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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Appellate Division affirms summary judgment against employer due to the exclusive remedy provision of the Act and affirms summary judgment, in part, to an insurance carrier in excluding coverage for intentional wrong claims.

Cannon v. Bravo Pack, Inc. and Kraft Machines Inc. v. Employers Preferred Ins., No. A-1702-21 (Oct. 31, 2023) and Cannon v. Bravo Pack, Inc. and Bravo Pack, Inc. v. Employers Preferred Ins., No. A-1731-21 (Oct. 31, 2023)

November 1, 2023

by Kiara K. Hartwell

In the first of these two cases (No. A-1702-21), the Appellate Division affirmed an order granting summary judgment to Bravo Pack (Bravo), dismissing all claims, cross-claims, and third party claims against Bravo. 

In reviewing the summary judgment record in a light more favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was hired by Bravo and began working on March 18, 2019. When he arrived, the manager directed another employee, Alexander Gongora, to train him. Gongora trained other employees before, but received no formal instructions nor was provided with any operating manuals. On that day, Gongora was working on a Kraft bubble mailer machine, which was noted to routinely jam from 10 to 15 times a day. The manager testified that employees were instructed on how to clear the jam, but acknowledged Gongora’s method to remove the plastic guard cleared the jams more quickly. The manager advised Gongora not to remove the guard, but was aware he did not always listen.

The plaintiff testified Gongora provided minimal instructions regarding the Kraft machine. It jammed several times in the morning, which Gongora fixed. However, it jammed for the first time at the discharge end, and Gongora left the plaintiff to remove it. The accident occurred when the plaintiff attempted to remove the jam and the blade caught his left hand, partially amputating three of his fingers.

OSHA performed an investigation and cited Bravo for multiple violations. In August 2019, the plaintiff sued Bravo, alleging his injuries occurred due to Bravo’s intentional conduct and, thus, his claim was not limited to workers’ compensation. He submitted an expert report by a professional engineer, who opined the plaintiff was exposure to a “high risk level” of imminent major injury and removal of the guard created substantial certainty of an accident. He relied on a risk assessment program called Designsafe in forming his opinions.

Bravo filed an answer and later asserted a third-party complaint against its insurer, employers Preferred Insurance Company. In August 2021, Bravo moved for summary judgment, arguing the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred the plaintiff’s claims. The judge heard arguments and in November 2021, issued an order and written opinion granting summary judgment in favor of Bravo, thus dismissing all claims against Bravo with prejudice. The judge determined the plaintiff did not have evidence to support a finding of substantial certainty of injury nor that this accident would fall into the narrow exception for injuries caused by an employer’s intentional wrong. The plaintiff argued there was sufficient evidence of intentional wrong, that the judge erred in finding no reasonable jury would find his accident was substantially certain, and that the judge erred in finding his proofs did not prove an intentional wrong. 

The Appellate Division found the judge’s analysis in his written opinion were well reasoned and affirmed. Specifically, the Appellate Division found Bravo’s conduct did not rise to the standard of an intentional wrong or substantial certainty of an injury.

In the second of these matters (No. A-1731-21), the Appellate Division affirmed the portion of an August 12, 2021, order granting partial summary judgment to employers Preferred Insurance Company (EPIC) as the insurance policy was clear in excluding coverage for intentional wrong claims. There was also a cross-appeal by EPIC, but it was dismissed as moot as this portion was settled between the parties.

As noted above, the plaintiff was injured in March 2019 and sued Bravo. Bravo filed a third party complaint against EPIC, alleging EPIC improperly denied coverage, and sought a declaration. The relevant portion of the insurance policy was quoted, noting there was a specific exclusion for intentional wrongs. Both parties cross-moved for summary judgment, with EPIC arguing it had no duty per the policy and Bravo contending the exclusion was invalid, ambiguous, or contrary to Bravo’s reasonable expectations.

The judge granted and denied, in part, EPIC’s motion for summary judgment and Bravo’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court found EPIC did not have to provide coverage for the intentional wrong claims, but did have to for the negligence, gross negligence, or reckless conduct claims. Bravo appealed the portion granting summary judgment to EPIC based on the exclusion, and EPIC cross-appealed the portion requiring them to pay defense costs for the negligence, etc. claims.

On appeal, Bravo argued the trial court erred in finding the exclusion was unambiguous and, even if it was, it ran contrary to the public policy of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Appellate Division rejected these arguments, noting the exclusion was clear and that the Workers’ Compensation Act was not inconsistent with an employer’s liability policy that excluded coverage for intentional wrongs. Bravo and EPIC settled the portion of EPIC’s cross-appeal and as such, it was rendered moot.
 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 11, November 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.