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Defense Digest

When Favors Feel Like Obligations: A Closer Look at the Special-Mission Exemption to the Going-and-Coming Rule

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023

March 1, 2023

by Lela N. Eke

Key Points:

  • An employee’s off-site accident may be compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, pursuant to the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule, even if the employee is doing a favor for the employer.
  • When determining an employee’s job duties and scope of employment, indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order.
  • A workers’ compensation claim may still be compensable even if the employee fails to follow the employer’s work guidelines.

To determine whether an injury is compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the court must find that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, among other factors. In New Jersey, the “going-and-coming” rule governs and generally states that compensable accidents occur at the place of employment. There are few exceptions to this rule which allow for an employee’s off-site injury to be compensable, and they are extremely fact-specific.

In Gregory Van Sciver v. Jersey Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2022 WL 16936881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022), the Appellate Division held that an employee met the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule when he was injured by an explosion in his personal vehicle. Mr. Van Sciver was a pipe fitter and truck driver for his employer. On September 29, 2020, Van Scriver was instructed to exchange two empty tanks that hold acetylene gas (B-Tanks) for full ones, deliver one of the full B-Tanks to a jobsite in Livingston, and deliver paychecks to a jobsite located in Bordentown.

While in Bordentown, a jobsite foreman asked Van Sciver about his B-Tank delivery, but it was not on the employee’s list of tasks, so he returned to the main jobsite to ask his supervisor. Later that day, Van Sciver (acting on his own initiative) decided to deliver a full B-Tank to Bordentown using his personal vehicle since he would pass by Bordentown on his way home. However, the employee did not stop at the Bordentown jobsite that night because it was too late in the day.

The next morning, the employee forgot to drop off the B-Tank in Bordentown. As he was driving his personal vehicle to work, the company’s project manager/estimator asked him for a ride to work. Van Sciver agreed. However, he heard a hissing noise from his vehicle while driving to the company executive’s house. When Van Sciver opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to investigate the sound, the B-Tank exploded and significantly injured him. He required numerous surgeries and extensive medical treatment after an eight-day coma, traumatic brain injuries, and the loss of use of one eye.

At trial, all parties agreed that Van Sciver was not instructed to use his personal vehicle to deliver the B-Tank. In fact, the employer and the union agreement both instructed Van Sciver to NOT use personal vehicles for company business. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Van Sciver was trained to not store B-Tanks in confined places, such as his vehicle’s hatchback.

Nonetheless, the trial judge found that: (1) the employee placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle with the sole intent and motive to deliver it to the Bordentown jobsite; (2) the tank was a “workplace instrumentality” of the employer; (3) the employee’s work responsibilities required him to be away from the main facility; (4) before the accident, the company’s executive asked the employee to pick him up for work; (5) the employee was en route to pick up the company’s executive when the accident occurred; and (6) the employee had an “objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that… he was in essence ‘compelled’ to say yes to picking up” the project manager/estimator because of his high-level position at the company.

Thus, the trial judge found that Van Sciver was completing work-related duties when the injury occurred. It held that he was entitled to compensation under the “special-mission” exception of the going-and-coming rule on two grounds: (1) the employee was on a special mission delivering the B-Tank to Bordentown and the mission had not ended before the accident, and (2) the employee was engaged in a special mission for the company when he was driving to pick up the executive.

The company appealed the trial judge’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision, stating that Van Sciver met the special-mission exception when he attempted to pick up the company’s high-level officer. The Appellate Division noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and occurring away from the place of employment if the employee is engaged in duties directed by the employer (i.e. the special-mission exception).

The company argued that Van Sciver was not directed by the employer to pick up the company’s executive because he could have declined. However, the Appellate Division reiterated that indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order, indicating that implied direction from high-level officers can expand an employee’s job duties.

Finally, the company argued that the trial court’s legal determinations were not supported by the facts. In its review, the Appellate Division noted that they do not re-determine the factual findings of the trial judge, but they determine whether the trial judge’s findings had sufficient credible evidence. Thus, once a trial judge makes a factual determination, it can be quite difficult to change such a finding on appeal.

