.

Defense Digest

Defending Against Undocumented Construction Workers’ Future Wage Loss Claims in Pennsylvania

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

September 1, 2024

by Jack A. Bennardo Jr.

Key Points:

  • Defending against an undocumented worker’s future wage loss and/or loss of future earnings capacity claim in a personal injury action filed in Pennsylvania in such a volatile area of practice is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. 
  • In light of the indeterminate state of Pennsylvania law, effectively defending against such future wage loss claims involving undocumented workers will necessarily require extensive and strategic written discovery, careful factual investigation, effective deposition questioning and tactics, close monitoring of sister-state jurisdictions for persuasive authority and added guidance, and (likely) significant pre-trial motion practice.

June 2024 Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data indicates that foreign-born workers comprised nearly 19.2% of the entire civilian labor force in the United States. Undocumented immigrant workers, in particular, appear to make up a disproportionate percentage of the construction workforce, with one recent study by The Century Foundation suggesting undocumented migrants, nationally, commanded roughly 23% of all construction site jobs. In 2020 alone, construction laborers accounted for 11.9% of all reported fatal falls, slips, or trips across all occupations. Defending against an undocumented worker’s future wage loss and/or loss of future earnings capacity claim in a personal injury action filed in Pennsylvania in such a volatile area of practice is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. 

Hoffman Plastics and Subsequent Court Confusion
In a significant decision handed down in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), overturned an award of back pay to an undocumented migrant worker, Jose Casto, who was found to have been unlawfully discharged by his employer, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, for engaging in union organizing activities. In reaching this determination, the court reasoned that awarding such back pay to Castro would run afoul of the comprehensive employer sanctions scheme of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). It noted the IRCA constitutes a “comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States” and that it mandated “an extensive employment verification system . . . designed to deny employment to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present in the United States, or (b) are not lawfully authorized to work in the United States[.]” The high court emphasized: 

Under the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies. Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent identification, which subverts the cornerstone of IRCA’s enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly hires the undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IRCA obligations. 

It further cautioned a contrary ruling would have set the stage for the grant of back pay to undocumented workers “for years of work not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned” in the first place. 

Much ink has been spilled by courts across the nation since Hoffman Plastic was first decided in an effort to decipher whether, and to what extent, its core holdings apply in the context of state-based tort claims filed by undocumented migrants seeking damages for future wage losses. Courts in different jurisdictions have reached inconsistent conclusions and findings in this regard. 

Some courts have held that undocumented tort claimants should be precluded altogether from pursuing future lost wages/earning capacity damages. For example, in Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1002 (N.H. 2005), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that “an illegal alien may not recover lost United States earnings.” Similarly, in Hernandez-Cortez v. Hernandez, 2003 WL 22519678, *7 (D. Kan. 2003), the District of Kansas determined that the plaintiff’s undocumented status prohibited any recovery for alleged lost income based on his projected wage earnings in United States. 

Other courts, by contrast, have determined that undocumented tort claimants’ recovery of such wage loss/lost earning damages should be limited in their recovery as measured at wage levels based upon the prevailing wage rates in their home countries (as opposed to being measured at United States wage levels). For instance, Ayala v. Lee, 81 A.3d 584, 597 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) highlighted that the plaintiff’s immigration status was relevant to the claim for lost wages since the ability to obtain legal work impacted the likelihood of future earnings in United States and whether the plaintiff was entitled to lost wages at a United States pay rate or home country rate. Also, in Cruz v. Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tile, LLC, 2008 WL 5598439, at *6–7 (D. New Mexico 2008) the plaintiff’s economics experts were barred from offering opinions at trial on the undocumented claimants’ loss of future earnings based upon United States wage levels due to failing to make “any attempt to acknowledge the Mexican citizenship of [the claimants] or the legal barriers to their earning the average American wages which are the foundations of both experts’ studies.” 

To date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly weighed in on the scope or availability of such future wage losses for undocumented workers pursuing personal injury claims. But, it has previously found, albeit in the context of a workers’ compensation matter, that a plaintiff’s immigration status and work authorization bears direct relevance to her loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity. In Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 108 (Pa. 2002), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically announced “the loss of earning power” of a non-citizen, who entered the United States unlawfully and who did not otherwise have authorization to work in the United States, was “caused by his immigration status, not his work-related injury.” 

Since Reinforced Earth, Pennsylvania courts have handed down rulings consistent with the notion that “an [undocumented worker] without current, valid USCIS work authorization, is not legally available for work” and, consequently, cannot recover damages for loss of future earnings. See Ruiz v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 911 A.2d 600, 605, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Mora v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (DDP Contracting Co.) elaborated on the consequences of the Reinforced Earth decision, stating:

What our Supreme Court, in effect, held [in Reinforced Earth Co.] is that loss of earning power need not be shown because it is going to be presumed that Claimant cannot work in this country and there can be no way to measure his/her earning power. Even though, in this case, Claimant found other illegal employment, that position cannot be used as a measure of earning power because only employers who fail to follow the federal immigration laws can offer him a position.

845 A.2d 950, 954, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (emphasis added).

Further muddying the waters, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has now adopted Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 413 (effective as of October 1, 2021), which provides, in relevant part: “In any civil matter, evidence of a party’s or a witness’s immigration status shall not be admissible unless immigration status is an essential fact to prove an element of, or a defense to, the action, or to show bias or prejudice of a witness pursuant to Rule 607.” The rule, as worded, appears to indicate that evidence of a litigant’s immigration status should be admissible in a case involving a claim for future wage losses. 

Still, there is a dearth of appellate guidance as to: 

  1. whether such evidence would be permitted to be introduced to a jury prior to its rendering a decision on liability; 
  2. the precise meaning of the phrase “an essential fact to prove an element of, or a defense to, the action”; 
  3. whether a jury should be limited in calculating such losses to consideration of evidence of the prevailing wage rates in the undocumented litigant’s home country; and 
  4. whether a jury may consider evidence an undocumented migrant is facing deportation proceedings or imminent deportation. 

In light of the indeterminate state of Pennsylvania law, effectively defending against such future wage loss claims involving undocumented workers will necessarily require extensive and strategic written discovery, careful factual investigation, effective deposition questioning and tactics, close monitoring of sister-state jurisdictions for persuasive authority and added guidance, and (likely) significant pre-trial motion practice. 

Jack is a member of our Casualty Department and works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.