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With more than 25 years of litigation and trial experience, Joan concentrates her practice in asbestos litigation, representing equipment and product manufacturers in the defense of asbestos claims and suits brought against them.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey in 2004, Joan maintained an active casualty practice with  a strong focus on personal injury litigation. Over the course of her career, she has tried dozens of personal injury and consumer credit cases to verdict, and she has additionally represented numerous clients in arbitrations and mediations in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Joan works with each client to identify and implement a litigation strategy that best suits the specifics of their case. Her vast experience allows her to counsel clients on the most cost effective course of action with evaluation of early resolution. 

Joan graduated cum laude from Widener University School of Law, where she was research editor for the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. During law school, Joan worked as a real estate and corporate paralegal at a law firm in Media, Pennsylvania. Joan's legal experience actually began when she served as a frequent court witness during her years as a caseworker with Chester County Children, Youth & Family Services. As an attorney, she has drawn on her caseworker experience in handling pro bono matters.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 1991)
    • Millersville University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 1982)
    • New Jersey, 1991
    • Pennsylvania, 1991
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1991
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1992
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 1996
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1996
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2008
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • American Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • “Limited Tort Litigation – Using the Plaintiff’s Perspective to Shape the Pleadings and Discovery,” Defense Digest, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2019
    • Asbestos Case: McCloskey v. Allis-Chalmers Prods. Liab. Trust, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25372 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2011)
    • Asbestos Case: Robinson v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44982 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2013)
    • Consumer Credit Case: Eaton v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23617 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2010)
    • Consumer Credit Case: Handley v. Chase Bank USA, NA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102781 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2011), affirmed by Handley v. Chase Bank USA, NA, 2012 US. App. LEXIS 3708 (3d Cir. NJ, Feb. 24, 2012)
    • Consumer Credit Case: Sankowski v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48634 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2006)
    • Consumer Credit Case: Tagayun v. Citibank, N.A., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38085 (D.N.J. June 9, 2006)
    • Success in resolving 50-60 consumer credit disputes prior to trial via settlement or by way of dispositive motion. 
    • Second chair jury trial experience in catastrophic personal injury matters involving premises or product liability claims. These cases were ultimately resolved for significantly less than the original multi-million dollar demands. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.