.

Defense Digest

New Jersey Medical Provider Claims Are Contingent Upon Jurisdiction Over Underlying Claim

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021

January 29, 2021

by Kiara K. Hartwell

Key Points:

  • For a New Jersey workers’ compensation court to have jurisdiction over Medical Provider claims, there must be jurisdiction over an underlying claim.
  • Jurisdiction can be determined by place of injury, place of contract, place of employment, place where industry is localized, place of residency, place decided on by a contract or place of sufficient contacts.
  • The Appellate Division cautions litigants against disrespectful characterizations of unfavorable decisions by workers’ compensation judges.

In a recently consolidated appeal, the New Jersey Appellate Division clarified the scope of jurisdiction granted to workers’ compensation courts in medical provider claims. The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act provides “[e]xclusive jurisdiction” to the courts over disputed medical charges “arising from any claim for compensation for a work-related injury or illness.” Although the jurisdiction inquiry is fact-sensitive, the Appellate Division went further to explain that a single day of treatment in New Jersey was insufficient without any other contacts.

In the first of the two consolidated cases, Anesthesia Assoc. of Morristown, PA v. Weinstein Supply Corp., 2020 WL 5944009 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 7, 2020), Anesthesia Assoc. of Morristown, PA provided services to an injured worker at a New Jersey hospital on March 22, 2018. The underlying workers’ compensation claim was filed in Pennsylvania because the accident occurred in Pennsylvania, the injured worker was a resident of Pennsylvania, and Weinstein Supply Corp. was based in Pennsylvania. Anesthesia Assoc. submitted a claim to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry and received a payment per the applicable fee schedule. It subsequently sought payment of the balance from Weinstein’s insurance carrier.

When Weinstein’s insurer failed to make payment on the balance, Anesthesia Assoc. filed a Medical Provider claim in New Jersey. Weinstein filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the New Jersey workers’ compensation court ultimately granted. In doing so, the court concluded it did not have personal jurisdiction over the underlying workers’ compensation claim because none of the “Larson factors” (found in Williams v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 175 N.J. 82, 87-88 (2003)) applied:

[the employee] lived in [Pennsylvania], worked in [Pennsylvania], and the accident occurred in [Pennsylvania]. The contract of hire occurred in [Pennsylvania]. No contract exists between [Anesthesia Assoc.] and Weinstein. The only connection to New Jersey is that [the employee] underwent one day of medical treatment with [Anesthesia Assoc.] in New Jersey.

The court explained that, just as the courts have found an injured worker’s New Jersey residence alone was insufficient for jurisdiction, “one day of treatment in New Jersey” was also insufficient.

In the second case, Surgicare of Jersey City v. Waldbaums, 2020 WL 5944009 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 7, 2020), the injured worker, a resident of New York, was injured in New York while working for his New York employer, Stop & Shop. The worker filed a claim in New York and, on August 11, 2017, underwent surgery at Surgicare of Jersey City. Surgicare submitted a claim for payment in New York and subsequently filed a Medical Provider claim in New Jersey. Similar to Weinstein, Waldbaums filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Surgicare argued that Waldbaums did business in New Jersey and that treatment was rendered in New Jersey, establishing jurisdiction there. However, the New Jersey workers’ compensation court granted Waldbaums’ motion, noting that the injured worker “was directed by his New York doctor to a surgical center in New Jersey for a single, one-day visit. The patient’s same-day surgery was performed by a New York doctor using equipment and devices ordered by the New York doctor.” The judge ruled that this single day of treatment was insufficient to “rise to the standard of sufficient purposeful minimal contacts” for personal jurisdiction.

In reviewing the consolidated appeals, the Appellate Division concluded that “[u]nless the Division [of Workers’ Compensation] has jurisdiction over the underlying claim for a compensable work-related injury, it does not have jurisdiction over a [Medical Provider claim] for payment.” After applying the six “Larson factors” to both cases, the Appellate Division agreed with the workers’ compensation courts in finding that no jurisdiction existed for either claim and held that both were appropriately dismissed.

Finally, feeling compelled to comment on various hyperbolic and inflammatory remarks in the appellants’ briefs, the Appellate Division cautioned against baseless, future attacks accusing the workers’ compensation judges of either abusing their authority or rendering incoherent or preposterous decisions. It was noted that such comments were unwarranted and did little to advance a client’s position, while, on the other hand, eroding the public’s trust in the judiciary.

As these cases illustrate, medical providers seeking reimbursement must establish jurisdiction over the underlying workers’ compensation claim. Although this is a fact-sensitive inquiry, these cases confirm that New Jersey workers’ compensation courts require, at the very least, more than a single day of treatment in New Jersey. The inquiry going forward will be whether two days of treatment or other similar examples will be sufficient bases for jurisdiction. In order to avoid any possibility of paying under the New Jersey payment scheme, where there is no set fee schedule, employers and carriers handling non-New Jersey claims should strive to direct care within their respective states as much as possible. This is not only because whether New Jersey has jurisdiction is fact-sensitive to each case, but also because New Jersey has no fee schedule and only pays the “usual and customary charges” for services.

