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Chair, EMR and Audit Trail Practice

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Portrait of Matthew P. Keris

Results

  • Defense Verdict Secured in a Contentious Long-Term Care Case

    We received a defense verdict in a contentious long-term care case that included a unique spoliation issue, allegations of cover-up regarding the cause of death and a “no show” plaintiff. A longtime nursing home resident, who was suffering from “end-stage dementia,” died nine days after suffering head trauma following a fall. The plaintiff was the resident’s son who was not his mother’s guardian. The plaintiff contacted a lawyer who delivered the body across Pennsylvania to a forensic pathologist for a private autopsy. No notice was provided to the nursing home administration of the impending autopsy, despite the fact that the lawyer had sued the long-term facility several times in the past. The corpse was cremated shortly after the autopsy without an opportunity for the defense to examine the body. The defense did not learn about the private autopsy until years later, when the report was provided in discovery. A motion for sanctions for spoliation was filed by the defense, which was followed by depositions of the funeral home staff and a hearing involving the forensic pathologist and the attending physician. Although the spoliation motion was denied, the court held that the defense could question the forensic pathologist on the cremation, destroyed specimens and failure to produce the autopsy photographs at trial. On the eve of trial, the judge proctored an agreement between the parties to arbitrate the case “on expert reports only.” At arbitration, plaintiff’s counsel continued to pursue a conspiracy theory about “the true cause of death” along with standard negligence criticisms about fall prevention. The plaintiff was cross-examined on a prior crimen falsi conviction and an Orphans’ Court petition initiated by the local Area Agency on Aging, wherein the deceased resident complained that she was afraid of her son, which was relevant to his “loss of society and companionship” claim. Not surprisingly, the plaintiff denied every allegation of the Orphans’ Court petition, which detracted his appearance and credibility. 

  • Partial Summary Judgment on Behalf of a Nursing Home and its Corporate Defendants

    In the complaint and throughout discovery, the plaintiff raised claims of overarching neglect in addition to a fall that occurred during physical therapy. The plaintiff alleged negligence, corporate negligence, and punitive damages premised upon allegations of understaffing, Department of Health violations and putting profits over patient care. The plaintiff sought to hold not only the nursing home, but also its management company and a holdings company, liable for such claims. The defense sought partial summary judgment and asked the court to limit the plaintiff’s claims to the fall only and argued that neither the record evidence nor the plaintiff’s expert reports supported the all-encompassing claims of neglect. The court agreed and narrowed the claims, thereby significantly hampering the plaintiff’s case. The court limited the claims to proceed at trial to the fall only. The court also dismissed punitive damages and dismissed the holdings company defendant outright.

  • Unanimous Defense Jury Verdict in One of the First Pennsylvania Civil Jury Trials Held During COVID-19 Pandemic

    The verdict came within 30 minutes of deliberation in a five-day Bradford County PA fire-loss subrogation trial. Social distancing protocols were in place: all participants had their temperatures taken before entering the courthouse; jury selection took place at a local school auditorium; everyone in the courtroom was required to wear masks or face shields; and the jurors were spread out to the gallery section of the courtroom instead of the jury box. Witnesses could appear via Zoom. Two witnesses were flawlessly broadcasted to the courtroom with help from the firm’s Allentown and Mount Laurel offices.

  • Defense verdict in dental malpractice action.

    We successfully obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a dentist in a dental malpractice action in Luzerne County. ​The plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligence and lack of informed consent. Regarding negligence, the plaintiff alleged the dentist used excessive force in extracting a lower third molar, thereby causing a fracture of the mandible and alleged permanent paresthesia. In response, the defense admitted that the mandible was fractured during the extraction, but offered expert testimony that the fracture was an extremely rare complication and was not caused by negligence. The defense argued there was no evidence of the use of excessive force, such as TMJ disorders or dislocation, lacerations or broken adjacent teeth. As for informed consent, the plaintiff argued the dentist did not obtain informed consent because he did not discuss the risk of fracture. The dentist testified that he discussed the possibility of permanent numbness as a risk, but he admitted that fracture was a risk of the extraction and that he did not discuss this risk because the chances of it occurring were astronomically low. The plaintiff’s and the defendant’s experts both agreed that the chances of a fracture occurring were less than 0.0009%. The jury returned a defense verdict on all causes of action in less than one hour.

  • Dismissal of Claims Against Drug Rehab Center

    We were successful in obtaining the dismissal of the plaintiff’s corporate negligence claims against an adult inpatient drug rehabilitation center. The plaintiff filed a complaint under wrongful death and survival acts, alleging that the decedent died of unspecified cardiac dysrhythmia while she was a voluntary inpatient resident at the facility. The complaint included claims of negligence/vicarious liability and corporate negligence. We filed preliminary objections seeking to dismiss the corporate negligence claim against the facility. We argued that the plaintiff’s cause of action for corporate negligence against it must be dismissed with prejudice because the doctrine of corporate negligence, as a matter of law, does not extend to drug and alcohol treatment facilities but, instead, applies only to hospitals, HMOs, nursing homes and professional medical corporations. In response, the plaintiff argued that the preliminary objections should be overruled because she alleged in the complaint that the defendant owed the same duties to the decedent that are owed to patients by hospitals, as set forth in Thompson v. Nason, the seminal corporate negligence case. The court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s arguments, sustained our preliminary objections, and dismissed the plaintiff’s corporate negligence claim against the defendant, with prejudice.

  • Defense Verdict in Nursing Negligence Case.

    The plaintiff alleged to have suffered a fall in a hospital bathroom three days post-operatively that reinjured his surgically repaired knees. The nurses denied the patient fell to the ground and testified, consistent with their charting, that the patient lost his balance in the bathroom and sat on a commode. There was a significant economic damage claim in that the plaintiff was a young restaurant owner who suffered two distinct orthopedic injuries that required multiple surgeries and additional future care. The jury returned a defense verdict 50 minutes after deliberations began, finding that the nurses were not negligent.

  • Jury Sides with Defense in High Stakes Medical Malpractice Case

    Obtained a defense verdict in a medical malpractice case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. ​The plaintiff alleged to be permanently disabled and in a wheelchair, requiring home health care for the rest of her life, as a result of an Emergency Room physician’s failure to timely diagnose and treat a viral infection involving the 7th and 8th cranial nerves (Ramsay Hunt Syndrome). We represented the ER physician, his employer (who staffed the ER) and the hospital. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a $4 million life care plan to the jury for consideration, and the final settlement demand was $2 million. The jury agreed with the defense’s position that the doctor did not deviate from the standard of care. Because of this, no liability could be found against our client, nor any of the other defendants.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.