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Chair, EMR and Audit Trail Practice

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Portrait of Matthew P. Keris

Results

  • Defense Verdict Secured in a Contentious Long-Term Care Case

    We received a defense verdict in a contentious long-term care case that included a unique spoliation issue, allegations of cover-up regarding the cause of death and a “no show” plaintiff. A longtime nursing home resident, who was suffering from “end-stage dementia,” died nine days after suffering head trauma following a fall. The plaintiff was the resident’s son who was not his mother’s guardian. The plaintiff contacted a lawyer who delivered the body across Pennsylvania to a forensic pathologist for a private autopsy. No notice was provided to the nursing home administration of the impending autopsy, despite the fact that the lawyer had sued the long-term facility several times in the past. The corpse was cremated shortly after the autopsy without an opportunity for the defense to examine the body. The defense did not learn about the private autopsy until years later, when the report was provided in discovery. A motion for sanctions for spoliation was filed by the defense, which was followed by depositions of the funeral home staff and a hearing involving the forensic pathologist and the attending physician. Although the spoliation motion was denied, the court held that the defense could question the forensic pathologist on the cremation, destroyed specimens and failure to produce the autopsy photographs at trial. On the eve of trial, the judge proctored an agreement between the parties to arbitrate the case “on expert reports only.” At arbitration, plaintiff’s counsel continued to pursue a conspiracy theory about “the true cause of death” along with standard negligence criticisms about fall prevention. The plaintiff was cross-examined on a prior crimen falsi conviction and an Orphans’ Court petition initiated by the local Area Agency on Aging, wherein the deceased resident complained that she was afraid of her son, which was relevant to his “loss of society and companionship” claim. Not surprisingly, the plaintiff denied every allegation of the Orphans’ Court petition, which detracted his appearance and credibility. 

  • Partial Summary Judgment on Behalf of a Nursing Home and its Corporate Defendants

    In the complaint and throughout discovery, the plaintiff raised claims of overarching neglect in addition to a fall that occurred during physical therapy. The plaintiff alleged negligence, corporate negligence, and punitive damages premised upon allegations of understaffing, Department of Health violations and putting profits over patient care. The plaintiff sought to hold not only the nursing home, but also its management company and a holdings company, liable for such claims. The defense sought partial summary judgment and asked the court to limit the plaintiff’s claims to the fall only and argued that neither the record evidence nor the plaintiff’s expert reports supported the all-encompassing claims of neglect. The court agreed and narrowed the claims, thereby significantly hampering the plaintiff’s case. The court limited the claims to proceed at trial to the fall only. The court also dismissed punitive damages and dismissed the holdings company defendant outright.

  • Unanimous Defense Jury Verdict in One of the First Pennsylvania Civil Jury Trials Held During COVID-19 Pandemic

    The verdict came within 30 minutes of deliberation in a five-day Bradford County PA fire-loss subrogation trial. Social distancing protocols were in place: all participants had their temperatures taken before entering the courthouse; jury selection took place at a local school auditorium; everyone in the courtroom was required to wear masks or face shields; and the jurors were spread out to the gallery section of the courtroom instead of the jury box. Witnesses could appear via Zoom. Two witnesses were flawlessly broadcasted to the courtroom with help from the firm’s Allentown and Mount Laurel offices.

  • Defense verdict in dental malpractice action.

    We successfully obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a dentist in a dental malpractice action in Luzerne County. ​The plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence and lack of informed consent. Regarding negligence, the plaintiff alleged the dentist used excessive force in extracting a lower third molar, thereby causing a fracture of the mandible and alleged permanent paresthesia. In response, the defense admitted that the mandible was fractured during the extraction, but offered expert testimony that the fracture was an extremely rare complication and was not caused by negligence. The defense argued there was no evidence of the use of excessive force, such as TMJ disorders or dislocation, lacerations or broken adjacent teeth. As for informed consent, the plaintiff argued the dentist did not obtain informed consent because he did not discuss the risk of fracture. The dentist testified that he discussed the possibility of permanent numbness as a risk, but he admitted that fracture was a risk of the extraction and that he did not discuss this risk because the chances of it occurring were astronomically low. The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s experts both agreed that the chances of a fracture occurring were less than 0.0009%. The jury returned a defense verdict on all causes of action in less than one hour.

  • Dismissal of Claims Against Drug Rehab Center

    We were successful in obtaining the dismissal of the plaintiff’s corporate negligence claims against an adult inpatient drug rehabilitation center. The plaintiff filed a complaint under wrongful death and survival acts, alleging that the decedent died of unspecified cardiac dysrhythmia while she was a voluntary inpatient resident at the facility. The complaint included claims of negligence/vicarious liability and corporate negligence. We filed preliminary objections seeking to dismiss the corporate negligence claim against the facility. We argued that the plaintiff’s cause of action for corporate negligence against it must be dismissed with prejudice because the doctrine of corporate negligence, as a matter of law, does not extend to drug and alcohol treatment facilities but, instead, applies only to hospitals, HMOs, nursing homes and professional medical corporations. In response, the plaintiff argued that the preliminary objections should be overruled because she alleged in the complaint that the defendant owed the same duties to the decedent that are owed to patients by hospitals, as set forth in Thompson v. Nason, the seminal corporate negligence case. The court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s arguments, sustained our preliminary objections, and dismissed the plaintiff’s corporate negligence claim against the defendant, with prejudice.

  • Defense Verdict in Nursing Negligence Case.

    The plaintiff alleged to have suffered a fall in a hospital bathroom three days post-operatively that reinjured his surgically repaired knees. The nurses denied the patient fell to the ground and testified, consistent with their charting, that the patient lost his balance in the bathroom and sat on a commode. There was a significant economic damage claim in that the plaintiff was a young restaurant owner who suffered two distinct orthopedic injuries that required multiple surgeries and additional future care. The jury returned a defense verdict 50 minutes after deliberations began, finding that the nurses were not negligent.

  • Jury Sides with Defense in High Stakes Medical Malpractice Case

    Obtained a defense verdict in a medical malpractice case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. ​The plaintiff alleged to be permanently disabled and in a wheelchair, requiring home health care for the rest of her life, as a result of an Emergency Room physician’s failure to timely diagnose and treat a viral infection involving the 7th and 8th cranial nerves (Ramsay Hunt Syndrome). We represented the ER physician, his employer (who staffed the ER) and the hospital. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a $4 million life care plan to the jury for consideration, and the final settlement demand was $2 million. The jury agreed with the defense’s position that the doctor did not deviate from the standard of care. Because of this, no liability could be found against our client, nor any of the other defendants.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.