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Defense Digest

COVID-19 and Florida’s Health Care Provider Liability Protection

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021

June 1, 2021

by Megan J. Nelson

Key Points:

  • Florida Statute 768.38 and Florida Statute 768.381 offer liability protection for health care providers against claims related to COVID-19.
  • In order for the immunity to apply to a health care provider, the complaint must state the damages, injuries or death were related to COVID-19.
  • An affirmative defense that may apply to COVID-19-related claims against a health care provider is substantial compliance with government-issued health standards specifically related to COVID-19 when the injury occurred.

The coronavirus was first detected in Florida on March 1, 2020, and from its start, health care providers and facilities have been overrun with sick patients and limited supplies. At the beginning of the pandemic, multiple health care organizations provided guidance on how to properly manage patients during the crisis. Hospitals, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and doctor’s offices were running low on supplies, and many patients were dying from COVID-19. More than a year has passed since the pandemic began, and Florida is being overrun with lawsuits against health care providers and facilities for claims associated to damages, injuries and deaths related to COVID-19. On March 29, 2021, Florida Governor, Ron DeSantis, signed CS/SB into law, creating Florida Statute 768.38 and Florida Statute 768.381, which offer liability protection for health care providers against claims related to COVID-19.

Florida Statute 768.381 provides liability protection for health care providers, including hospitals, nursing homes and assisted living facilities, against claims brought by a patient (or legal representative) related to damages, injuries or death due to COVID-19.

The liability protection for COVID-19-related claims against a health care provider mainly relates to claims arising from the diagnosis or treatment of a person for COVID-19, the provision of a novel or experimental COVID-19 treatment, the transmission of COVID-19, and the delay or cancellation of a surgery or medical procedure.

The new law will apply retroactively. A plaintiff will have one year from the time the injury related to COVID-19 occurred to bring a lawsuit. However, if a lawsuit for a cause of action related to COVID-19 were filed before March 29, 2021, the liability protection would not apply.

A plaintiff will still be required to participate in Chapter 766 pre-suit investigation. The liability protection will not be addressed until a complaint has been filed. For the liability protection to apply to a health care provider, the complaint must be pled with particularity. Meaning, the complaint must state that the damage, injury or death was related to COVID-19 and was caused by the health care provider’s acts or omissions.

There has been a recent surge in COVID-19 lawsuits, and plaintiffs have become creative in the language contained in their complaints. The language may claim an injury or death caused by a health care provider’s negligence related to COVID-19 without using the term COVID-19. For example, instead of the complaint stating the plaintiff died due to contracting COVID-19, the complaint will state the plaintiff died due to contracting a respiratory illness that eventually led to multi-organ failure.

Currently throughout the United States, cases related to COVID-19 injuries and death have been moved to federal court. This is due to the federal government allowing the COVID-19 pandemic to fall under the PREP Act. The PREP Act grants liability immunity to entities and individuals involved in developing, manufacturing, testing, distribution, administration and use of medical countermeasures. As the COVID-19 pandemic continued, seven amendments have been made to the PREP Act related to the medical countermeasures and who qualifies for immunity as a covered person. Health care providers and facilities have been identified as a covered person. With each amendment, the definition and qualification of a covered person have become more defined.

Once these cases are moved from state court to federal court, the judges must determine if the complaint was pled with particularity to include a cause of action related to COVID-19. The majority of federal courts have determined that the complaints do not include the specific language regarding COVID-19-related claims. Since the complaints do not specifically state a claim related to COVID-19, the health care provider does not qualify for immunity under the PREP Act. Therefore, the cases are sent back to the corresponding state court to be tried under that state’s medical negligence standard.

Florida has joined ranks with other states to combat these lawsuits and provide liability immunity to health care providers. Although Florida has passed a new law that gives liability immunity to health care providers and facilities, it is not an instant immunity. A complaint must still be filed, and the plaintiff must prove that the health care provider was negligent. However, if the health care provider can prove that they followed the guidance and standards from health care organizations, federal agencies or Florida agencies at the time of the incident, then immunity will apply.

The burden of proof that the plaintiff must prove is by the greater weight of the evidence. The plaintiff must prove more than just medical negligence. They must prove that the health care provider was grossly negligent or engaged in intentional misconduct. This means that the health care provider’s conduct must have been deliberate or committed with reckless disregard for the patient’s safety.

Even with this new law, in order for the immunity to apply to a health care provider, the complaint must state the damages, injuries or death was related to COVID-19. If the complaint states the medical negligence was related to anything other than COVID-19, the liability protection may not apply.

However, if the damage, injury or death is related to COVID-19 (e.g., medical diagnosis of COVID-19, positive COVID-19 respiratory swab, death certificate states cause of death was COVID-19), the health care provider should state the liability protection in the affirmative defenses. The new law provides additional affirmative defenses a health care provider should use.

The affirmative defenses that may apply to COVID-19-related claims against a health care provider include substantial compliance with government-issued health standards specifically related to COVID-19 when the injury occurred. This includes the early standards related to preserving or prioritizing supplies, materials or equipment due to widespread shortages of those necessary items.

Since the pandemic began, federal and state health care agencies have performed unannounced facility investigations to verify proper compliance with recommended health standards. Those certificates of compliance will be essential in proving that the facilities were making a good faith effort and substantially complied with the appropriate health standards at that time.

It will be essential to talk with your attorney regarding your facility’s compliance with the health care standards as soon as the pre-suit investigation begins. Although the court will not have a pre-suit hearing on health care liability protection related to COVID-19, it will help determine the strategy for the defense of your case.

*Megan is an associate in our Orlando, Florida office. She can be reached at 407.420.4381 or mjnelson@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. 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Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

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