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Defense Digest

A Royal Assignment [of Benefits]: Ramifications for Insurers in the First-Party Property Context

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by James H. Cole

Key Points:

  • This summer, a federal court in Pennsylvania, on two separate occasions, permitted an insured to assign a bad faith claim to a vendor seeking payment for services on their property.

  • Until now, Pennsylvania courts had not previously permitted the assignment of extra-contractual tort claims, such as bad faith, in the first-party property context.

  • These recent decisions may have costly ramifications for insurers and have the potential to profoundly change the first-party property landscape in Pennsylvania.

With recent decisions in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, insurers must be braced for bad faith claims brought by their insured’s vendors. For the past 25 years, with the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute has allowed insureds to bring lawsuits against their insurance companies for improper first-party claims handling, with the primary purpose being to hold insurers accountable for good faith and fair dealing towards their insureds. See, generally, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371; see also Charter Oak Insurance Co. v. Maglio Fresh Food, 45 F.Supp.3d 461 (E.D. Pa. 2014).

Prior to the enactment of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, bad faith actions existed only under common law, and only in the third-party context, wherein an insured could sue their liability carrier for a bad faith refusal to settle a lawsuit against the insured within the policy limits, exposing him to an excess verdict. In the third-party/excess verdict context, courts have held assignments of bad faith claims, post-judgment, to be valid. See, e.g., Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 223 A.2d 8 (Pa. 1966); Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Wolfe, 105 A.3d 1181, 1188 (Pa. 2014) (carving out scenarios in which bad faith claims may be assigned by insureds).

A concept rooted in contract law, an assignment is the signing over of a claim by one party to the contract to a non-party. This has been found acceptable in the first-party insurance context when an insured assigns benefits for services rendered, such as to a physician in a PIP claim or to a mitigation vendor in a property claim, but courts stopped short of extending this concept to the assignment of extra-contractual tort claims such as bad faith.

Some states, such as Florida, have allowed vendors to secure post-loss assignments, not only for services rendered, but for extra-contractual damages such as attorney’s fees and bad faith in the first-party context, leading to what may be described as an insurance crisis. It has been widely reasoned that lawsuits involving the assignment of benefits have increased between 2004–2018. See Bethan Moorcraft, AOB Abuse in Florida Rises 70% in 15 Years, Insurance Business Mag., Mar. 28, 2019, https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/aob-abuse-in-florida-rises-70-in-15-years-163448.asp. Mostly due to the assignment of benefits, Florida is responsible for 76% of lawsuits filed against insurance companies in the United States, although the state itself only accounts for 8% of the population. David Altmaier, Florida OIR Report, Insurance Journal, Apr. 2, 2021, https://www.insurancejournal.com/app/ uploads/2021/04/Florida-OIR-Report.pdf.

In Pennsylvania, however, courts had not allowed the assignment of a bad faith claim outside the narrow third-party/excess verdict context. For example, in a case in which a disbarred attorney sought assignment of his client’s underinsured motorist-turned-bad faith claim, the Third Circuit specifically held that under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371, bad faith claims can only be assigned to an injured plaintiff and judgment creditor. See Feingold v. Palmer & Barr, 831 F. App'x 608, 609 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that bad faith claims may be assigned by statutory permission, but are not “freely assignable”). Feingold reaffirmed Wolfe’s interpretation that, in the first-party property context, an insured may assign his bad faith claim only to a judgment creditor who has been injured.

On June 29, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an opinion which royally changes the Commonwealth’s interpretation of first-party property bad faith claims. In Royal Water Damage Restoration, Inc. a/a/o 1133 Columbia LLC v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., WL 2345740 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2022), the court decided that an insured’s water mitigation vendor has standing to bring a bad faith claim against the insurer—not on behalf of the insured, but directly as an injured party. Simply stated, the court has ruled, contrary to the precedent set in Wolfe and reconfirmed in Feingold, that an insured’s vendor—who is not a party to the insurance contract between the carrier and its insured—may pursue an extra-contractual claim under the Pennsylvania bad faith statute against the carrier.

On July 28, 2022, in another case involving Royal Water Damage Restoration, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania again permitted a third party’s standing to pursue a bad faith claim against an insurer. See Royal Water Damage Restoration, Inc. a/a/o Janet Thorn v. Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Co., WL 2985637 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2022). More pointedly, in this case, the court based its finding on the mere potential that a vendor “could potentially be” a judgment creditor, even if the property owner/named insured is the only party actually injured. It can be argued, however, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern who is permitted to bring a lawsuit, have not and were not meant to be bent for the sake of convenience. A plethora of case law since the enactment of the Federal Rules has held that a plaintiff must establish standing in order to bring any claim in suit, bad faith or otherwise. Allowing a party who has not sustained any actual injury to bring a claim for bad faith may circumvent the purpose of the federal rule on standing.

More concernedly, allowing insureds to assign their bad faith claims to vendors seeking payment for services on their property could open a floodgate of litigation directly against carriers who issue insurance policies with the specific understanding that the named insureds are the only parties to whom they owe any duties or obligations. A vendor that performs repair work on the insured property is neither an injured party nor a judgment creditor, particularly if no judgment has been rendered by a court. Widening the class of first-party bad faith plaintiffs to include vendors of insureds has the potential to significantly increase premiums.

Allowing any repair contractor—who is not a party to the contract and who was not considered in the underwriting process—to pursue a bad faith claim has the potential to profoundly change the first party property landscape in Pennsylvania. With the recent Royal Water decisions contorting Pennsylvania’s understanding of the bad faith statute, insurers should wait with bated breath for a case to reach the Third Circuit or Pennsylvania appellate courts to decide whether Pennsylvania will follow Florida down the assignment-of-benefits rabbit hole.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.