.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

In four back-to-back appeals, the Appellate Division finds the triennial redetermination of average current monthly earnings was not applicable in New Jersey as a reverse offset state.

Wilhelm v. Ryder Logistics & Transp. & Second Injury Fund, No. A-3770-18; Bozarth, Sr. v Burlington Cnty. & SIF, No. A-3792-18; Schiazza v. Western Oilfield Supply & SIF, No. A-3797-18; Pierce, Jr. v. CBF Trucking & SIF, No. A-3798-18, (App. Div. 6/21/21)

September 1, 2021

by Kiara K. Hartwell

In four back-to-back appeals, the Appellate Division again affirmed the workers’ compensation court’s decisions, noting the petitioners were not entitled to a redetermination of benefits. In these cases, the petitioners all collected permanent and total disability benefits and Social Security Disability benefits. Wilhelm’s Social Security Disability application was pending, whereas Pierce’s and Schiazza’s applications were on appeal at the time of the total disability orders. They were required to notify the respondents and the Second Injury Fund (Fund) if Social Security Disability was approved so that reimbursements could be made for workers’ compensation benefits paid in excess of the Social Security Disability offset rate. Once they were approved for Social Security Disability, the Fund moved for reimbursement. The petitioners opposed, seeking a recalculation of the benefit rates to include a triennial redetermination of the average current monthly earnings (ACE). Bozarth also re-opened his case for same reason.

The cases were consolidated and tried in 2016-2017. The Fund produced Larry Crider as its witness, who was the administrator of Special Compensation Funds for the New Jersey Department of Labor since 1990. In 1980, he became involved in processing calculations for the Fund with the Social Security offset. He worked with compensation judges Alan Napier and Michael Cunningham. He testified that they agreed an offset was required if the “total of the weekly workers’ compensation benefits and the weekly equivalent of social security benefit exceed[s] [eighty] percent of the ACE.” There were no cost-of-living increases mentioned in the statute. Crider indicated that legislative history did not reveal an intent for a triennial review for the offset calculations.

He recalled that in 2004 or 2005 an attorney inquired whether petitioners were entitled to a triennial redetermination of ACE. Crider did his own research and requested Glenn Sklar, the Associate Commissioner of Disability Programs at the Social Security Administration, to provide clarification. Sklar confirmed that Social Security was precluded from taking a reduction in Social Security Disability in a reverse offset state and that their manual noted a reverse offset existed for Fund benefits in New Jersey. Crider concluded that N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 did not support a triennial redetermination and that 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d) excluded a reverse offset state from performing same.

The petitioners presented Alan Polonsky, an attorney with 30 years of experience handling Social Security benefit claims, as a witness. He was a staff attorney with the Social Security Administration Office of Hearing and Appeals until 1987 when he entered private practice. He related the triennial redetermination to a cost-of-living adjustment, but conceded he had never seen the triennial redetermination applied to a petitioner under the age of 62 receiving total disability benefits. He also confirmed the redetermination would not be applicable as New Jersey is a reverse offset state.

The Judge of Compensation issued an oral decision, finding N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 did not compel a triennial redetermination of ACE nor was it mentioned. Also, the judge found the petitioners neglected 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d). The petitioners’ motions for a triennial redetermination was denied, and the respondents’ and the Fund’s motions for offset and reimbursement were granted.

The petitioners appealed, arguing they were entitled to the redetermination of ACE under N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 until they reach age 62 and that the statute did not comply with 42 U.S.C. § 424a(f). The Fund contended the petitioners were precluded from asserting this issue as it was not presented before the total disability awards, and the respondents asserted there was no support for a triennial determination.

The Appellate Division briefly addressed the procedural bar raised by the Fund, noting the petitioners did not raise the triennial redetermination issue prior to the entry of the awards nor that their disability increased or decreased. It was noted the petitioners failed to meet the statutory criteria to re-open their cases. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division did address the substantive issue, as it was an issue of first impression. The Appellate Division noted that New Jersey is a reverse offset state, in which the workers’ compensation award is reduced rather than Social Security Disability. Both Crider and Polonsky testified that a person below the age of 62 is subject to the reverse offset if receiving total disability benefits.

As 42 U.S.C. § 424a(f) provided for a redetermination of the Social Security offset every three years, the petitioners argued the New Jersey Legislature intended to adopt the federal triennial redetermination. However, the Appellate Division noted the plain language does not include same and there was no mention in the legislative history. It was also indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d) created an exception for reverse offset states. As such, the Appellate Division found the triennial redetermination of ACE was not applicable in New Jersey as a reverse offset state.
 
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.