This was an all issues trial where plaintiff presented state-of-the-art and failure to warn evidence, as well as evidence on causation. On the eve of trial, all co-defendants settled, leaving contractor alone in the courtroom to defend this matter. Although the jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff, after setoffs and credits, our client paid zero dollars. 
    • Tried a consolidated group of three asbestos lung cancers cases to verdict before a jury in state court in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. These cases were reverse bifurcated with damages being tried first. Plaintiffs alleged their lung cancers were caused solely by occupational exposure to asbestos. Defendants alleged Plaintiffs' lung cancers were caused solely by their smoking histories. Our client received outright defense verdicts in two of the three cases and a verdict of $190,000 in the third case. During the liability phase of this third case, Plaintiff alleged his injuries were caused solely by exposure to our client's asbestos product. The jury disagreed and found that our client was liable for only $20,000 of this verdict and that other Defendants were liable for varying amounts. 

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Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter