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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Sixth DCA Rejects Prejudice Requirement for Excluding Late‑Disclosed Expert Opinions, Certifies Conflict with Sixteen DCAs

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – June 2026

June 11, 2026

by Danielle N. Robinson

Michael John Crecelius v. Mildred Rizzitano; (February 27, 2026)

Crecelius involved an appeal by a defendant of the trial court’s exclusion of its late disclosed experts at trial. The defendant was involved in a vehicle accident, in which he made a left turn into an intersection and collided with the plaintiff, killing him. Plaintiff’s estate sued for negligence.

The defendant disclosed two experts after the deadline imposed by the court. The disclosure described each expert’s anticipated scope of work, but did not contain their respective substantive opinions. Approximately three-weeks before trial, both expert reports were provided. The plaintiff moved to strike the experts’ testimony, arguing it was prejudiced because their expert had insufficient time to prepare rebuttal testimony before trial. The defendant argued the late disclosures were due to the experts’ not diligently providing reports and opinions to the defendant and there was no bad faith. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The plaintiff obtained a verdict in its favor, finding the defendant 100% at fault, to which the defendant appealed.

The defendant argued on appeal that the experts’ opinions were received three weeks before trial, so any prejudice to the plaintiff was insufficient to warrant exclusion of his experts, and any prejudice could have been cured by a brief continuance. The defendant argued that he suffered extreme prejudice, as striking his witnesses left the plaintiff’s experts uncontradicted.

In reaching its decision in Crecelius, the 6th DCA addressed the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981) at length, which addressed late disclosed experts. The Crecelius court found that its sister courts have consistently misapplied the Binger opinion, which “has severely ambered the ability of trial judges to effectively manage civil lawsuits and . . . prevent surprises at trial and to assist arriving at the truth.” The court wrote, “if the trial court finds that the undisclosed witness will not prejudice the other party after considering the factors listed in Binger, then the witness should be allowed to testify – as binding holding,” highlighting that its sister courts improperly expanded the Binger opinion to apply to undisclosed opinions of disclosed experts.

The court criticized this approach, finding it meant that a trial judge could not enforce pretrial orders and exclude undisclosed testimony without first finding that the opposing party was prejudiced. The court noted that approach puts the burden on the opposing party to make an adequate showing of prejudice, potentially in the middle of trial and with no notice, which is inappropriate and incentivizes non-disclosure. The court explained that completing a last-minute deposition prior to trial to cure any prejudice also places a burden on the non-offending party, and even offering a continuance, puts that party in a position of having to choose between inadequate time to prepare or delay the trial, none of which is proper.

The Crecelius court found that “Binger concerned undisclosed witness testimony that was improperly allowed and should have been excluded due to prejudice to other party. Binger did not concern undisclosed testimony that was improperly excluded or what the trial court should have considered before excluding undisclosed testimony.” Additionally, the Crecelius court found the statement in the Binger opinion “about what a trial court considers before excluding an undisclosed witness’s testimony was pure dictum” and that nothing in that statement led to the judgment, and thus, was not binding on it or on trial courts. The court noted that Binger expressly stated trial courts can issue pretrial orders that prohibit the introduction of undisclosed opinions, and those orders do not derogate from its decision. Trial courts are permitted to strictly enforce pretrial orders and to require them to make a finding of prejudice before doing so makes the ability to enforce court orders meaningless.

The court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s order, striking the defendant’s witnesses, finding that Binger imposes no requirement that a trial court find that the opposing party would be prejudiced by the introduction of an undisclosed or late-disclosed expert opinion before excluding the opinion and certified conflict with 16 decisions out of the 1st DCA, 2nd DCA, 3rd DCA and 4th DCA.

Firm Highlights

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Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

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New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

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Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.