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The Quarterly Dose

ALL RISE: Recent Victories and Success Stories

The Quarterly Dose – November 2025

November 1, 2025

Gary Samms (Philadelphia and King of Prussia) obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a Philadelphia hospital and two Emergency Department physicians after a six-day jury trial in a complex and extremely emotional case involving the death of 7-year-old child. Allegations of negligence surrounded the failure to admit and perform a urine drug screen on an 18-year-old who presented high on synthetic marijuana or K2. Gary argued that the doctors appropriately performed numerous exams, tested and monitored the patient until he achieved clinical sobriety. The patient was discharged, then 22 hours later smoked more K2 and within two hours strangled his 7-year-old sister to death. Paralegal Nancy Farnen (Philadelphia) was instrumental in the result.

In another matter, Gary obtained a dismissal in the middle of trial after cross-examining the plaintiff’s witnesses in a case involving a former NFL player and opera singer who contended they had permanent injuries after knee surgery and the failure to diagnose a pseudoaneurysm. Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to dismiss Gary and his client prior to the end of their case to prevent him from participating in the trial further and decided to limit their recovery to the other defendants due to Gary’s successful cross-examination.

Gary also obtained a defense verdict after an 11-day trial on behalf of four physicians and a major teaching hospital in Philadelphia. The medical malpractice action involved the labor and delivery of a baby later alleged to have a hypoxic birth injury that caused developmental delays and permanent brain damage, among other issues. The plaintiffs’ experts boarded $21 million in future medical costs to take care of the child and the demand in the pretrial was commensurate with those numbers.

In another matter, Gary obtained a non-suit in a wrongful death case in Delaware County. The court found upon motion that there was no link to causation after an extensive, nuanced argument.

With tremendous support from Adam Fulginiti and paralegal Nancy Farnen (both of Philadelphia), Gary also secured a unanimous defense verdict in Philadelphia on behalf of a prominent orthopedic surgeon accused of inappropriate touching of a patient. The plaintiff alleged that the physician inappropriately touched her during a preoperative examination for bilateral hip surgery. Through meticulous cross-examination and persuasive argument, the defense team achieved a complete victory.

Adam, working closely with Bobbi Lewis, Ryan Harvie and paralegal Dorien Belle (all of Philadelphia) also obtained summary judgment on behalf of their nursing home client. The case involved allegations that the facility failed to prevent various conditions and injuries during the resident’s admission, such as UTI/sepsis, acute kidney injury/metabolic encephalopathy, dehydration and failure to thrive/weight loss, and skin breakdown. The plaintiff alleged these developments resulted in numerous damages including, but not limited to, death. Our motion for summary judgment sought dismissal under the grounds that the facility held immunity pursuant to the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act and included numerous supporting documents, ranging from public entity reimbursement agreements, personnel information, corporate bylaws and other materials.

Melissa Dziak and Robert Aldrich (both in Scranton) received a defense verdict after a two-day arbitration hearing in a traumatic brain injury case. With an initial $5.25 million demand, the plaintiff alleged overmedication led to cardiac arrest and a traumatic brain injury, resulting in permanent neurocognitive impairment. Through testimony from our providers and experts across internal medicine, pulmonology, toxicology and neuropsychology, Missy and Rob demonstrated that the care met the standard, did not cause the arrest and any deficits could have been pre-existing.

Kevin Hexstall (Philadelphia) and Michael Mongiello (Harrisburg) were successful on appeal of a child abuse determination levied against a home health nurse. The three-day hearing was litigated before the PA Department of Human Services. As a result of the court’s order, the nurse’s record of child abuse is being expunged. The matter arose out of the alleged attack of a child-patient by a family pit bull dog during home nursing care. It was asserted that the nurse failed to properly supervise and protect the child and failed to properly respond to the incident when it occurred. Kevin and Mike established a lack of definitive proof that the nurse negligently left the child unsupervised. They also called into question the circumstances surrounding the alleged attack, including whether the dog had a known history of aggression, which led to credibility issues on the part of the family member witnesses. Medical experts also testified on the appellant’s behalf to address possible alternate explanations for the child’s injuries. Ultimately, Kevin and Mike established that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof, highlighting multiple errors and inconsistencies relating to the investigation and the reporting processes. This is a significant outcome in a difficult jurisdiction with many problematic underlying facts (which led to the decision to not call the nurse to testify in her defense). Kevin and Mike’s efforts in this regard were also instrumental in allowing for achievement of a very favorable resolution of the civil claim.

