.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

New Jersey Appellate Court affirms permanent disability award found in workers’ compensation order in pro se appeal.

Morales v. Advance Auto Parts, No. A-0557-20 (App. Div. Sept. 30, 2021)

January 3, 2022

by Kiara K. Hartwell

A pro se petitioner appealed a workers’ compensation order awarding 25% permanent partial-total disability. The Appellate Division affirmed, substantially for reasons laid out by the Workers’ Compensation Judge, and only added a few comments.

In September 2011, the petitioner was driving a company car when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. At the hospital, she was diagnosed with a head contusion and neck and upper back strains. After failing conservative treatment, she underwent an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion in January 2013. Subsequently, she returned to work for the employer, but continued to complain of back pain, limiting her ability to drive. She was found disabled by Dr. A. Taha from September 5, 2013, to November 15, 2013, for her back pain. The petitioner then became self-employed.

The petitioner underwent two independent medical exams, one with Dr. S. Lomazow in November 2014 and another with Dr. C. Mercurio in April 2015. Dr. Lomazow found no neurological permanency, whereas Dr. Mercurio found 10% permanent disability to the cervical spine and 5% for the lumbar spine.

In May 2015, the petitioner was involved in another motor vehicle accident—unrelated to her job—for which she claimed her cervical and lumbar spine pain was exacerbated and her headaches more severe. In April 2018, she was evaluated by her expert, Dr. V. Kulkarni, who opined the petitioner’s cervical and lumbar spines were aggravated by the 2015 accident and found 65% permanent disability for the cervical spine and 45% for the lumbar spine. Dr. Kulkarni could not apportion disability for the two accidents. The petitioner also saw Dr. C. Wong, who found 27.5% neurological disability from all causes and 25% psychiatric disability from all causes.

In February 2020, the petitioner, represented by counsel and with a Spanish interpreter, testified about her complaints after the two accidents. She noted she presently receives treatment from a psychologist, psychiatrist and pain management specialist. In March 2020, the parties waived testimony by the experts and stipulated their reports into evidence. Subsequently, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the judge’s decision was delayed. In August 2020, the judge rendered an oral opinion, noting credibility issues with the petitioner and inconsistencies by Dr. Mercurio, leading the judge to find the petitioner was exaggerating some complaints.

The judge indicated that the petitioner was not evaluated by her experts until after the 2015 accident and that neither provided any apportionment of disability from the two accidents. The judge found 15% permanent disability for the cervical spine and 10% for the lumbar spine, for a total of 25% permanent disability, orthopedic in nature. He also noted the overall disability was greater due to the subsequent and unrelated 2015 accident. The petitioner appealed.

The Appellate Division noted substantial deference was given to factual findings and legal determinations unless “manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent relevant and reasonably credible evidence so as to offend the interests of justice.” Based on same, the Appellate Division affirmed, largely for the reasons provided by the Judge of Compensation. In response to some of the petitioner’s arguments, the Appellate Division found no merit, including the argument that the judge did not consider her permanently disabled; her testimony was incorrectly translated; she was disabled from the 2011 accident, not the 2015 accident; her attorney did not present all proofs; and she had outstanding medical bills.

With regard to her argument that the 2011 accident caused her disability, not the 2015 accident, the Appellate Division noted the evidence “clearly showed” aggravation from the 2011 accident. Also, the Appellate Division indicated the Judge of Compensation considered the 2015 aggravation and correctly determined her disability from the 2011 accident. With regard to the translator argument, the Appellate Division confirmed this was argued for the first time on appeal—that she was “forced” to testify in Spanish and the translation did not match her actual testimony. However, the Appellate Division found no issue with the interpreter. Finally, the Appellate Division briefly addressed the outstanding medical bill argument, noting the judge was made aware of the Social Security award and third party settlements and that no outstanding bills were presented during trial.
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.