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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The New Jersey Supreme Court addresses medical marijuana in workers’ compensation cases.

Hager v. M&K Constr., 246 N.J., 1247 A.3d 864 (2021) and Calmon v. Pepsi Bottling Group, No. A-2160-19, (App. Div. May 11, 2021)

July 1, 2021

by Kiara K. Hartwell

In Hager v. M&K Constr., the respondent, M&K Construction, appealed a workers’ compensation order to reimburse the petitioner for medical marijuana, which was prescribed after a work-related injury. The petitioner was injured in August 2001 while employed as a laborer for M&K. He underwent two back surgeries, but due to persistent pain, he took opioid medication. He began treating with Dr. Joseph Liotta in 2016, when he was enrolled in the medical marijuana program as an alternative pain treatment and a means to wean him off opioids. Although he started with an ounce per month, his dose increased to the maximum allowed—two ounces—which cost more than $600.00 per month.

At trial, Dr. Liotta testified for the petitioner, noting that he suffered adverse side effects from opioids and was “motivated” to stop, which happened a month after starting medical marijuana. Dr. Liotta indicated there is a smaller risk of addiction to marijuana and fewer serious side effects. The petitioner also testified that it helped him wean off opioids, lessened his pain and helped with muscle spasms. In addition, Dr. Cary Skolnick testified for the petitioner that he needed long-term pain management as a result of the August 2001 injury and that he was 100% permanently and totally disabled, apportioning 65% for the back injury and 35% due to medication effects.

On the other hand, Dr. Gregory Gallick testified for the respondent, finding the petitioner to be 12.5% permanently disabled and still capable of certain jobs. Dr. Robert Brady also testified in describing side effects and risks of medical marijuana. He noted both medical marijuana and opioids were equally psychologically addictive, though opioids were more physically addictive. He opined that medical marijuana was not proven effective for conditions such as the petitioner’s and, rather, the best form of relief would be physical therapy and home exercise.

The Workers’ Compensation Judge found 65% permanent partial disability, apportioning 50% for the orthopedic condition and 15% due to medical marijuana effects. In choosing between medical marijuana and opioids, the court noted medical marijuana was the “clearly indicated option” and ordered M&K to reimburse the petitioner for its costs. The judge found Dr. Liotta and the petitioner’s testimony to be more credible than that of Dr. Brady, specifically emphasizing the petitioner’s ability to wean off opioids. The court indicated that “the Legislature intended to make available the benefits of medical marijuana to persons displaying a medical need, despite the federal attitude toward the substance.” Finally, the judge rejected the notion that M&K was like a private health insurer or government medical benefit program, which would not be required to reimburse medical marijuana costs.

The Appellate Division affirmed the workers’ compensation court’s findings and further went on to analyze whether the New Jersey Jake Honig Compassionate Use Medical Cannabis Act (Compassionate Use Act) was preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). In doing so, the Appellate Division found the Compassionate Use Act did not require employers to “possess, manufacture, or distribute” marijuana per the CSA. In addition, the Appellate Division concluded there was no aider-and-abettor liability for assisting in the petitioner’s possession as M&K did not have the requisite intent and, thus, did not face a credible threat of federal prosecution.

The Supreme Court then granted M&K’s petition for certification. First, the Supreme Court considered M&K’s argument that it should not have to reimburse the petitioner for costs of medical marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act and N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14 as it exempts “a government medical assistance program or private health insurer” from reimbursement. The court rejected this argument, citing to the plain language of the statute and indicating a workers’ compensation carrier does not fall into either category. Furthermore, the court looked to the legislative intent in not specifically including workers’ compensation insurance in the Compassionate Use Act, as other states have done. Because the Legislature did not exclude workers’ compensation carriers and included “chronic pain” as a qualifying medical condition, M&K was not exempt from reimbursing the petitioner.

Next, the Supreme Court rejected M&K’s argument that medical marijuana was not a “reasonable and necessary treatment.” The court looked to a prior decision in Squeo v. Comfort Control Corp., 99 N.J. 588 (1985), where construction of an injured worker’s apartment was found to be reasonable and necessary. The Squeo court not only considered the petitioner’s loss of use of his arms and legs, but also the possible psychological harm due to the petitioner’s multiple suicide attempts after an offer for placement in a nursing home. Similarly, in this case, the court recognized a potential harm to the petitioner in continuing to use opioids. In addition, reimbursement of medical marijuana was noted to be much less unique than the construction of an apartment found in Squeo.

In returning to the first point, as the Supreme Court found M&K was obligated to reimburse the petitioner under the Compassionate Use Act and the workers’ compensation statute, the court then analyzed whether the federal CSA quashed M&K’s state law obligations. After finding guidance from the United States Supreme Court and several circuit courts, the court determined M&K could follow both the Compassionate Use Act and CSA, as the first does not create any obstacles in accomplishing congressional objectives. The court also acknowledged that its decision differed from other state supreme courts, but it noted they were not binding and that its decision was in line with legislative intent, an analysis of federal authorities and the principles of preemption.

Finally, the Supreme Court discussed M&K’s contention that reimbursing medical marijuana costs would be aiding and abetting the petitioner’s possession of marijuana. The court initially noted that M&K was not “electing” to aid the petitioner’s possession of marijuana but, rather, that it was being compelled by court order. Further, the court indicated M&K failed to demonstrate specific intent to aid-and-abet. Again, it was reiterated that M&K was being compelled by the court and, thus, could not be considered as intentionally committing an offense.

Approximately a month after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hager, the Appellate Division in Calmon v. Pepsi Bottling Group affirmed the workers’ compensation order to reimburse the petitioner for medical marijuana prescribed for a work-related back injury. As Hager addressed the same issues raised by Pepsi Bottling Group, the Appellate Division issued this decision after relying on Hager.

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.