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Lela is a member of the Workers' Compensation Department, where she represents insured entities in New Jersey workers' compensation matters. Lela is admitted to practice law in New Jersey and Washington, DC.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Lela clerked for the Honorable Darlene M. Soltys and the Honorable Rupa Ranga of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. She also represented clients in family, immigration, and probate matters at the DC Affordable Law Firm, a non-profit organization providing accessible legal assistance.

Lela received her J.D. in 2019 and her LL.M in Civil Justice in 2021 from Georgetown University Law Center. During her time at Georgetown, Lela completed an Affordable Law Fellowship and was recognized as a Special Pro Bono Pledge Honoree for providing over 100 hours of pro bono services. She also served as an Opportunity Scholar, studied abroad at the National University of Singapore, served on the executive board for the Black Law Students Association, and competed internationally as a member of Georgetown's Alternative Dispute Resolution Team. Prior to law school, Lela graduated from Washington University in St. Louis in with a Bachelor of Arts in Psychological & Brain Sciences and a minor in Religion & Politics

    • Georgetown University Law Center (LL.M., 2021)
      • Civil Justice
    • Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2019)
    • Washington University in St. Louise (B.A., 2016)
    • New Jersey, 2021
    • District of Columbia, 2019
    • D.C. Bar Association
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • The Intersection of Implicit Bias and Microaggressions in the Legal Workplace and Workers’ Compensation, New Jersey Workers' Compensation May Day Seminar, May 1, 2024
    • Spanish (conversational)

Results

Dismissals on the Rise! Our New Jersey Workers’ Compensation attorneys are successful in precluding litigation

Lela Eke received a Dismiss Without Prejudice for Lack of Prosecution, after filing a Motion to Dismiss in response to numerous discovery requests that remained unanswered. At the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel was unable to provide an explanation for the delay. We argued that keeping the case open to give them more time to respond to our discovery and Motion would be prejudicial against us, and the Court granted our Motion. Jessica Gordon received a dismissal for lack of prosecution in a case where the claim was denied with ongoing request for medical treatment, but there had been no report from the Petitioner to support the request and no demand was made in lieu of litigation. William Murphy successfully obtained an order for dismissal for a claim involving a workplace assault. In the case, the Petitioner alleged injuries to their neck, back, chest, and right hand following an assault at work. After the Petitioner missed multiple independent medical exams scheduled by the employer, we filed a motion to dismiss this claim for lack of prosecution. The judge of compensation granted the motion. Rachel Ramsay-Lowe was successful in defending a case where the Petitioner was not complying with discovery requests and did not appear for Respondent’s permanency evaluation. We filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution and the Court entered the dismissal Order. Kristy Salvitti was successful in obtaining an Order for Dismissal where the  Petitioner had filed a Reopener of a Clam Petition relative to a prior permanency award arguing that disability to his right shoulder, thoracic and lumbar spine had increased to permanent and total disability. If successful, Petitioner would receive lifetime related medical treatment and 450 weeks to life of his temporary total disability rate.  However, following oral argument that Petitioner failed to timely prosecute the claim, the Reopener Petitioner was dismissed.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

When Favors Feel Like Obligations: A Closer Look at the Special-Mission Exemption to the Going-and-Coming Rule

