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Case Law Alerts

Florida Appellate Court Reverses Summary Judgment, Holding Commercial Landlord Had a Duty to Investigate Roof Leak

Hale v. Sleiman Enterprises, Inc., 5D2024-2944 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, June 5, 2026)

July 20, 2026

by Brian E. Catelli

The District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment, holding that the commercial landlord owed a duty of reasonable care to investigate a roof leak.

Plaintiff, Scott Hale, managed a Domino's Pizza operating on premises leased from Sleiman Enterprises, Inc., slipped and fell on water that had leaked from the roof into the kitchen. Because the lease permitted only Sleiman to access the roof, Domino's could not investigate the source and instead reported the leak to Sleiman. The trial court granted summary judgment for Sleiman, reasoning that the lease required Domino's to maintain the allegedly defective hood vent and that Sleiman therefore owed no duty.

The appellate court reversed, holding that Sleiman owed a duty of reasonable care because its exclusive control over roof access foreseeably created a zone of risk and prevented Domino's from discovering or repairing the source of the leak. The court held that the lease provision assigning hood vent maintenance to Domino's did not relieve Sleiman of that duty, and it rejected the argument that the danger was open and obvious, noting that an obvious danger discharges only the duty to warn, not the duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. The ruling reinforces that a landlord's retained exclusive control over an area can support a duty notwithstanding a tenant's contractual maintenance obligations.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.