It is clear that “special-mission” cases are heavily fact-specific. Employers must quickly investigate how an accident occurred, what the employee was asked to do, and the employee’s job responsibilities. Just as the court considered an executive’s request for a ride to work as an extension of the employee’s job duties, other requests could impact an employee in the same manner. Thus, employers must be careful not to blur the line between an employee’s professional responsibilities and personal favors.

To determine whether an injury is compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the court must find that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, among other factors. In New Jersey, the “going-and-coming” rule governs and generally states that compensable accidents occur at the place of employment. There are few exceptions to this rule which allow for an employee’s off-site injury to be compensable, and they are extremely fact-specific.

In Gregory Van Sciver v. Jersey Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2022 WL 16936881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022), the Appellate Division held that an employee met the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule when he was injured by an explosion in his personal vehicle. Mr. Van Sciver was a pipe fitter and truck driver for his employer. On September 29, 2020, Van Scriver was instructed to exchange two empty tanks that hold acetylene gas (B-Tanks) for full ones, deliver one of the full B-Tanks to a jobsite in Livingston, and deliver paychecks to a jobsite located in Bordentown.

While in Bordentown, a jobsite foreman asked Van Sciver about his B-Tank delivery, but it was not on the employee’s list of tasks, so he returned to the main jobsite to ask his supervisor. Later that day, Van Sciver (acting on his own initiative) decided to deliver a full B-Tank to Bordentown using his personal vehicle since he would pass by Bordentown on his way home. However, the employee did not stop at the Bordentown jobsite that night because it was too late in the day.

The next morning, the employee forgot to drop off the B-Tank in Bordentown. As he was driving his personal vehicle to work, the company’s project manager/estimator asked him for a ride to work. Van Sciver agreed. However, he heard a hissing noise from his vehicle while driving to the company executive’s house. When Van Sciver opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to investigate the sound, the B-Tank exploded and significantly injured him. He required numerous surgeries and extensive medical treatment after an eight-day coma, traumatic brain injuries, and the loss of use of one eye.

At trial, all parties agreed that Van Sciver was not instructed to use his personal vehicle to deliver the B-Tank. In fact, the employer and the union agreement both instructed Van Sciver to NOT use personal vehicles for company business. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Van Sciver was trained to not store B-Tanks in confined places, such as his vehicle’s hatchback.

Nonetheless, the trial judge found that: (1) the employee placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle with the sole intent and motive to deliver it to the Bordentown jobsite; (2) the tank was a “workplace instrumentality” of the employer; (3) the employee’s work responsibilities required him to be away from the main facility; (4) before the accident, the company’s executive asked the employee to pick him up for work; (5) the employee was en route to pick up the company’s executive when the accident occurred; and (6) the employee had an “objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that… he was in essence ‘compelled’ to say yes to picking up” the project manager/estimator because of his high-level position at the company.

Thus, the trial judge found that Van Sciver was completing work-related duties when the injury occurred. It held that he was entitled to compensation under the “special-mission” exception of the going-and-coming rule on two grounds: (1) the employee was on a special mission delivering the B-Tank to Bordentown and the mission had not ended before the accident, and (2) the employee was engaged in a special mission for the company when he was driving to pick up the executive.

The company appealed the trial judge’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision, stating that Van Sciver met the special-mission exception when he attempted to pick up the company’s high-level officer. The Appellate Division noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and occurring away from the place of employment if the employee is engaged in duties directed by the employer (i.e. the special-mission exception).

The company argued that Van Sciver was not directed by the employer to pick up the company’s executive because he could have declined. However, the Appellate Division reiterated that indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order, indicating that implied direction from high-level officers can expand an employee’s job duties.

Finally, the company argued that the trial court’s legal determinations were not supported by the facts. In its review, the Appellate Division noted that they do not re-determine the factual findings of the trial judge, but they determine whether the trial judge’s findings had sufficient credible evidence. Thus, once a trial judge makes a factual determination, it can be quite difficult to change such a finding on appeal.

