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M. Scott Gemberling

Portrait of M. Scott Gemberling

For over 40 years, Scott has focused a significant portion of his practice on the defense of liquor liability, professional liability (legal, accounting, employment, D&O, non-profit, HOA) and significant exposure excess insurance claims. Scott has tried over 100 jury cases to verdict, many involving dram shop, medical and dental malpractice and product liability matters.

In addition to his law practice, Scott has lectured extensively to various claims and trial lawyer associations concerning liquor liability, early mediation and/or settlement negotiations and trial tactics. He serves as the National Litigation Coordinator for high-exposure liquor liability, professional liability and excess claims cases for a number of national insurance companies. Scott has actively defended liquor liability, casualty and professional liability claims in a variety of jurisdictions including Florida, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Michigan, Minnesota, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, New Jersey, Connecticut, California, Washington, Arizona, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas and Colorado. 

Scott previously served on the faculty of the Pennsylvania Bar Institute for its annual Tort Law Update Program lecturing attorneys on subjects including dram shop liability and the admission of evidence of alcohol in civil cases. He has served as a judge pro tem in Delaware County (1997-2002), co-chairman of the Delaware County Civil Trial Practice Committee (1998-2002) and a member of the Delaware County Judicial Advisory Committee. 

Scott graduated from Clarion University of Pennsylvania in 1974 and completed master's credits toward a Master of Psychosocial Science at the Pennsylvania State University from 1976 through 1978. He concluded his legal education at Widener University School of Law in 1981. Scott began his career with Marshall Dennehey as a law clerk in 1979 and continued employment with the firm following his admission to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1981.
 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1981)
    • Pennsylvania Western University, Clarion (B.A., 1974)
    • The Pennsylvania State University
      • M.Pssc. [course credits completed for Master in Psycho Social Science], 1976-1978
    • Pennsylvania, 1981
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Litigation Counsel of America Fellows
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2005-2021)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, Eastern Pennsylvania Chapter
    • Delaware County Bar Association
    • Delaware County Judge Pro Tem (1997 – 2002)
    • Delaware County, Judicial Advisory Committee (1998-2002); Co-Chairman, Civil Trial Practices Committee (1998 ¬- 2002)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Dram Shop, The Toxicology and the Law, National Academy of Continuing Legal Education, August 1, 2024
    • Dram Shop,The Toxicology and The Law, National Academy of Continuing Legal Education, December, 2020
    • The New Fair Share Act and Dram Shop Liquor Liability, Markel Insurance Co. and Markel International Insurance, August 2011
    • Recent Developments in Dram Shop Litigation, Pennsylvania Association for Justice, April 2010
    • Mealey's Retail Hospitality Liability Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 2005
    • Annual Symposium on Alcoholic Beverage Law, National Alcohol Beverage Control Association, Inc., Arlington, Virginia, March 2004
    • Dram Shop Liability, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, December 2003
    • Tort Law Update, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, August 2008
    • Liquor Liability, Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association, November 1999
    • Liquor Liability Seminar, Pennsylvania Bar Institute (Pittsburgh, Mechanicsburg and Philadelphia), 1999-Present
    • Tort Law Update (Evidence and Expert Witnesses), Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 1995-Present
    • Evidence of Intoxication, Philadelphia Bar Education Foundation, December 1995
    • Defending Liquor Liability Cases, Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association, June 1992
    • Dram Shop Liability, Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, Winter 1991
    • American College of Forensic Psychiatrists, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999
    • "Dram Shop Cases Are Perfectly Suited For Early Mediation," The Legal Intelligencer, Liquor Law Supplement (page 6), February 22, 2019
    • “Appellate Bailout in Pennsylvania Dram Shop Case,” Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 2012
    • "Recent Dram Shop Developments," The Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 3, July, 1999
    • "Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence of Visible Intoxication in Dram Shop Case - Kelly Hotel Continues The Trend," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999
    • "Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence of Visible Intoxication in Dram Shop Case - Kelly Hotel Continues The Trend," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, July 19, 1999
    • "Defense of Contributory Negligence In A Dram Shop Case Involving An Adult Consumer of Alcohol," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999
    • "Defense of Contributory Negligence In A Dram Shop Case Involving An Adult Consumer of Alcohol," The Legal Intelligencer, June 14, 1999
    • "Dram Shop Liability," Pennsylvania Bar Institute No. 1999-2074
    • "'After Hours' Service of Alcohol Not A Basis For Liability Under PA Dram Shop Act," Defense Digest, October 1995
    • "Estate of Boudwin v. Dino's Lounge, et al.: A Dram Shop Act Case," (Co-Author), American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994
    • "No Social Host Liability for 'Minors'," Defense Digest, Summer 1992
    • "The Dram Shop Act in Pennsylvania: Strategies for the Defense," (Co-Author), American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992
    • Advisory Board of the Nerney Leadership Institute at Cabrini College, Advisory Board, 2014-2016
    • National Advisory Board, United States Liability Insurance Group
    • In Hiles v. The Brandywine Club, 443 Pa. Super. 462; 662 A.2d 16 (1995), Scott represented the co-defendant liquor licensee, The Brandywine Club, in the wrongful death/survival claim of a husband whose wife was killed by the co­defendant drunk driver, William Diviney, as she was driving to work at 6:30 a.m. on November 30, 1985.  Following trial in Chester County, Pennsylvania, the jury rendered a verdict finding Diviney 100% liable and awarded Hiles $925,000.00 with The Brandywine Club avoiding payment of the entire verdict under joint and several liability for any percent of negligence.  The Hiles case has since provided the defining standard in Pennsylvania for licensee liability involving off-premises accidents caused by intoxicated adult patrons.
    • In Pulliam v. Bakerstown Hotel, 2004 Pa. Super. 116 (2004), the plaintiff was rendered quadriplegic as a result of a one-vehicle accident following his consumption of alcoholic beverages at the defendant bar.  During jury trial in Butler County, Pennsylvania in 2002, the Court admitted evidence of plaintiff's juvenile drug rehabilitation records, prior DUI convictions and evidence that plaintiff's urine tested positive for marijuana and cocaine following the accident as "highly probative" of the plaintiff's life expectancy and tolerance to intoxicants.  Plaintiff's Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in July 2005 and the case has since provided the standard by which evidence of plaintiff's prior drug and alcohol history may be admitted at trial.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA.