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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The Appellate Division remands a workers’ compensation order dismissing a petitioner’s case for exceeding the statute of limitations.

Gary Streeper v. State of N.J., No. A-1625-19 (App. Div. Mar. 8, 2022)

May 1, 2022

by Kiara K. Hartwell

In this case, the Appellate Division vacated the November 8, 2019, order dismissing the petitioner’s application for review or modification of an award and remanded to the lower court. 

On April 15, 2003, the petitioner, an employee of the State, injured his right leg while at work. After authorized treatment, a judgment for settlement was entered in September 2008. The petitioner subsequently underwent additional treatment through February 1, 2012. On July 24, 2019, he filed an application for review or modification of the award to the 2003 incident, and in its answer, the State noted it was filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations period. The workers’ compensation court considered this to be the State’s motion to dismiss, which the petitioner opposed. The petitioner argued the judge should relax this time period in the interest of justice, re-open the 2003 claim due to mistake or other good cause, and/or amend his 2013 claim to include the 2003 injuries.

In 2010, the petitioner had multiple other claims, including one for a 2000 incident involving his left knee. That claim was settled in 2005, re-opened in 2007, and settled again in 2009. He noted that he sought treatment for both his knees and the State provided treatment without him filing applications for review or modification on either claim. He obtained a left knee replacement in October 2010 and a right knee replacement two months later.

Per the petitioner, he received additional treatment for both the 2000 and 2003 claims under the 2000 claim petition at the direction of the Division of Workers’ Compensation. He argued that by doing so, his attorney believed both claims would be treated as one going forward. The petitioner also noted that Horizon Casualty Services, the insurer for the State, assigned one claim number for both of these incidents.

In November 2013, the petitioner filed an application for review or modification of the 2000 claim petition, anticipating that it would apply to both the 2000 and 2003 claims, though the dates on that application only referred to the 2000 claim. The petitioner also submitted two memos by his attorney—the first in September 2018, noting Horizon was only using one claim number for both claims, and the second in January 2018, noting a representative of the Division advised that the 2003 claim was open via phone call. Three months after, a Division investigator informed petitioner’s attorney that the 2003 claim was closed.

An oral opinion was issued by the Judge of Compensation granting the State’s motion and finding that the July 24, 2019, application was filed more than seven years after the final benefit on February 1, 2012. The petitioner appealed, arguing the judge erred in failing to exercise her authority to correct his attorney’s mistake by re-opening the 2003 claim or amending the November 2013 application to include the 2003 claim.

Although the Appellate Division acknowledged the two-year statute of limitations to reopen a claim, it also delved into exceptions, including the exception to correct a mistake, as in Hyman v. Essex Cty. Carpet Cleaning Co., 157 N.J. Super. 510 (App. Div. 1978), or an omission, as in Camp v. Lockheed Elec., Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div. 1981). The Appellate Division found the Judge of Compensation erred when she concluded she did not have the authority to consider whether the attorney’s mistake in the administrative consolidation warranted reopening the 2003 claim and its judgment in 2008 or amending the 2013 application. As such, the Appellate Division remanded the case for the judge to review same.

While the Appellate Division did not comment on whether the petitioner’s request for relief was warranted, it noted the State did not dispute providing treatment to both knees at the same time and under the same claim number. The petitioner’s attorney alleged the Division’s personnel instructed him to treat both claims under one claim petition number, his objections to same were rejected, to seek consolidation of the claims at settlement of his 2013 application, and advised after four years that the 2013 application the 2003 claim was still open. The Appellate Division directed the Judge of Compensation to ascertain what happened between the parties and the Division representative and whether the petitioner pursued an application of his 2000 and 2003 awards.

 

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Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.