.

Defense Digest

New Jersey Medical Provider Claims Are Contingent Upon Jurisdiction Over Underlying Claim

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021

January 29, 2021

by Kiara K. Hartwell

Key Points:

  • For a New Jersey workers’ compensation court to have jurisdiction over Medical Provider claims, there must be jurisdiction over an underlying claim.
  • Jurisdiction can be determined by place of injury, place of contract, place of employment, place where industry is localized, place of residency, place decided on by a contract or place of sufficient contacts.
  • The Appellate Division cautions litigants against disrespectful characterizations of unfavorable decisions by workers’ compensation judges.

In a recently consolidated appeal, the New Jersey Appellate Division clarified the scope of jurisdiction granted to workers’ compensation courts in medical provider claims. The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act provides “[e]xclusive jurisdiction” to the courts over disputed medical charges “arising from any claim for compensation for a work-related injury or illness.” Although the jurisdiction inquiry is fact-sensitive, the Appellate Division went further to explain that a single day of treatment in New Jersey was insufficient without any other contacts.

In the first of the two consolidated cases, Anesthesia Assoc. of Morristown, PA v. Weinstein Supply Corp., 2020 WL 5944009 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 7, 2020), Anesthesia Assoc. of Morristown, PA provided services to an injured worker at a New Jersey hospital on March 22, 2018. The underlying workers’ compensation claim was filed in Pennsylvania because the accident occurred in Pennsylvania, the injured worker was a resident of Pennsylvania, and Weinstein Supply Corp. was based in Pennsylvania. Anesthesia Assoc. submitted a claim to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry and received a payment per the applicable fee schedule. It subsequently sought payment of the balance from Weinstein’s insurance carrier.

When Weinstein’s insurer failed to make payment on the balance, Anesthesia Assoc. filed a Medical Provider claim in New Jersey. Weinstein filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the New Jersey workers’ compensation court ultimately granted. In doing so, the court concluded it did not have personal jurisdiction over the underlying workers’ compensation claim because none of the “Larson factors” (found in Williams v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 175 N.J. 82, 87-88 (2003)) applied:

[the employee] lived in [Pennsylvania], worked in [Pennsylvania], and the accident occurred in [Pennsylvania]. The contract of hire occurred in [Pennsylvania]. No contract exists between [Anesthesia Assoc.] and Weinstein. The only connection to New Jersey is that [the employee] underwent one day of medical treatment with [Anesthesia Assoc.] in New Jersey.

The court explained that, just as the courts have found an injured worker’s New Jersey residence alone was insufficient for jurisdiction, “one day of treatment in New Jersey” was also insufficient.

In the second case, Surgicare of Jersey City v. Waldbaums, 2020 WL 5944009 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 7, 2020), the injured worker, a resident of New York, was injured in New York while working for his New York employer, Stop & Shop. The worker filed a claim in New York and, on August 11, 2017, underwent surgery at Surgicare of Jersey City. Surgicare submitted a claim for payment in New York and subsequently filed a Medical Provider claim in New Jersey. Similar to Weinstein, Waldbaums filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Surgicare argued that Waldbaums did business in New Jersey and that treatment was rendered in New Jersey, establishing jurisdiction there. However, the New Jersey workers’ compensation court granted Waldbaums’ motion, noting that the injured worker “was directed by his New York doctor to a surgical center in New Jersey for a single, one-day visit. The patient’s same-day surgery was performed by a New York doctor using equipment and devices ordered by the New York doctor.” The judge ruled that this single day of treatment was insufficient to “rise to the standard of sufficient purposeful minimal contacts” for personal jurisdiction.

In reviewing the consolidated appeals, the Appellate Division concluded that “[u]nless the Division [of Workers’ Compensation] has jurisdiction over the underlying claim for a compensable work-related injury, it does not have jurisdiction over a [Medical Provider claim] for payment.” After applying the six “Larson factors” to both cases, the Appellate Division agreed with the workers’ compensation courts in finding that no jurisdiction existed for either claim and held that both were appropriately dismissed.

Finally, feeling compelled to comment on various hyperbolic and inflammatory remarks in the appellants’ briefs, the Appellate Division cautioned against baseless, future attacks accusing the workers’ compensation judges of either abusing their authority or rendering incoherent or preposterous decisions. It was noted that such comments were unwarranted and did little to advance a client’s position, while, on the other hand, eroding the public’s trust in the judiciary.

As these cases illustrate, medical providers seeking reimbursement must establish jurisdiction over the underlying workers’ compensation claim. Although this is a fact-sensitive inquiry, these cases confirm that New Jersey workers’ compensation courts require, at the very least, more than a single day of treatment in New Jersey. The inquiry going forward will be whether two days of treatment or other similar examples will be sufficient bases for jurisdiction. In order to avoid any possibility of paying under the New Jersey payment scheme, where there is no set fee schedule, employers and carriers handling non-New Jersey claims should strive to direct care within their respective states as much as possible. This is not only because whether New Jersey has jurisdiction is fact-sensitive to each case, but also because New Jersey has no fee schedule and only pays the “usual and customary charges” for services.

