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Defense Digest

A Workers’ Compensation Judge’s Approval of a Section 20 Settlement Can Be Contingent on a Petitioner’s Live Testimony

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023

December 1, 2023

by Kiara K. Hartwell

Key Points:

  • A workers’ compensation judge has the discretion to require live testimony from a petitioner as a condition for approval of a Section 20 settlement. 
  • The New Jersey Appellate Division defers to a judge’s findings of issues involving jurisdiction, liability, causal relationship, or dependency.

New Jersey’s workers’ compensation judges have the discretion to approve or reject a Section 20 settlement based solely on affidavits due to COVID-19. Specifically, if a judge feels a case requires live testimony or finds the affidavit is insufficient, they can order a petitioner to testify before approving a Section 20 settlement. 

In Gonzalez v. N.J. Transit Corp., 2023 WL 5344867 (N.J. Super. App. Div. August 21, 2023), New Jersey Transit (NJT) appealed a workers’ compensation judge’s order denying a proposed N.J.S.A 34:15-20 (Section 20) settlement with the petitioner. The Appellate Division affirmed the interlocutory workers’ compensation order denying a proposed Section 20 settlement. 

To provide the factual background, in January 2016, the petitioner, a bus driver working for NJT, slipped and fell while walking from a store to his bus. He filed a claim petition for alleged injuries to his head, neck, shoulders, back, right wrist, and legs. His employer accepted compensability but denied the nature and extent of permanent disability and reserved N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 (Section 40) lien rights.

A proposed Section 20 settlement was submitted to the workers’ compensation judge for approval by NJT in November 2021. Under this settlement, NJT would pay $200,000. Additionally, it noted the basis for the settlement was the petitioner’s failure to disclose his prior low back and neck injuries and his prior workers’ compensation awards until after settlement discussions began, causing NJT to be unable to address causation initially. Further, the Section 20 settlement would put money in the petitioner’s pocket versus an Order Approving Settlement due to the $250,000 Section 40 lien from the settlement against the store. 

The petitioner’s affidavit was submitted, indicating he had prior neck and back injuries, but had not experienced any issues for the past six years, and that his attorney had explained the settlement, his rights, and the consequences of a Section 20 proposal.

Rather than accepting the affidavit, the judge requested the petitioner to testify prior to approving settlement due to the petitioner not having prior neck issues and the defense expert providing ratings on both the neck and back. Although the judge asked for a defense addendum, NJT advised that their expert had retired. Instead, NJT noted no objection to the petitioner testifying and requested the judge to approve the settlement.

At the August 9th pre-trial conference, the judge reiterated she would not approve a Section 20 settlement and scheduled trial for November 1. NJT filed a motion for leave to appeal. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and remanded by directing the judge to issue an order to either approve or reject the proposed settlement and provide the reasons why.

The judge then issued a timely order and written decision rejecting the Section 20 settlement, noting she found no basis. Specifically, she noted the petitioner’s pre-existing injuries and the Section 20 lien were not valid reasons for a Section 20 resolution. Rather, she noted an Order Approving Settlement under N.J.S.A. 34:15-22 would address these issues without dismissing the case with prejudice. She also found no issues with causation or liability. As such, the judge noted no issue of “jurisdiction, dependency, liability, or causal relationship” that would make a Section 20 settlement appropriate. She did note that she would reconsider if the petitioner or the experts testified live, so she could make credibility determinations and confirm the petitioner’s knowledge of his rights.

NJT sought leave to appeal, and the Appellate Division granted, along with amicus participation by the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce, Division of Workers’ Compensation. NJT argued that the judge abused her discretion by refusing to approve a Section 20 settlement, citing to Univ. of Mass. Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Christodoulou, 851 A.2d 636 (N.J. 2004), Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Constr. Co., 735 A.2d 1142 (N.J. 1999), and Sperling v. Bd. of Rev., 693 A.2d 901 (N.J. App. Div. 1997). Specifically, NJT argued that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, judges regularly approved Section 20 settlements based on affidavits. Also, NJT pointed to Univ. of Mass. Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. in noting that the judge’s decision to reject the Section 20 proposal without live testimony was contrary to Section 20’s purpose of “avoid[ing] a hearing on contested issues.” 851 A.2d at 643-644.

In addition, NJT argued that the judge’s bases for rejecting the Section 20 settlement were incorrect. NJT noted her determinations that the nature and extent of pre-existing injuries and a Section 40 lien were not bases for Section 20 were incorrect. NJT also argued that the judge’s finding, that there were no issues when the parties advised there were, raised due process concerns and that her inability to make a credibility determination without hearing live testimony went against the parties’ intent. NJT asked the Appellate Division to order the judge to approve the settlement after reviewing the petitioner’s affidavit for competency and understanding.

The Appellate Division found no merit in these arguments, noting its review of the judge’s findings is limited and that the judge properly exercised her discretion. The Appellate Division found that the judge had discretion to approve the Section 20 settlement solely based on an affidavit or to request testimony.

As respondents, we have to ensure the language in affidavits meets the judge’s standards in a Section 20 settlement. Further, there needs to be clear issues of jurisdiction, liability, causal relationship, or dependency, so judges will have no hesitation in finding a basis for the Section 20 settlement.

*Kiara is an associate in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. She can be reached at 856.414.6404 or KKHartwell@mdwcg.com.
 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.