John J. Hare

We prevailed in a unanimous, precedential decision in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which reconciled conflicting case law in the state. The plaintiffs were joined by 55 amici, and our client was joined by numerous construction organizations as amici. The court eventually applied Pennsylvania’s statute of repose to bar construction defect claims brought by homeowners.

By Order dated April 5, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to review the Superior Court’s affirmance of a 2021 nonsuit obtained by Jack Delany in hotly contested litigation stemming from the death of a construction worker. John Hare and Shane Haselbarth handled the appeal along with Jack. The Supreme Court’s ruling ends more than five years of litigation that arose from the construction worker’s death while he was involved in the Pier 78 renovation project on the Delaware River in Philadelphia. The plaintiff sued the general contractor and others involved in the project and ultimately settled with the general contractor for $10.5 million. The general contractor then pursued a contractual indemnification claim against Jack Delany’s concrete subcontractor client on the Pier 78 project. The indemnification claim included the $10.5 million settlement plus approximately $1 million in attorneys’ fees.   The case proceeded to trial in 2021 and, at the close of the general contractor’s case-in-chief, Jack moved for and was granted a nonsuit on the basis that the general contractor was the deceased construction workers’ statutory employer pursuant to the five-element test set forth by the PA Supreme Court in McDonald v. Levinson Steel, 153 A. 424 (Pa. 1930). The case was especially notable because, rather than retaining an attorney to address the reasonableness of the amount of the underlying settlement, which is typical, Jack retained an economist to explain that, based upon his analysis of comparable cases, the settlement amount was excessive. The general contractor appealed the nonsuit. In an unanimous decision dated September 30, 2022, the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court denial of allowance of appeal brings the lengthy litigation to an end.    

The decision, which reversed the trial court and Superior Court, reinstated a jury verdict in favor of our clients. Following a defense verdict, the trial court awarded a new trial based on a question posed by defense counsel, who was not a Marshall Dennehey attorney. The Superior Court affirmed the award of a new trial, but the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the defense verdict on the basis that defense counsel’s question was neither improper nor prejudicial.

Our appellate attorneys succeeded in convincing the Pennsylvania Superior Court to vacate a $40.2 million medical malpractice verdict and remand for a new trial. ​In its unanimous, precedential decision, the Superior Court ruled that the trial court had erroneously allowed plaintiffs’ counsel to utilize hearsay medical literature as substantive evidence. The case involved a spinal cord birth injury and was tried in Delaware County.

Marshall Dennehey’s appellate attorneys filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and Pennsylvania Association of Defense Counsel in a case pending in the Pennsylvania Superior Court that involved interpretation of a “regular use” exclusion that commonly appears in underinsured motorist coverage in automobile policies. The Superior Court enforced the exclusion, as PDI and PADC had requested. The plaintiff regularly used a company vehicle for his daily work. But one or two days before the accident, the specific vehicle he had been driving was taken out of service for repairs, and his employer rented a replacement vehicle for the plaintiff’s use. The insurer denied the UIM claim, based on the “regular use” exclusion, because the plaintiff was driving a company vehicle, which was his regular practice. The plaintiff countered that the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident had not, in fact, been made “regularly” available to him because he only began using it a day or two prior. Relying on its prior decision in Brink v. Erie Ins. Group, 940 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2008), which held that the “regular use” exclusion properly barred coverage for a plaintiff injured in a “fleet vehicle,” even though the plaintiff may have driven a different specific vehicle each day, the Rawl court held that the employer’s temporary rental of a replacement vehicle triggered application of the “regular use” exclusion and barred coverage. “Stated simply,” Rawl explains, “it does not matter whether Mr. Rawl had regular use of a particular vehicle furnished by his employer, but whether he regularly used a vehicle supplied by his employer.” The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the carrier.

Marshall Dennehey succeeded in having the Pennsylvania Superior Court reverse, as excessive, a $10 million wrongful death award. ​The jury had also awarded $10 million in survival damages, but that award was reversed in post-trial motions.