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Co-Chair, New York Construction & Labor Law

Portrait of Keith M. Andresen

Defense Digest

Did the Cat Move the Ladder?

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Keith M. Andresen

Key Points:

  • New York appellate decision gives defense counsel firm ground on which to defend a standard § 240(1) case. 
  • In Simpertegui v. Carlyle House Inc., 209 N.Y.S.3d (1st Dept. May 9, 2024), a “ladder-fall” case, the First Department found that the defendants raised triable issues of fact by identifying inconsistencies in plaintiff’s account of the accident and “calling into question his overall credibility and circumstances underlying his claimed injuries.” 

In 2024 there were several important New York labor law decisions across the Appellate Divisions and even at the Court of Appeals. It is easy to ignore some of these cases given the ongoing “Fraudemic.” However, in the midst of this storm, one appellate decision has given defense counsel some firm ground on which to defend a standard § 240(1) case, particularly one involving a fall from a ladder. So, what does a cat have to do with anything? Let me explain. 

New York Labor Law § 240(1), also known as the scaffold law, provides in relevant part:

"All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed."

Once judgment under this statute is granted, liability is absolute, and it doesn’t matter what the plaintiff was doing or if they were comparatively negligent. 

While there are some limited defenses available—such as an uncovered worker, a non-covered activity, a recalcitrant worker, sole proximate cause—these are all very fact-specific and are typically not available in a standard fall-from-a-ladder case. Unfortunately, the majority of cases involving a fall from a ladder are simply liability dead-ends, where the plaintiff testifies they climbed up the ladder to do work, it shook, and they fell. Often times the plaintiff will testify they knew the ladder was unsafe, but they “wanted to get the job done.” These facts pled bare in an affidavit are enough for a plaintiff to move for early summary judgment after joinder of issue and before any depositions or initial discovery have taken place. 

Again, defendants are hard pressed to come up with a defense. The purpose of the statute itself, which was created to protect workers by charging owners and general contractors with absolute liability, seems to fall by the wayside. Ladder cases in recent years seem to follow the same exact fact pattern. Still, the courts seem to simply adopt the circular logic without even looking at the underlying facts—the plaintiff fell because there was a violation; there was a violation because the plaintiff fell. 

Anyone who has defended a ladder case has found it extremely frustrating. The testimonies are usually the exact same: “The ladder moved.” “The ladder shifted.” “The ladder shook.” This testimony is enough to trigger liability, no matter how ridiculous or unbelievable the remainder of the plaintiff’s testimony may be or what led up to the ladder mysteriously moving. I am tempted, sometimes, to ask the plaintiff, “Did a cat move it? Were there cats on the jobsite?” Because, frankly, that would be a much more credible explanation than the ladder just moved. 

Enter Simpertegui v. Carlyle House Inc., 209 N.Y.S.3d (1st Dept. May 9, 2024). In this matter, the plaintiff alleged he fell from a ladder while performing brickwork. He claimed that the ladder “suddenly shook” while he was about seven feet off the ground (shocking) and he fell. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), which was granted by the Bronx Supreme Court. 

The defendants appealed to the First Department. In a short, but powerful decision, the Appellate Division found the defendant raised triable issues of fact to defeat the summary judgment motion and reversed the lower court’s ruling. 

First, the plaintiff provided two separate dates of accident. He cited July 28, 2017, as the accident date in a workers’ compensation form and at a hearing. Later, at his deposition, he stated his accident date was on July 31, 2017. While mixing up accident dates is usually not dispositive, video evidence shows the plaintiff working on both days. Furthermore, no accidents were reported on those days. 

Second, he claimed he personally reported his accident to his supervisor, Abraham Diaz. Mr. Diaz confirmed the plaintiff did not report an accident to him on either date. He also provided phone records to prove the plaintiff never called him to report the accident. 

Finally, the court noted the plaintiff first went to the hospital just days after the employer fired him for absenteeism. 

The defendants also argued on appeal that the plaintiff never put forth any evidence that the ladder itself was defective, either from his own recollection or witnesses. Specifically, the plaintiff testified he was not aware if his feet came off the ladder. The court did not mention these issues, and it seems they were more concerned with his overall credibility: “Defendants raised triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat the motion by identifying various inconsistencies in plaintiff’s account of the accident, thus calling into question his overall credibility and circumstances underlying his claimed injuries.” 

This decision is important because it highlights the importance of getting all specific facts surrounding the plaintiff’s accident, not just those facts focusing on the happening of the accident itself. Defendants should seek to obtain testimony from all co-workers, supervisors, or anyone else at the jobsite who can testify as to whether an accident happened or was reported at all. Even if an accident was reported, the initial complaints or accident reports, workers’ compensation filings, testimony provided by the plaintiff, and the first medical treatment should all be compared and analyzed when assessing the plaintiff’s credibility. Obviously, phone, video, and metadata also must be scrutinized to the extent they are available. 

This may be the first in a significant line of cases where the New York State courts start seriously looking at the circumstances of ladder falls, not just providing the typical rubber-stamp treatment. After all, a cat was not on the jobsite.

*Keith is Co-Chair of our New York Construction & Labor Law Practice Group and works in our New York City office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.