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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

New Jersey Appellate Court affirms permanent disability award found in workers’ compensation order in pro se appeal.

Morales v. Advance Auto Parts, No. A-0557-20 (App. Div. Sept. 30, 2021)

January 3, 2022

by Kiara K. Hartwell

A pro se petitioner appealed a workers’ compensation order awarding 25% permanent partial-total disability. The Appellate Division affirmed, substantially for reasons laid out by the Workers’ Compensation Judge, and only added a few comments.

In September 2011, the petitioner was driving a company car when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. At the hospital, she was diagnosed with a head contusion and neck and upper back strains. After failing conservative treatment, she underwent an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion in January 2013. Subsequently, she returned to work for the employer, but continued to complain of back pain, limiting her ability to drive. She was found disabled by Dr. A. Taha from September 5, 2013, to November 15, 2013, for her back pain. The petitioner then became self-employed.

The petitioner underwent two independent medical exams, one with Dr. S. Lomazow in November 2014 and another with Dr. C. Mercurio in April 2015. Dr. Lomazow found no neurological permanency, whereas Dr. Mercurio found 10% permanent disability to the cervical spine and 5% for the lumbar spine.

In May 2015, the petitioner was involved in another motor vehicle accident—unrelated to her job—for which she claimed her cervical and lumbar spine pain was exacerbated and her headaches more severe. In April 2018, she was evaluated by her expert, Dr. V. Kulkarni, who opined the petitioner’s cervical and lumbar spines were aggravated by the 2015 accident and found 65% permanent disability for the cervical spine and 45% for the lumbar spine. Dr. Kulkarni could not apportion disability for the two accidents. The petitioner also saw Dr. C. Wong, who found 27.5% neurological disability from all causes and 25% psychiatric disability from all causes.

In February 2020, the petitioner, represented by counsel and with a Spanish interpreter, testified about her complaints after the two accidents. She noted she presently receives treatment from a psychologist, psychiatrist and pain management specialist. In March 2020, the parties waived testimony by the experts and stipulated their reports into evidence. Subsequently, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the judge’s decision was delayed. In August 2020, the judge rendered an oral opinion, noting credibility issues with the petitioner and inconsistencies by Dr. Mercurio, leading the judge to find the petitioner was exaggerating some complaints.

The judge indicated that the petitioner was not evaluated by her experts until after the 2015 accident and that neither provided any apportionment of disability from the two accidents. The judge found 15% permanent disability for the cervical spine and 10% for the lumbar spine, for a total of 25% permanent disability, orthopedic in nature. He also noted the overall disability was greater due to the subsequent and unrelated 2015 accident. The petitioner appealed.

The Appellate Division noted substantial deference was given to factual findings and legal determinations unless “manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent relevant and reasonably credible evidence so as to offend the interests of justice.” Based on same, the Appellate Division affirmed, largely for the reasons provided by the Judge of Compensation. In response to some of the petitioner’s arguments, the Appellate Division found no merit, including the argument that the judge did not consider her permanently disabled; her testimony was incorrectly translated; she was disabled from the 2011 accident, not the 2015 accident; her attorney did not present all proofs; and she had outstanding medical bills.

With regard to her argument that the 2011 accident caused her disability, not the 2015 accident, the Appellate Division noted the evidence “clearly showed” aggravation from the 2011 accident. Also, the Appellate Division indicated the Judge of Compensation considered the 2015 aggravation and correctly determined her disability from the 2011 accident. With regard to the translator argument, the Appellate Division confirmed this was argued for the first time on appeal—that she was “forced” to testify in Spanish and the translation did not match her actual testimony. However, the Appellate Division found no issue with the interpreter. Finally, the Appellate Division briefly addressed the outstanding medical bill argument, noting the judge was made aware of the Social Security award and third party settlements and that no outstanding bills were presented during trial.
 

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Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.