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Lela is a member of the Workers' Compensation Department, where she represents insured entities in New Jersey workers' compensation matters. Lela is admitted to practice law in New Jersey and Washington, DC.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Lela clerked for the Honorable Darlene M. Soltys and the Honorable Rupa Ranga of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. She also represented clients in family, immigration, and probate matters at the DC Affordable Law Firm, a non-profit organization providing accessible legal assistance.

Lela received her J.D. in 2019 and her LL.M in Civil Justice in 2021 from Georgetown University Law Center. During her time at Georgetown, Lela completed an Affordable Law Fellowship and was recognized as a Special Pro Bono Pledge Honoree for providing over 100 hours of pro bono services. She also served as an Opportunity Scholar, studied abroad at the National University of Singapore, served on the executive board for the Black Law Students Association, and competed internationally as a member of Georgetown's Alternative Dispute Resolution Team. Prior to law school, Lela graduated from Washington University in St. Louis in with a Bachelor of Arts in Psychological & Brain Sciences and a minor in Religion & Politics

    • Georgetown University Law Center (LL.M., 2021)
      • Civil Justice
    • Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2019)
    • Washington University in St. Louise (B.A., 2016)
    • New Jersey, 2021
    • District of Columbia, 2019
    • D.C. Bar Association
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • The Intersection of Implicit Bias and Microaggressions in the Legal Workplace and Workers’ Compensation, New Jersey Workers' Compensation May Day Seminar, May 1, 2024
    • Spanish (conversational)

Results

Dismissals on the Rise! Our New Jersey Workers’ Compensation attorneys are successful in precluding litigation

Lela Eke received a Dismiss Without Prejudice for Lack of Prosecution, after filing a Motion to Dismiss in response to numerous discovery requests that remained unanswered. At the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel was unable to provide an explanation for the delay. We argued that keeping the case open to give them more time to respond to our discovery and Motion would be prejudicial against us, and the Court granted our Motion. Jessica Gordon received a dismissal for lack of prosecution in a case where the claim was denied with ongoing request for medical treatment, but there had been no report from the Petitioner to support the request and no demand was made in lieu of litigation. William Murphy successfully obtained an order for dismissal for a claim involving a workplace assault. In the case, the Petitioner alleged injuries to their neck, back, chest, and right hand following an assault at work. After the Petitioner missed multiple independent medical exams scheduled by the employer, we filed a motion to dismiss this claim for lack of prosecution. The judge of compensation granted the motion. Rachel Ramsay-Lowe was successful in defending a case where the Petitioner was not complying with discovery requests and did not appear for Respondent’s permanency evaluation. We filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution and the Court entered the dismissal Order. Kristy Salvitti was successful in obtaining an Order for Dismissal where the  Petitioner had filed a Reopener of a Clam Petition relative to a prior permanency award arguing that disability to his right shoulder, thoracic and lumbar spine had increased to permanent and total disability. If successful, Petitioner would receive lifetime related medical treatment and 450 weeks to life of his temporary total disability rate.  However, following oral argument that Petitioner failed to timely prosecute the claim, the Reopener Petitioner was dismissed.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

When Favors Feel Like Obligations: A Closer Look at the Special-Mission Exemption to the Going-and-Coming Rule

