.

M. Scott Gemberling

Portrait of M. Scott Gemberling

For over 40 years, Scott has focused a significant portion of his practice on the defense of liquor liability, professional liability (legal, accounting, employment, D&O, non-profit, HOA) and significant exposure excess insurance claims. Scott has tried over 100 jury cases to verdict, many involving dram shop, medical and dental malpractice and product liability matters.

In addition to his law practice, Scott has lectured extensively to various claims and trial lawyer associations concerning liquor liability, early mediation and/or settlement negotiations and trial tactics. He serves as the National Litigation Coordinator for high-exposure liquor liability, professional liability and excess claims cases for a number of national insurance companies. Scott has actively defended liquor liability, casualty and professional liability claims in a variety of jurisdictions including Florida, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Michigan, Minnesota, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, New Jersey, Connecticut, California, Washington, Arizona, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas and Colorado. 

Scott previously served on the faculty of the Pennsylvania Bar Institute for its annual Tort Law Update Program lecturing attorneys on subjects including dram shop liability and the admission of evidence of alcohol in civil cases. He has served as a judge pro tem in Delaware County (1997-2002), co-chairman of the Delaware County Civil Trial Practice Committee (1998-2002) and a member of the Delaware County Judicial Advisory Committee. 

Scott graduated from Clarion University of Pennsylvania in 1974 and completed master's credits toward a Master of Psychosocial Science at the Pennsylvania State University from 1976 through 1978. He concluded his legal education at Widener University School of Law in 1981. Scott began his career with Marshall Dennehey as a law clerk in 1979 and continued employment with the firm following his admission to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1981.
 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1981)
    • Pennsylvania Western University, Clarion (B.A., 1974)
    • The Pennsylvania State University
      • M.Pssc. [course credits completed for Master in Psycho Social Science], 1976-1978
    • Pennsylvania, 1981
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Litigation Counsel of America Fellows
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2005-2021)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, Eastern Pennsylvania Chapter
    • Delaware County Bar Association
    • Delaware County Judge Pro Tem (1997 – 2002)
    • Delaware County, Judicial Advisory Committee (1998-2002); Co-Chairman, Civil Trial Practices Committee (1998 ¬- 2002)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Dram Shop, The Toxicology and the Law, National Academy of Continuing Legal Education, August 1, 2024
    • Dram Shop,The Toxicology and The Law, National Academy of Continuing Legal Education, December, 2020
    • The New Fair Share Act and Dram Shop Liquor Liability, Markel Insurance Co. and Markel International Insurance, August 2011
    • Recent Developments in Dram Shop Litigation, Pennsylvania Association for Justice, April 2010
    • Mealey's Retail Hospitality Liability Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 2005
    • Annual Symposium on Alcoholic Beverage Law, National Alcohol Beverage Control Association, Inc., Arlington, Virginia, March 2004
    • Dram Shop Liability, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, December 2003
    • Tort Law Update, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, August 2008
    • Liquor Liability, Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association, November 1999
    • Liquor Liability Seminar, Pennsylvania Bar Institute (Pittsburgh, Mechanicsburg and Philadelphia), 1999-Present
    • Tort Law Update (Evidence and Expert Witnesses), Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 1995-Present
    • Evidence of Intoxication, Philadelphia Bar Education Foundation, December 1995
    • Defending Liquor Liability Cases, Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association, June 1992
    • Dram Shop Liability, Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, Winter 1991
    • American College of Forensic Psychiatrists, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999
    • "Dram Shop Cases Are Perfectly Suited For Early Mediation," The Legal Intelligencer, Liquor Law Supplement (page 6), February 22, 2019
    • “Appellate Bailout in Pennsylvania Dram Shop Case,” Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 2012
    • "Recent Dram Shop Developments," The Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 3, July, 1999
    • "Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence of Visible Intoxication in Dram Shop Case - Kelly Hotel Continues The Trend," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999
    • "Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence of Visible Intoxication in Dram Shop Case - Kelly Hotel Continues The Trend," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, July 19, 1999
    • "Defense of Contributory Negligence In A Dram Shop Case Involving An Adult Consumer of Alcohol," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999
    • "Defense of Contributory Negligence In A Dram Shop Case Involving An Adult Consumer of Alcohol," The Legal Intelligencer, June 14, 1999
    • "Dram Shop Liability," Pennsylvania Bar Institute No. 1999-2074
    • "'After Hours' Service of Alcohol Not A Basis For Liability Under PA Dram Shop Act," Defense Digest, October 1995
    • "Estate of Boudwin v. Dino's Lounge, et al.: A Dram Shop Act Case," (Co-Author), American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994
    • "No Social Host Liability for 'Minors'," Defense Digest, Summer 1992
    • "The Dram Shop Act in Pennsylvania: Strategies for the Defense," (Co-Author), American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992
    • Advisory Board of the Nerney Leadership Institute at Cabrini College, Advisory Board, 2014-2016
    • National Advisory Board, United States Liability Insurance Group
    • In Hiles v. The Brandywine Club, 443 Pa. Super. 462; 662 A.2d 16 (1995), Scott represented the co-defendant liquor licensee, The Brandywine Club, in the wrongful death/survival claim of a husband whose wife was killed by the co­defendant drunk driver, William Diviney, as she was driving to work at 6:30 a.m. on November 30, 1985.  Following trial in Chester County, Pennsylvania, the jury rendered a verdict finding Diviney 100% liable and awarded Hiles $925,000.00 with The Brandywine Club avoiding payment of the entire verdict under joint and several liability for any percent of negligence.  The Hiles case has since provided the defining standard in Pennsylvania for licensee liability involving off-premises accidents caused by intoxicated adult patrons.
    • In Pulliam v. Bakerstown Hotel, 2004 Pa. Super. 116 (2004), the plaintiff was rendered quadriplegic as a result of a one-vehicle accident following his consumption of alcoholic beverages at the defendant bar.  During jury trial in Butler County, Pennsylvania in 2002, the Court admitted evidence of plaintiff's juvenile drug rehabilitation records, prior DUI convictions and evidence that plaintiff's urine tested positive for marijuana and cocaine following the accident as "highly probative" of the plaintiff's life expectancy and tolerance to intoxicants.  Plaintiff's Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in July 2005 and the case has since provided the standard by which evidence of plaintiff's prior drug and alcohol history may be admitted at trial.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.