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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

In four back-to-back appeals, the Appellate Division finds the triennial redetermination of average current monthly earnings was not applicable in New Jersey as a reverse offset state.

Wilhelm v. Ryder Logistics & Transp. & Second Injury Fund, No. A-3770-18; Bozarth, Sr. v Burlington Cnty. & SIF, No. A-3792-18; Schiazza v. Western Oilfield Supply & SIF, No. A-3797-18; Pierce, Jr. v. CBF Trucking & SIF, No. A-3798-18, (App. Div. 6/21/21)

September 1, 2021

by Kiara K. Hartwell

In four back-to-back appeals, the Appellate Division again affirmed the workers’ compensation court’s decisions, noting the petitioners were not entitled to a redetermination of benefits. In these cases, the petitioners all collected permanent and total disability benefits and Social Security Disability benefits. Wilhelm’s Social Security Disability application was pending, whereas Pierce’s and Schiazza’s applications were on appeal at the time of the total disability orders. They were required to notify the respondents and the Second Injury Fund (Fund) if Social Security Disability was approved so that reimbursements could be made for workers’ compensation benefits paid in excess of the Social Security Disability offset rate. Once they were approved for Social Security Disability, the Fund moved for reimbursement. The petitioners opposed, seeking a recalculation of the benefit rates to include a triennial redetermination of the average current monthly earnings (ACE). Bozarth also re-opened his case for same reason.

The cases were consolidated and tried in 2016-2017. The Fund produced Larry Crider as its witness, who was the administrator of Special Compensation Funds for the New Jersey Department of Labor since 1990. In 1980, he became involved in processing calculations for the Fund with the Social Security offset. He worked with compensation judges Alan Napier and Michael Cunningham. He testified that they agreed an offset was required if the “total of the weekly workers’ compensation benefits and the weekly equivalent of social security benefit exceed[s] [eighty] percent of the ACE.” There were no cost-of-living increases mentioned in the statute. Crider indicated that legislative history did not reveal an intent for a triennial review for the offset calculations.

He recalled that in 2004 or 2005 an attorney inquired whether petitioners were entitled to a triennial redetermination of ACE. Crider did his own research and requested Glenn Sklar, the Associate Commissioner of Disability Programs at the Social Security Administration, to provide clarification. Sklar confirmed that Social Security was precluded from taking a reduction in Social Security Disability in a reverse offset state and that their manual noted a reverse offset existed for Fund benefits in New Jersey. Crider concluded that N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 did not support a triennial redetermination and that 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d) excluded a reverse offset state from performing same.

The petitioners presented Alan Polonsky, an attorney with 30 years of experience handling Social Security benefit claims, as a witness. He was a staff attorney with the Social Security Administration Office of Hearing and Appeals until 1987 when he entered private practice. He related the triennial redetermination to a cost-of-living adjustment, but conceded he had never seen the triennial redetermination applied to a petitioner under the age of 62 receiving total disability benefits. He also confirmed the redetermination would not be applicable as New Jersey is a reverse offset state.

The Judge of Compensation issued an oral decision, finding N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 did not compel a triennial redetermination of ACE nor was it mentioned. Also, the judge found the petitioners neglected 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d). The petitioners’ motions for a triennial redetermination was denied, and the respondents’ and the Fund’s motions for offset and reimbursement were granted.

The petitioners appealed, arguing they were entitled to the redetermination of ACE under N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 until they reach age 62 and that the statute did not comply with 42 U.S.C. § 424a(f). The Fund contended the petitioners were precluded from asserting this issue as it was not presented before the total disability awards, and the respondents asserted there was no support for a triennial determination.

The Appellate Division briefly addressed the procedural bar raised by the Fund, noting the petitioners did not raise the triennial redetermination issue prior to the entry of the awards nor that their disability increased or decreased. It was noted the petitioners failed to meet the statutory criteria to re-open their cases. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division did address the substantive issue, as it was an issue of first impression. The Appellate Division noted that New Jersey is a reverse offset state, in which the workers’ compensation award is reduced rather than Social Security Disability. Both Crider and Polonsky testified that a person below the age of 62 is subject to the reverse offset if receiving total disability benefits.

As 42 U.S.C. § 424a(f) provided for a redetermination of the Social Security offset every three years, the petitioners argued the New Jersey Legislature intended to adopt the federal triennial redetermination. However, the Appellate Division noted the plain language does not include same and there was no mention in the legislative history. It was also indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d) created an exception for reverse offset states. As such, the Appellate Division found the triennial redetermination of ACE was not applicable in New Jersey as a reverse offset state.
 
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.