Michael also obtained partial summary judgment for an obstetrician in a medical professional liability action, significantly curtailing his client’s exposure. The case arose out of the alleged negligent delivery of a baby, resulting in a shoulder dystocia, right brachial plexus injury and Erb’s palsy. Michael argued that there was a lack of evidence that his client improperly applied traction during the delivery. The judge agreed and granted partial summary judgment on the plaintiff’s gravamen claim of direct negligence. The court also granted summary judgment on claims for res ipsa loquitur and failure to obtain informed consent and also as to the plaintiff’s claim for past medical expenses, due to a lack of proper evidence in support of these claims.

Jeffrey Bates and Travis Talbot, with the help of paralegal Jennifer Cicchetti (all in Philadelphia), received a defense verdict in a dental malpractice action before the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiff had a history of issues with his third molars (wisdom teeth) beginning in 2012. In 2013 he was referred to have one of them extracted by a prior dentist. In October 2015, the plaintiff presented to our client for a broken tooth. During the exam, our client advised him that he needed to have all four of his third molars removed. He even suggested it needed to be done at the next visit. However, the plaintiff did not schedule any further appointments. On January 10, 2017, the plaintiff presented with an infected third molar on the lower right, and our client suggested extracting both third molars on the right, as all of his third molars were broken down and sources of infection. However, the plaintiff would only allow extraction of the lower tooth. Our client extracted the tooth, gave a prescription of amoxicillin and administered two loading doses to get the antibiotic to therapeutic levels more quickly. He also told the plaintiff to call if the swelling in his face did not improve or if it got worse. Over the next four days, as the plaintiff testified, his swelling got worse every day, but he did not call the doctor. Finally, on January 14, 2017, his swelling had progressed into his neck, and he called our client, who saw him and immediately sent him to the emergency department. He was admitted to the hospital for 40 days, was intubated, underwent 11 procedures, including multiple incision and drainage procedures, placement of a PEG tube and a tracheostomy. The plaintiff’s experts agreed that a patient has responsibility for his own care, and failing to have his teeth extracted, or calling the doctor when the situation got worse, contributed to his injury. Although contributory negligence was on the verdict slip, the jury never got to the question as they found our client was not negligent.

Justin Johnson and Nataliana Guida, with assistance from paralegal Elina Sheldon (all in Roseland), secured a wrongful birth verdict well below the pre-trial settlement offer, which the plaintiffs rejected. Despite being brought into the case just seven months prior to the trial, Justin and Talia delivered compelling arguments that led to a total verdict that was less than the original offer made before the trial, with our client responsible for only 65%.

Megan Nelson (Orlando) was successful in having her Florida Rule 5.900 Petition for Expedited Judicial Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Procedure granted. The alleged incapacitated person had been medically cleared for discharge to a skilled nursing facility. However, his brother, who had been appointed as the health care surrogate and power of attorney, had refused to consent to his brother’s transfer to any skilled nursing facility. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by the hospital case management team to transfer the patient, Megan was retained to file a Florida Rule 5.900 Petition for Expedited Judicial Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Procedures. After the emergency evidentiary hearing, the court granted the petition and ordered the brother to consent to the transfer of the patient to a skilled nursing facility.

Michael Roberts and David Williamson (both of Cincinnati) successfully secured a dismissal on behalf of our client, a leading provider of complex specialty pharmacy services, via a Motion to Dismiss. At oral argument, Michael successfully argued that the plaintiff’s claim was a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113 and, thus, subject to the affidavit of merit requirement in Civil Rule 10(D)(2). In addition, he argued that the plaintiff’s cause of action should be dismissed since she could not establish the adequacy of her complaint without a proper affidavit of merit. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result.


The Quarterly Dose – November 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.