March 1, 2023

Key Points: An employee’s off-site accident may be compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, pursuant to the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule, even if the employee is doing a favor for the employer. When determining an employee’s job duties and scope of employment, indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order. A workers’ compensation claim may still be compensable even if the employee fails to follow the employer’s work guidelines. To determine whether an injury is compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the court must find that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, among other factors. In New Jersey, the “going-and-coming” rule governs and generally states that compensable accidents occur at the place of employment. There are few exceptions to this rule which allow for an employee’s off-site injury to be compensable, and they are extremely fact-specific. In Gregory Van Sciver v. Jersey Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2022 WL 16936881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022), the Appellate Division held that an employee met the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule when he was injured by an explosion in his personal vehicle. Mr. Van Sciver was a pipe fitter and truck driver for his employer. On September 29, 2020, Van Scriver was instructed to exchange two empty tanks that hold acetylene gas (B-Tanks) for full ones, deliver one of the full B-Tanks to a jobsite in Livingston, and deliver paychecks to a jobsite located in Bordentown. While in Bordentown, a jobsite foreman asked Van Sciver about his B-Tank delivery, but it was not on the employee’s list of tasks, so he returned to the main jobsite to ask his supervisor. Later that day, Van Sciver (acting on his own initiative) decided to deliver a full B-Tank to Bordentown using his personal vehicle since he would pass by Bordentown on his way home. However, the employee did not stop at the Bordentown jobsite that night because it was too late in the day. The next morning, the employee forgot to drop off the B-Tank in Bordentown. As he was driving his personal vehicle to work, the company’s project manager/estimator asked him for a ride to work. Van Sciver agreed. However, he heard a hissing noise from his vehicle while driving to the company executive’s house. When Van Sciver opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to investigate the sound, the B-Tank exploded and significantly injured him. He required numerous surgeries and extensive medical treatment after an eight-day coma, traumatic brain injuries, and the loss of use of one eye. At trial, all parties agreed that Van Sciver was not instructed to use his personal vehicle to deliver the B-Tank. In fact, the employer and the union agreement both instructed Van Sciver to NOT use personal vehicles for company business. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Van Sciver was trained to not store B-Tanks in confined places, such as his vehicle’s hatchback. Nonetheless, the trial judge found that: (1) the employee placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle with the sole intent and motive to deliver it to the Bordentown jobsite; (2) the tank was a “workplace instrumentality” of the employer; (3) the employee’s work responsibilities required him to be away from the main facility; (4) before the accident, the company’s executive asked the employee to pick him up for work; (5) the employee was en route to pick up the company’s executive when the accident occurred; and (6) the employee had an “objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that… he was in essence ‘compelled’ to say yes to picking up” the project manager/estimator because of his high-level position at the company. Thus, the trial judge found that Van Sciver was completing work-related duties when the injury occurred. It held that he was entitled to compensation under the “special-mission” exception of the going-and-coming rule on two grounds: (1) the employee was on a special mission delivering the B-Tank to Bordentown and the mission had not ended before the accident, and (2) the employee was engaged in a special mission for the company when he was driving to pick up the executive. The company appealed the trial judge’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision, stating that Van Sciver met the special-mission exception when he attempted to pick up the company’s high-level officer. The Appellate Division noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and occurring away from the place of employment if the employee is engaged in duties directed by the employer (i.e. the special-mission exception). The company argued that Van Sciver was not directed by the employer to pick up the company’s executive because he could have declined. However, the Appellate Division reiterated that indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order, indicating that implied direction from high-level officers can expand an employee’s job duties. Finally, the company argued that the trial court’s legal determinations were not supported by the facts. In its review, the Appellate Division noted that they do not re-determine the factual findings of the trial judge, but they determine whether the trial judge’s findings had sufficient credible evidence. Thus, once a trial judge makes a factual determination, it can be quite difficult to change such a finding on appeal. It is clear that “special-mission” cases are heavily fact-specific. Employers must quickly investigate how an accident occurred, what the employee was asked to do, and the employee’s job responsibilities. Just as the court considered an executive’s request for a ride to work as an extension of the employee’s job duties, other requests could impact an employee in the same manner. Thus, employers must be careful not to blur the line between an employee’s professional responsibilities and personal favors. To determine whether an injury is compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the court must find that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, among other factors. In New Jersey, the “going-and-coming” rule governs and generally states that compensable accidents occur at the place of employment. There are few exceptions to this rule which allow for an employee’s off-site injury to be compensable, and they are extremely fact-specific. In Gregory Van Sciver v. Jersey Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2022 WL 16936881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022), the Appellate Division held that an employee met the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule when he was injured by an explosion in his personal vehicle. Mr. Van Sciver was a pipe fitter and truck driver for his employer. On September 29, 2020, Van Scriver was instructed to exchange two empty tanks that hold acetylene gas (B-Tanks) for full ones, deliver one of the full B-Tanks to a jobsite in Livingston, and deliver paychecks to a jobsite located in Bordentown. While in Bordentown, a jobsite foreman asked Van Sciver about his B-Tank delivery, but it was not on the employee’s list of tasks, so he returned to the main jobsite to ask his supervisor. Later that day, Van Sciver (acting on his own initiative) decided to deliver a full B-Tank to Bordentown using his personal vehicle since he would pass by Bordentown on his way home. However, the employee did not stop at the Bordentown jobsite that night because it was too late in the day. The next morning, the employee forgot to drop off the B-Tank in Bordentown. As he was driving his personal vehicle to work, the company’s project manager/estimator asked him for a ride to work. Van Sciver agreed. However, he heard a hissing noise from his vehicle while driving to the company executive’s house. When Van Sciver opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to investigate the sound, the B-Tank exploded and significantly injured him. He required numerous surgeries and extensive medical treatment after an eight-day coma, traumatic brain injuries, and the loss of use of one eye. At trial, all parties agreed that Van Sciver was not instructed to use his personal vehicle to deliver the B-Tank. In fact, the employer and the union agreement both instructed Van Sciver to NOT use personal vehicles for company business. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Van Sciver was trained to not store B-Tanks in confined places, such as his vehicle’s hatchback. Nonetheless, the trial judge found that: (1) the employee placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle with the sole intent and motive to deliver it to the Bordentown jobsite; (2) the tank was a “workplace instrumentality” of the employer; (3) the employee’s work responsibilities required him to be away from the main facility; (4) before the accident, the company’s executive asked the employee to pick him up for work; (5) the employee was en route to pick up the company’s executive when the accident occurred; and (6) the employee had an “objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that… he was in essence ‘compelled’ to say yes to picking up” the project manager/estimator because of his high-level position at the company. Thus, the trial judge found that Van Sciver was completing work-related duties when the injury occurred. It held that he was entitled to compensation under the “special-mission” exception of the going-and-coming rule on two grounds: (1) the employee was on a special mission delivering the B-Tank to Bordentown and the mission had not ended before the accident, and (2) the employee was engaged in a special mission for the company when he was driving to pick up the executive. The company appealed the trial judge’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision, stating that Van Sciver met the special-mission exception when he attempted to pick up the company’s high-level officer. The Appellate Division noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and occurring away from the place of employment if the employee is engaged in duties directed by the employer (i.e. the special-mission exception). The company argued that Van Sciver was not directed by the employer to pick up the company’s executive because he could have declined. However, the Appellate Division reiterated that indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order, indicating that implied direction from high-level officers can expand an employee’s job duties. Finally, the company argued that the trial court’s legal determinations were not supported by the facts. In its review, the Appellate Division noted that they do not re-determine the factual findings of the trial judge, but they determine whether the trial judge’s findings had sufficient credible evidence. Thus, once a trial judge makes a factual determination, it can be quite difficult to change such a finding on appeal. It is clear that “special-mission” cases are heavily fact-specific. Employers must quickly investigate how an accident occurred, what the employee was asked to do, and the employee’s job responsibilities. Just as the court considered an executive’s request for a ride to work as an extension of the employee’s job duties, other requests could impact an employee in the same manner. Thus, employers must be careful not to blur the line between an employee’s professional responsibilities and personal favors.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.