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Defense Digest

District Court of Appeals Tell Plaintiffs They ‘Can’t Have Their Cake and Eat It Too’

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

By Jacksonville, Florida Casualty Department


Key Points:

  • In Mickler v. Triplett, 397 So.3d 188 (Fla. 5th DCA Nov. 15, 2024), the Court of Appeal thwarted a new strategy from the plaintiffs’ bar to remove the causation question from the hands of the jury. 
  • Ruling helps shield defendants from having to sacrifice their expert witnesses in order to preserve the causation question for a jury.

The question of causation is often the crux of personal injury litigation, particularly in cases involving pre-existing conditions. In Rebecca Diley v. Bonnie Lee Mickler, a 2023 trial in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Duval County, Florida, the defense confronted this challenge head-on. The plaintiff, Rebecca Triplett, alleged injuries from a 2019 rear-end motor vehicle accident, yet her medical history revealed strikingly similar injuries from prior accidents in 2009 and 2017. The defense argued that her injuries predated the 2019 accident and, furthermore, that she suffered no new harm. However, an unexpected trial ruling significantly altered the trajectory of the case—removing the issue of causation from jury consideration and leading to a substantial plaintiff’s verdict. This decision ultimately set the stage for an appellate battle, culminating in a Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal ruling that reaffirmed the jury’s role in determining causation and reshaped defense strategy in bodily injury cases statewide.

In 2020, Rebecca Triplett sued the defendant, claiming injuries arising from a rear-end motor vehicle accident occurring on September 6, 2019. Notably, the injuries being claimed as arising from this accident were similar to injuries Triplett suffered in two prior motor vehicle accidents—one in 2009 and the other in 2017. One of the defenses focused on these prior injuries. The defendant contended, at least in part, that Triplett’s alleged injuries pre-existed the September 6, 2019, motor vehicle accident. Additionally, going one step further, the defendant argued Triplett did not suffer any injuries as a result of the 2019 accident. 

Through years of litigation and discovery, the defendant refined the key issues for trial. Specifically, one of the primary issues that remained to be litigated was whether the defendant’s negligence, if any, was a legal cause of loss, injury, or damage to Triplett.

The trial lasted a full week, including substantial testimony from the plaintiff, retained experts, and treating physicians. On Thursday, April 20, 2023, Triplett’s counsel moved for directed verdict as to causation. The plaintiff argued, since the defendant’s own expert witnesses testified that Triplett suffered and was treated for a strain or sprain of her neck as a result of the motor vehicle accident, the defendant’s negligence was the legal cause of at least some damage to the plaintiff. 

On the final day of trial, although initially denied, the court ultimately granted the partial directed verdict. This decision had an immense prejudicial effect on the defense. 

Typically, and prior to the court granting Triplett’s motion in this case, the first question on the verdict form is some version of, “Was the negligence of the defendant, a legal cause of loss, injury or damage to plaintiff?” This initial question posed to a jury precedes any additional questions regarding the amount of monetary damages the plaintiff may be entitled to as a result of such negligence. 

By granting the plaintiff’s motion, the court removed the issue of causation from the jury instructions and that initial question from the verdict form. As a result, the jury was simply asked to essentially answer “how much” money Triplett was entitled to. The jury subsequently returned a large verdict, arguably, in part, due to the court’s decision to remove the issue of causation from the jury. 

The defense moved for a new trial as a result, which the court denied, and the issue was taken up to Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal. 

In Mickler v. Triplett, 397 So.3d 188 (Fla. 5th DCA Nov. 15, 2024), a big win for defense counsel, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict, and the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. This ruling, and the growing trend of other Florida district courts following suit, thwarted this new plaintiffs’ strategy to remove the causation question from the hands of the jury. 

In Lancheros v. Burke, 375 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), a case with similar facts, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on causation, stating: “[a] jury is not free to reject uncontradicted expert findings by multiple doctors. And because [Appellants’ expert] said, yes, the chiropractic care was reasonable and necessary and related to the accident, then that establishes legal cause.” Id., 375 So.3d at 928. The defense in Lancheros contested causation, refuted the plaintiff’s causation evidence, and offered their own evidence showing the plaintiff’s injuries could have occurred for reasons not related to the incident at issue in the case. In Lancheros, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the directed verdict, siding with the defense. 

Prior to the appellate decisions, not only did these trial court rulings jeopardize the defense’s legal strategy, but the retained experts were becoming increasingly concerned with potential credibility issues. In many motor vehicle accident cases, expert witnesses testify a plaintiff only suffered a sprain or strain, which would require approximately six to eight weeks of conservative treatment. This testimony, while denying the existence of a permanent injury, allowed defense experts to strike a middle ground in explaining a plaintiff’s initial pain complaints experienced after an accident. 

However, these trial court rulings forced the defendants to sacrifice their expert witnesses in order to preserve the causation question for a jury, even if it resulted in an uphill (if not near impossible) battle; to argue causation without expert witness testimony. 

Thankfully, these recent Florida Appellate Court decisions on this topic shield defendants who were being boxed into an impossible corner. Defendants will no longer have to decide whether to forgo a causation defense at trial when their experts testify that a plaintiff suffered a sprain or strain. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. 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Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

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