Jillian L. Dinehart

Ohio has recognized that there are exceptions to the application of res judicata in extraordinary circumstances but has never applied such an exception. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District Court of Appeals, finding that “res judicata bars parties from raising claims based on unreasonable or unjust results when the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first instance.”

AJZ Hauling brought a suit against TruNorth, seeking reimbursement for repairs it had made to its trucks that should have been covered by a warranty. TruNorth responded with a motion to compel arbitration and stay the case. The trial court granted the motion and stayed the matter until arbitration could proceed. Rather than participate in arbitration or appeal the decision (as a decision compelling arbitration is an interlocutory final appealable order), AJZ Hauling exercised its right to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice. 

AJZ Hauling then re-filed the action. TruNorth again moved the court to stay and compel arbitration. However, this time the trial court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. TruNorth appealed this holding to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which held that the trial court in the first action “summarily concluded” that the arbitration provision was valid and enforceable because it did not address AJZ’s unconscionability argument or reference the forum selection clause. Specifically, the trial court wrote:

The Court grants Defendant TruNorth’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings and to Compel Arbitration as to Count Six and Seven Pursuant to R.C. 2711.02 and 2711.03. The Court finds Plaintiff’s claims are subject to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. So ordered. All other dates and orders remain in effect.

In the re-filed action (heard by the same trial court judge), the court denied the motion and wrote: 

The court denies Defendant TruNorth’s Motion to dismiss or in the Alternative Compel Arbitration. The court finds the arbitration provision to be procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court finds a voluntary meeting of minds did not occur as the arbitration agreement and forum selection clause were never explained to Plaintiff and Plaintiff did not understand any information regarding arbitration proceedings or the surrendering of certain appellate rights. The language compelling arbitration was inconspicuous and the warranty was provided by a third-party and not signed by Defendant TruNorth. Further, the Plaintiff was not provided a copy of the agreement until four days after taking possession of the vehicle at issue. The court finds enforcement of the forum selection clause would be unreasonable and unjust as the Plaintiff has no contacts with North Carolina nor does anyone in North Carolina have any contacts or information regarding the vehicle at issue in this suit. All dates and orders remain in effect. Notice issued.

Since these were decisions by the same sitting judge, the Eighth District held that this was nothing more than a reconsideration by the court of its own previous judgment, evidenced by the more thoughtful reasoning in the more recent holding, and thus, the law of the case doctrine did not apply. 

In reviewing the Eighth District’s holding, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that res judicata applies unless its application would contravene an overriding public policy or result in a manifest injustice. The court held that such injustice does not exist where the aggrieved party had an opportunity to appeal the prior judgment. In the instant case, AJZ’s Hauling could have appealed the trial court’s first ruling, instead of voluntarily dismissing its claim. Therefore, res judicata must apply and the arbitration agreement was enforceable. The Court further held that: “holding that res judicata—specifically issue preclusion—applies to require AJZ’s Hauling to arbitrate the same claims against TruNorth in the second lawsuit is the only conclusion that gives meaning to the parties’ ability to challenge a judgment through a Civ.R. 60(B) motion or through an appeal under App.R. 3.”

The lesson here is two-fold: Interlocutory appealable orders cannot be undone through Civ. R. 41(A)’s voluntary dismissal process. Second, a trial court cannot reconsider its final orders even before an appeal is taken, absent a Civ. R. 60(B) motion. The Court left an issue on the table in this ruling: does a motion to compel arbitration need to be orally heard, or is it sufficient for the issue to be briefed? R.C. 2711.03 states that the “court shall hear the parties” before compelling arbitration. The Eighth District has long held that a ruling based just upon briefing is sufficient so long as a request for an oral hearing is not made by the parties. If the parties request simply a “hearing,” then a ruling on the briefs is sufficient. The Supreme Court of Ohio stated that though they “understand that this area of law may need clarification, (they) must exercise judicial constraint;” and declined to address the issue.
 

 

_{Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.}