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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias Win Pivotal NJ Appellate Decision Impacting the Defense of Plaintiff’s Counsel in Legal Malpractice Actions

Presented by the Lawyers' Professional Liability Practice Group

In an appellate decision impacting the defense of the plaintiff’s bar in legal malpractice actions, Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias were successful in defending an appeal in the matter of DeCaro v. Elkind & DiMento, A-2707-22 (App. Div. May 16, 2024).

This decision arose out of an underlying dram shop case in which the plaintiff claimed that another patron threatened and screamed profanities at her in the presence of the restaurant staff. The plaintiff asserted that she was later physically assaulted by the patron outside the restaurant. Everyone had been served alcoholic beverages. The plaintiff suffered debilitating injuries, including skull fractures and brain injuries, and retained our client to represent her in the case against the restaurant. 

Our client negotiated an expedited trial/high-low agreement with counsel for the nightclub, pursuant to which the plaintiff would receive a minimum recovery and a maximum recovery. The parties waived their right to appeal from the verdict. Under the agreement, the conditions included limiting opening statements to 15 minutes, closing statements to 30 minutes, and permitting each party to call five lay witnesses, stipulating to the admission of business records, expert reports, written statements and the like. The case went to trial in Ocean County, New Jersey, and resulted in a defense verdict in favor of the bar. However, as a result of the high-low agreement, the plaintiff did receive an award, albeit a low one.

Further, in the legal malpractice action, the plaintiff submitted an expert report, opining the case involved permanent brain injuries and the attorneys deviated from the standard of care by recommending an expedited trial with a high-low agreement. The trial court granted our motion to strike this expert report as a net opinion and then granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that her malpractice claim was dependent upon expert testimony establishing the standard of care and the concomitant duty the plaintiff alleged the attorneys breached during their representation of the plaintiff in the dram shop case. The plaintiff recognized that the sole issue on appeal was the adequacy of her expert report in creating a prima facie case against the attorneys.

New Jersey’s Net Opinion Rule
This case is an excellent review of New Jersey’s Net Opinion Rule, which is a corollary of N.J.R.E. 703, which forbids the admission into evidence an expert’s conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence but, rather, data. Notably, this is the first opinion of its kind dealing with recommendations made by plaintiff’s attorneys to their client to proceed with an expedited trial on a high-low basis.

In DeCaro, the Appellate Division affirmed the order of the trial court, which had dismissed the case and struck the expert opinion as a net opinion. The opinions of the plaintiff’s expert were all personal net opinions regarding: (a) how long he would have opened; (b) how long he would have closed; (c) what evidence he would have put into evidence; and (d) what witnesses he would have called at trial (lay and expert). However, the expert failed to provide the benchmark for the opinions he offered. He was unable to come forward with a document or unwritten custom accepted by the plaintiff’s bar recognizing what would constitute reasonable actions in such a dram shop case. The plaintiff’s expert was unable to provide evidence establishing any of the purported standards to which he vaguely referred.

Also, this case is important because typically a plaintiff’s expert will use the Rules of Professional Conduct in order to establish a cause of action for legal malpractice. The plaintiff’s expert tried that here. It is true that although the Rules of Professional Conduct set forth a standard of care by which to measure an attorney’s conduct, and was recognized by the Appellate Division, the expert only made conclusory statements pertaining to our client’s alleged misconduct and did not identify with any particularity how such misconduct violated any established and accepted standards of care under the Rules he cited. He failed to explain how the attorney’s representation of DeCaro in the dram shop case breached an established standard of care under those rules. He provided only conclusory assertions that the attorney’s conduct breached the Rules, without providing any evidence establishing the standard of care on which his opinions were based.

This is a key opinion in connection with the defense of plaintiff’s counsel in legal malpractice actions. It also covers when and how the Net Opinion Rule applies in legal malpractice cases.

Should you need further information regarding this recent decision, please contact Jack Slimm (jlslimm@mdwcg.com) or Jeremy Zacharias (jjzacharias@mdwcg.com). 


 

Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – May 22, 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.