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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Appellate Division affirms summary judgment against employer due to the exclusive remedy provision of the Act and affirms summary judgment, in part, to an insurance carrier in excluding coverage for intentional wrong claims.

Cannon v. Bravo Pack, Inc. and Kraft Machines Inc. v. Employers Preferred Ins., No. A-1702-21 (Oct. 31, 2023) and Cannon v. Bravo Pack, Inc. and Bravo Pack, Inc. v. Employers Preferred Ins., No. A-1731-21 (Oct. 31, 2023)

November 1, 2023

by Kiara K. Hartwell

In the first of these two cases (No. A-1702-21), the Appellate Division affirmed an order granting summary judgment to Bravo Pack (Bravo), dismissing all claims, cross-claims, and third party claims against Bravo. 

In reviewing the summary judgment record in a light more favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was hired by Bravo and began working on March 18, 2019. When he arrived, the manager directed another employee, Alexander Gongora, to train him. Gongora trained other employees before, but received no formal instructions nor was provided with any operating manuals. On that day, Gongora was working on a Kraft bubble mailer machine, which was noted to routinely jam from 10 to 15 times a day. The manager testified that employees were instructed on how to clear the jam, but acknowledged Gongora’s method to remove the plastic guard cleared the jams more quickly. The manager advised Gongora not to remove the guard, but was aware he did not always listen.

The plaintiff testified Gongora provided minimal instructions regarding the Kraft machine. It jammed several times in the morning, which Gongora fixed. However, it jammed for the first time at the discharge end, and Gongora left the plaintiff to remove it. The accident occurred when the plaintiff attempted to remove the jam and the blade caught his left hand, partially amputating three of his fingers.

OSHA performed an investigation and cited Bravo for multiple violations. In August 2019, the plaintiff sued Bravo, alleging his injuries occurred due to Bravo’s intentional conduct and, thus, his claim was not limited to workers’ compensation. He submitted an expert report by a professional engineer, who opined the plaintiff was exposure to a “high risk level” of imminent major injury and removal of the guard created substantial certainty of an accident. He relied on a risk assessment program called Designsafe in forming his opinions.

Bravo filed an answer and later asserted a third-party complaint against its insurer, employers Preferred Insurance Company. In August 2021, Bravo moved for summary judgment, arguing the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred the plaintiff’s claims. The judge heard arguments and in November 2021, issued an order and written opinion granting summary judgment in favor of Bravo, thus dismissing all claims against Bravo with prejudice. The judge determined the plaintiff did not have evidence to support a finding of substantial certainty of injury nor that this accident would fall into the narrow exception for injuries caused by an employer’s intentional wrong. The plaintiff argued there was sufficient evidence of intentional wrong, that the judge erred in finding no reasonable jury would find his accident was substantially certain, and that the judge erred in finding his proofs did not prove an intentional wrong. 

The Appellate Division found the judge’s analysis in his written opinion were well reasoned and affirmed. Specifically, the Appellate Division found Bravo’s conduct did not rise to the standard of an intentional wrong or substantial certainty of an injury.

In the second of these matters (No. A-1731-21), the Appellate Division affirmed the portion of an August 12, 2021, order granting partial summary judgment to employers Preferred Insurance Company (EPIC) as the insurance policy was clear in excluding coverage for intentional wrong claims. There was also a cross-appeal by EPIC, but it was dismissed as moot as this portion was settled between the parties.

As noted above, the plaintiff was injured in March 2019 and sued Bravo. Bravo filed a third party complaint against EPIC, alleging EPIC improperly denied coverage, and sought a declaration. The relevant portion of the insurance policy was quoted, noting there was a specific exclusion for intentional wrongs. Both parties cross-moved for summary judgment, with EPIC arguing it had no duty per the policy and Bravo contending the exclusion was invalid, ambiguous, or contrary to Bravo’s reasonable expectations.

The judge granted and denied, in part, EPIC’s motion for summary judgment and Bravo’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court found EPIC did not have to provide coverage for the intentional wrong claims, but did have to for the negligence, gross negligence, or reckless conduct claims. Bravo appealed the portion granting summary judgment to EPIC based on the exclusion, and EPIC cross-appealed the portion requiring them to pay defense costs for the negligence, etc. claims.

On appeal, Bravo argued the trial court erred in finding the exclusion was unambiguous and, even if it was, it ran contrary to the public policy of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Appellate Division rejected these arguments, noting the exclusion was clear and that the Workers’ Compensation Act was not inconsistent with an employer’s liability policy that excluded coverage for intentional wrongs. Bravo and EPIC settled the portion of EPIC’s cross-appeal and as such, it was rendered moot.
 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 11, November 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.