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Joseph L. Hoynoski III

Portrait of Joseph L. Hoynoski III

Joseph is a shareholder in the Health Care Department. He focuses the majority of his practice on the defense of various medical/psychiatric providers and facilities in medical malpractice, dental malpractice, complex health care liability matters and premises liability. Joseph has also served as a member of the firm's Executive Committee Advisory Council, a distinguished group of firm leaders whose purpose is to enhance the communication between the Executive Committee and younger members of the firm's professional ranks, including associates, special counsel and junior shareholders. 

Joseph has a rather unique background, which serves him well in handling matters in the health care liability field. From 2004 until 2007, he was involved in representing plaintiffs in hundreds of actions brought against pharmaceutical companies covering a wide array of drugs. Mass torts included Vioxx, Bextra, Celebrex, Viagra, Adderall and ReNu with MoistureLoc.

Since 2008, Joseph has been extensively involved in defending various medical providers in medical malpractice cases. He has obtained dismissals for several physicians and hospitals. He has also represented hospitals and physician groups in health care liability matters and through use of surveillance experts, was able to have cases dismissed against hospitals and physicians. He also successfully handled an Immigration Customs Enforcement Audit for a major Philadelphia corporation.

Joseph also has experience in trademark/copyright litigation and licensing. He has represented national corporations in the areas of retail, specialty food products, hair care products and toys in trademark and copyright litigation matters.

In 2001, Joseph graduated from Temple University cum laude, majoring in corporate law. At Temple, he was involved in the marching band, basketball pep band, orchestra, Student Judicial Board, Business Honors Program and the law fraternity Phi Alpha Delta, where he competed in several mock trial competitions.

Joseph graduated from Widener University School of Law, magna cum laude, in 2004. He was involved in Law Review and received the Senior Staff Award. He was also the treasurer of the Trial Advocacy Honor Society and competed in several mock trial competitions. Joseph received the Widener University School of Law Outstanding Service Award upon graduation, as well as the American Bankruptcy Institute Medal of Excellence.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004)
    • Temple University (B.B.A., cum laude, 2001)
    • Pennsylvania, 2004
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2005
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2009
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants (2026-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2012-2019)
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • “Dealing with Unidentified/Identified Agents Not Named as Defendants in a Complaint.” Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2015
    • "The Certificate of Merit Status Quo Has to Go," The Legal Intelligencer, Health Care Supplement (page 7), February 17, 2015
    • "Statutory Damages: To Copy Or Not To Copy, That Is The Burning Question," Commercial Damages Reporter, Vol 25, Issue 2, April 2010
    • Civil Litigation Update, contributing author for the annual update published by the Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2009 and 2010
    • Peer Review: Status 2022, Marshall Dennehey Trends in Health Care and Health Law Seminar, May 5, 2022
    • Secured a Directed Verdict on behalf of an orthopedic surgeon who was alleged to have breached the standard of care as it relates to his performance of a reverse right shoulder replacement. After an 8-day trial, the court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the surgery performed by the orthopedic surgeon was unnecessary, as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in Philadelphia County on behalf of an emergency room physician, hospital physician group and hospital for an alleged failure to appropriately treat elevated blood sugar and groin abscess leading to necrotizing fasciitis. The evidence presented to the jury supported the argument that the emergency room physician appropriately treated the abscess as presented and gave appropriate instructions for the plaintiff to return to the hospital if symptoms changed or worsened. Plaintiff did not require admission for treatment of elevated blood sugar as she was a long time diabetic and the glucose level was not abnormal for her. When she finally returned to the hospital after seven days, she had developed the necrotizing fasciitis. The trial lasted four days and the jury returned the verdict in 16 minutes. 
    • Noasha LLC v. Nordic Group of Cos., Ltd., et al, 08-cv-05635, E.D.P.A.
    • Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Sheetz Inc., et al., 09-cv-88, E.D. Va
    • Humana Inc. v. Aetna Ins., Opposition No. 91192704 (October 13, 2010) [not precedential]. Joseph represented Aetna, Inc. and successfully assisted with defeating Humana Inc.'s opposition to Aetna's use of AETNA ONE for the name of an insurance program in front of the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.