March 1, 2023

Key Points: An employee’s off-site accident may be compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, pursuant to the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule, even if the employee is doing a favor for the employer. When determining an employee’s job duties and scope of employment, indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order. A workers’ compensation claim may still be compensable even if the employee fails to follow the employer’s work guidelines. To determine whether an injury is compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the court must find that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, among other factors. In New Jersey, the “going-and-coming” rule governs and generally states that compensable accidents occur at the place of employment. There are few exceptions to this rule which allow for an employee’s off-site injury to be compensable, and they are extremely fact-specific. In Gregory Van Sciver v. Jersey Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2022 WL 16936881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022), the Appellate Division held that an employee met the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule when he was injured by an explosion in his personal vehicle. Mr. Van Sciver was a pipe fitter and truck driver for his employer. On September 29, 2020, Van Scriver was instructed to exchange two empty tanks that hold acetylene gas (B-Tanks) for full ones, deliver one of the full B-Tanks to a jobsite in Livingston, and deliver paychecks to a jobsite located in Bordentown. While in Bordentown, a jobsite foreman asked Van Sciver about his B-Tank delivery, but it was not on the employee’s list of tasks, so he returned to the main jobsite to ask his supervisor. Later that day, Van Sciver (acting on his own initiative) decided to deliver a full B-Tank to Bordentown using his personal vehicle since he would pass by Bordentown on his way home. However, the employee did not stop at the Bordentown jobsite that night because it was too late in the day. The next morning, the employee forgot to drop off the B-Tank in Bordentown. As he was driving his personal vehicle to work, the company’s project manager/estimator asked him for a ride to work. Van Sciver agreed. However, he heard a hissing noise from his vehicle while driving to the company executive’s house. When Van Sciver opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to investigate the sound, the B-Tank exploded and significantly injured him. He required numerous surgeries and extensive medical treatment after an eight-day coma, traumatic brain injuries, and the loss of use of one eye. At trial, all parties agreed that Van Sciver was not instructed to use his personal vehicle to deliver the B-Tank. In fact, the employer and the union agreement both instructed Van Sciver to NOT use personal vehicles for company business. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Van Sciver was trained to not store B-Tanks in confined places, such as his vehicle’s hatchback. Nonetheless, the trial judge found that: (1) the employee placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle with the sole intent and motive to deliver it to the Bordentown jobsite; (2) the tank was a “workplace instrumentality” of the employer; (3) the employee’s work responsibilities required him to be away from the main facility; (4) before the accident, the company’s executive asked the employee to pick him up for work; (5) the employee was en route to pick up the company’s executive when the accident occurred; and (6) the employee had an “objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that… he was in essence ‘compelled’ to say yes to picking up” the project manager/estimator because of his high-level position at the company. Thus, the trial judge found that Van Sciver was completing work-related duties when the injury occurred. It held that he was entitled to compensation under the “special-mission” exception of the going-and-coming rule on two grounds: (1) the employee was on a special mission delivering the B-Tank to Bordentown and the mission had not ended before the accident, and (2) the employee was engaged in a special mission for the company when he was driving to pick up the executive. The company appealed the trial judge’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision, stating that Van Sciver met the special-mission exception when he attempted to pick up the company’s high-level officer. The Appellate Division noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and occurring away from the place of employment if the employee is engaged in duties directed by the employer (i.e. the special-mission exception). The company argued that Van Sciver was not directed by the employer to pick up the company’s executive because he could have declined. However, the Appellate Division reiterated that indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order, indicating that implied direction from high-level officers can expand an employee’s job duties. Finally, the company argued that the trial court’s legal determinations were not supported by the facts. In its review, the Appellate Division noted that they do not re-determine the factual findings of the trial judge, but they determine whether the trial judge’s findings had sufficient credible evidence. Thus, once a trial judge makes a factual determination, it can be quite difficult to change such a finding on appeal. It is clear that “special-mission” cases are heavily fact-specific. Employers must quickly investigate how an accident occurred, what the employee was asked to do, and the employee’s job responsibilities. Just as the court considered an executive’s request for a ride to work as an extension of the employee’s job duties, other requests could impact an employee in the same manner. Thus, employers must be careful not to blur the line between an employee’s professional responsibilities and personal favors. To determine whether an injury is compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the court must find that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, among other factors. In New Jersey, the “going-and-coming” rule governs and generally states that compensable accidents occur at the place of employment. There are few exceptions to this rule which allow for an employee’s off-site injury to be compensable, and they are extremely fact-specific. In Gregory Van Sciver v. Jersey Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2022 WL 16936881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022), the Appellate Division held that an employee met the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule when he was injured by an explosion in his personal vehicle. Mr. Van Sciver was a pipe fitter and truck driver for his employer. On September 29, 2020, Van Scriver was instructed to exchange two empty tanks that hold acetylene gas (B-Tanks) for full ones, deliver one of the full B-Tanks to a jobsite in Livingston, and deliver paychecks to a jobsite located in Bordentown. While in Bordentown, a jobsite foreman asked Van Sciver about his B-Tank delivery, but it was not on the employee’s list of tasks, so he returned to the main jobsite to ask his supervisor. Later that day, Van Sciver (acting on his own initiative) decided to deliver a full B-Tank to Bordentown using his personal vehicle since he would pass by Bordentown on his way home. However, the employee did not stop at the Bordentown jobsite that night because it was too late in the day. The next morning, the employee forgot to drop off the B-Tank in Bordentown. As he was driving his personal vehicle to work, the company’s project manager/estimator asked him for a ride to work. Van Sciver agreed. However, he heard a hissing noise from his vehicle while driving to the company executive’s house. When Van Sciver opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to investigate the sound, the B-Tank exploded and significantly injured him. He required numerous surgeries and extensive medical treatment after an eight-day coma, traumatic brain injuries, and the loss of use of one eye. At trial, all parties agreed that Van Sciver was not instructed to use his personal vehicle to deliver the B-Tank. In fact, the employer and the union agreement both instructed Van Sciver to NOT use personal vehicles for company business. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Van Sciver was trained to not store B-Tanks in confined places, such as his vehicle’s hatchback. Nonetheless, the trial judge found that: (1) the employee placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle with the sole intent and motive to deliver it to the Bordentown jobsite; (2) the tank was a “workplace instrumentality” of the employer; (3) the employee’s work responsibilities required him to be away from the main facility; (4) before the accident, the company’s executive asked the employee to pick him up for work; (5) the employee was en route to pick up the company’s executive when the accident occurred; and (6) the employee had an “objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that… he was in essence ‘compelled’ to say yes to picking up” the project manager/estimator because of his high-level position at the company. Thus, the trial judge found that Van Sciver was completing work-related duties when the injury occurred. It held that he was entitled to compensation under the “special-mission” exception of the going-and-coming rule on two grounds: (1) the employee was on a special mission delivering the B-Tank to Bordentown and the mission had not ended before the accident, and (2) the employee was engaged in a special mission for the company when he was driving to pick up the executive. The company appealed the trial judge’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision, stating that Van Sciver met the special-mission exception when he attempted to pick up the company’s high-level officer. The Appellate Division noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and occurring away from the place of employment if the employee is engaged in duties directed by the employer (i.e. the special-mission exception). The company argued that Van Sciver was not directed by the employer to pick up the company’s executive because he could have declined. However, the Appellate Division reiterated that indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order, indicating that implied direction from high-level officers can expand an employee’s job duties. Finally, the company argued that the trial court’s legal determinations were not supported by the facts. In its review, the Appellate Division noted that they do not re-determine the factual findings of the trial judge, but they determine whether the trial judge’s findings had sufficient credible evidence. Thus, once a trial judge makes a factual determination, it can be quite difficult to change such a finding on appeal. It is clear that “special-mission” cases are heavily fact-specific. Employers must quickly investigate how an accident occurred, what the employee was asked to do, and the employee’s job responsibilities. Just as the court considered an executive’s request for a ride to work as an extension of the employee’s job duties, other requests could impact an employee in the same manner. Thus, employers must be careful not to blur the line between an employee’s professional responsibilities and personal favors.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.