It is clear that “special-mission” cases are heavily fact-specific. Employers must quickly investigate how an accident occurred, what the employee was asked to do, and the employee’s job responsibilities. Just as the court considered an executive’s request for a ride to work as an extension of the employee’s job duties, other requests could impact an employee in the same manner. Thus, employers must be careful not to blur the line between an employee’s professional responsibilities and personal favors.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Congress Passes Financial Exploitation Prevention Act

On June 25, 2026, the House passed the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act of 2025 (“the Act”) by a vote of 414 to 2. The Act allows financial advisors and firms to delay suspicious transactions regarding the accounts of clients who are 65 or older, if they believe financial exploitation has occurred or is about to take place. With the advancement of technology and AI, the House’s overwhelming bipartisan passage of the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act represents an important step in strengthening the financial industry’s ability to combat the growing threat of elder financial exploitation. The Act recognizes what advisors have long known that financial professionals are often the first to detect suspicious behavior but have historically lacked clear legal authority to intervene before irreversible financial harm occurs. From the industry’s perspective, the bill accomplishes several important objectives, including the following: (1) Provides a practical “pause button” by allowing financial professionals to temporarily delay certain transaction requests when there is a reasonable belief that a senior or vulnerable adult is being financially exploited; (2) Empowers financial professionals to act by providing greater certainty that firms can act in good faith to protect clients without unnecessary legal risk; and (3) Strengthens investor protection without sacrificing client rights by allowing temporary delays based on a reasonable suspicion of exploitation, which is intended only to allow additional review and not to deny clients access to their money indefinitely. In sum, the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act will equip financial professionals with practical, carefully tailored tools to stop suspected financial exploitation before client assets are lost. By allowing firms to temporarily delay suspicious transactions under defined circumstances, Congress is recognizing the critical role advisors play as the first line of defense against increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. The Act strikes an appropriate balance between protecting vulnerable investors and preserving individual financial autonomy, while reinforcing collaboration among advisors, families, and law enforcement to combat financial exploitation. The bill now awaits Senate action.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Expands Family Leave Protections Effective July 17, 2026

On January 17, 2026, Governor Murphy signed into law legislation expanding the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA). Beginning July 17, 2026, significant amendments to the NJFLA will expand job-protected family leave to smaller businesses and more employees across the state. The new law broadens coverage by lowering the threshold for private employers from 30 employees to 15 employees, meaning many smaller businesses will now be subject to the NJFLA. Employees of state and local government agencies will continue to be covered regardless of the size of the employer. The amendments also make it easier for employees to qualify for leave. Under the revised law, an employee will be eligible after three months of employment and at least 250 hours worked during the preceding 12 months, replacing the previous requirement of 12 months of employment and 1,000 hours worked. Currently, New Jersey's Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) and Family Leave Insurance (FLI) programs provide eligible employees with wage replacement while they are on leave but do not independently guarantee job protection. The recent amendments to the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA) expand these protections by extending job-protected leave to additional employees. Under the amended law, employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits may be entitled to return to the same position they held before taking leave, or to an equivalent position with the same seniority, status, pay, and benefits. Although the legislation also states that it does not expand or modify an employee's reinstatement rights under the NJFLA, the amendments appear to provide job protection to eligible employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits without requiring them to separately satisfy the eligibility requirements of the NJFLA or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). As a result, some employees may be entitled to longer periods of job-protected leave than were previously available under existing law. With these amendments, New Jersey continues to strengthen workplace protections by expanding access to job-protected family leave for eligible employees. These changes significantly expand access to job-protected family leave and may require employers to update their leave policies, employee handbooks, and HR practices. Notably, employers who were previously not required to administer NJFLA may need to amend their policies and/or create new protocols to come into compliance with the NJFLA. Failure to do so would prove costly, as the penalties for non-compliance are significant.

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998. For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer. In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability. The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline. Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter. The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant. The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing. The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations. As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer. The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements. Therefore, the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b). Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements. For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.