*Kiara is an associate in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey office. She can be reached at (856) 414-6404 or kkhartwell@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

In a recently consolidated appeal, the New Jersey Appellate Division clarified the scope of jurisdiction granted to workers’ compensation courts in medical provider claims. The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act provides “[e]xclusive jurisdiction” to the courts over disputed medical charges “arising from any claim for compensation for a work-related injury or illness.” Although the jurisdiction inquiry is fact-sensitive, the Appellate Division went further to explain that a single day of treatment in New Jersey was insufficient without any other contacts.

In the first of the two consolidated cases, Anesthesia Assoc. of Morristown, PA v. Weinstein Supply Corp., 2020 WL 5944009 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 7, 2020), Anesthesia Assoc. of Morristown, PA provided services to an injured worker at a New Jersey hospital on March 22, 2018. The underlying workers’ compensation claim was filed in Pennsylvania because the accident occurred in Pennsylvania, the injured worker was a resident of Pennsylvania, and Weinstein Supply Corp. was based in Pennsylvania. Anesthesia Assoc. submitted a claim to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry and received a payment per the applicable fee schedule. It subsequently sought payment of the balance from Weinstein’s insurance carrier.

When Weinstein’s insurer failed to make payment on the balance, Anesthesia Assoc. filed a Medical Provider claim in New Jersey. Weinstein filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the New Jersey workers’ compensation court ultimately granted. In doing so, the court concluded it did not have personal jurisdiction over the underlying workers’ compensation claim because none of the “Larson factors” (found in Williams v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 175 N.J. 82, 87-88 (2003)) applied:

[the employee] lived in [Pennsylvania], worked in [Pennsylvania], and the accident occurred in [Pennsylvania]. The contract of hire occurred in [Pennsylvania]. No contract exists between [Anesthesia Assoc.] and Weinstein. The only connection to New Jersey is that [the employee] underwent one day of medical treatment with [Anesthesia Assoc.] in New Jersey.

The court explained that, just as the courts have found an injured worker’s New Jersey residence alone was insufficient for jurisdiction, “one day of treatment in New Jersey” was also insufficient.

In the second case, Surgicare of Jersey City v. Waldbaums, 2020 WL 5944009 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 7, 2020), the injured worker, a resident of New York, was injured in New York while working for his New York employer, Stop & Shop. The worker filed a claim in New York and, on August 11, 2017, underwent surgery at Surgicare of Jersey City. Surgicare submitted a claim for payment in New York and subsequently filed a Medical Provider claim in New Jersey. Similar to Weinstein, Waldbaums filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Surgicare argued that Waldbaums did business in New Jersey and that treatment was rendered in New Jersey, establishing jurisdiction there. However, the New Jersey workers’ compensation court granted Waldbaums’ motion, noting that the injured worker “was directed by his New York doctor to a surgical center in New Jersey for a single, one-day visit. The patient’s same-day surgery was performed by a New York doctor using equipment and devices ordered by the New York doctor.” The judge ruled that this single day of treatment was insufficient to “rise to the standard of sufficient purposeful minimal contacts” for personal jurisdiction.

In reviewing the consolidated appeals, the Appellate Division concluded that “[u]nless the Division [of Workers’ Compensation] has jurisdiction over the underlying claim for a compensable work-related injury, it does not have jurisdiction over a [Medical Provider claim] for payment.” After applying the six “Larson factors” to both cases, the Appellate Division agreed with the workers’ compensation courts in finding that no jurisdiction existed for either claim and held that both were appropriately dismissed.

Finally, feeling compelled to comment on various hyperbolic and inflammatory remarks in the appellants’ briefs, the Appellate Division cautioned against baseless, future attacks accusing the workers’ compensation judges of either abusing their authority or rendering incoherent or preposterous decisions. It was noted that such comments were unwarranted and did little to advance a client’s position, while, on the other hand, eroding the public’s trust in the judiciary.

As these cases illustrate, medical providers seeking reimbursement must establish jurisdiction over the underlying workers’ compensation claim. Although this is a fact-sensitive inquiry, these cases confirm that New Jersey workers’ compensation courts require, at the very least, more than a single day of treatment in New Jersey. The inquiry going forward will be whether two days of treatment or other similar examples will be sufficient bases for jurisdiction. In order to avoid any possibility of paying under the New Jersey payment scheme, where there is no set fee schedule, employers and carriers handling non-New Jersey claims should strive to direct care within their respective states as much as possible. This is not only because whether New Jersey has jurisdiction is fact-sensitive to each case, but also because New Jersey has no fee schedule and only pays the “usual and customary charges” for services.

*Kiara is an associate in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey office. She can be reached at (856) 414-6404 or kkhartwell@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.