*Kiara is an associate in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey office. She can be reached at (856) 414-6404 or kkhartwell@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

In a recently consolidated appeal, the New Jersey Appellate Division clarified the scope of jurisdiction granted to workers’ compensation courts in medical provider claims. The New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act provides “[e]xclusive jurisdiction” to the courts over disputed medical charges “arising from any claim for compensation for a work-related injury or illness.” Although the jurisdiction inquiry is fact-sensitive, the Appellate Division went further to explain that a single day of treatment in New Jersey was insufficient without any other contacts.

In the first of the two consolidated cases, Anesthesia Assoc. of Morristown, PA v. Weinstein Supply Corp., 2020 WL 5944009 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 7, 2020), Anesthesia Assoc. of Morristown, PA provided services to an injured worker at a New Jersey hospital on March 22, 2018. The underlying workers’ compensation claim was filed in Pennsylvania because the accident occurred in Pennsylvania, the injured worker was a resident of Pennsylvania, and Weinstein Supply Corp. was based in Pennsylvania. Anesthesia Assoc. submitted a claim to the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry and received a payment per the applicable fee schedule. It subsequently sought payment of the balance from Weinstein’s insurance carrier.

When Weinstein’s insurer failed to make payment on the balance, Anesthesia Assoc. filed a Medical Provider claim in New Jersey. Weinstein filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the New Jersey workers’ compensation court ultimately granted. In doing so, the court concluded it did not have personal jurisdiction over the underlying workers’ compensation claim because none of the “Larson factors” (found in Williams v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 175 N.J. 82, 87-88 (2003)) applied:

[the employee] lived in [Pennsylvania], worked in [Pennsylvania], and the accident occurred in [Pennsylvania]. The contract of hire occurred in [Pennsylvania]. No contract exists between [Anesthesia Assoc.] and Weinstein. The only connection to New Jersey is that [the employee] underwent one day of medical treatment with [Anesthesia Assoc.] in New Jersey.

The court explained that, just as the courts have found an injured worker’s New Jersey residence alone was insufficient for jurisdiction, “one day of treatment in New Jersey” was also insufficient.

In the second case, Surgicare of Jersey City v. Waldbaums, 2020 WL 5944009 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 7, 2020), the injured worker, a resident of New York, was injured in New York while working for his New York employer, Stop & Shop. The worker filed a claim in New York and, on August 11, 2017, underwent surgery at Surgicare of Jersey City. Surgicare submitted a claim for payment in New York and subsequently filed a Medical Provider claim in New Jersey. Similar to Weinstein, Waldbaums filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Surgicare argued that Waldbaums did business in New Jersey and that treatment was rendered in New Jersey, establishing jurisdiction there. However, the New Jersey workers’ compensation court granted Waldbaums’ motion, noting that the injured worker “was directed by his New York doctor to a surgical center in New Jersey for a single, one-day visit. The patient’s same-day surgery was performed by a New York doctor using equipment and devices ordered by the New York doctor.” The judge ruled that this single day of treatment was insufficient to “rise to the standard of sufficient purposeful minimal contacts” for personal jurisdiction.

In reviewing the consolidated appeals, the Appellate Division concluded that “[u]nless the Division [of Workers’ Compensation] has jurisdiction over the underlying claim for a compensable work-related injury, it does not have jurisdiction over a [Medical Provider claim] for payment.” After applying the six “Larson factors” to both cases, the Appellate Division agreed with the workers’ compensation courts in finding that no jurisdiction existed for either claim and held that both were appropriately dismissed.

Finally, feeling compelled to comment on various hyperbolic and inflammatory remarks in the appellants’ briefs, the Appellate Division cautioned against baseless, future attacks accusing the workers’ compensation judges of either abusing their authority or rendering incoherent or preposterous decisions. It was noted that such comments were unwarranted and did little to advance a client’s position, while, on the other hand, eroding the public’s trust in the judiciary.

As these cases illustrate, medical providers seeking reimbursement must establish jurisdiction over the underlying workers’ compensation claim. Although this is a fact-sensitive inquiry, these cases confirm that New Jersey workers’ compensation courts require, at the very least, more than a single day of treatment in New Jersey. The inquiry going forward will be whether two days of treatment or other similar examples will be sufficient bases for jurisdiction. In order to avoid any possibility of paying under the New Jersey payment scheme, where there is no set fee schedule, employers and carriers handling non-New Jersey claims should strive to direct care within their respective states as much as possible. This is not only because whether New Jersey has jurisdiction is fact-sensitive to each case, but also because New Jersey has no fee schedule and only pays the “usual and customary charges” for services.

*Kiara is an associate in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey office. She can be reached at (856) 414-6404 or kkhartwell@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.