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Gary T. Lesser

Portrait of Gary T. Lesser

Gary Lesser is special counsel in the Casualty Department with extensive experience in disputes involving Personal Injury Protection claims and bodily injury claims. He also handles matters as a member of the Fraud/Special Investigation Practice Group. Gary primarily deals with evaluating both medical provider fraud and intentional/staged losses. In this arena, Gary has significant experience conducting Examinations Under Oath as it relates to both specific claims and broader SIU investigations.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Gary managed his own firm for almost 20 years where he handled bodily injury claims and PIP arbitrations on behalf of  plaintiffs. Additionally, he was also a full time PIP Arbitrator for Forthright Solutions for almost 13 years hearing and  deciding thousands of arbitrations between medical providers and automobile insurance carriers. Gary's unique perspective fosters a balanced understanding having represented both sides and enables him to approach legal matters with a comprehensive view and also develop effective strategies for each party. 

Gary earned his juris doctor from the Cardozo School of Law and earned a B.A. in Political Science from Binghamton University.

He is admitted to practice in New Jersey and New York.
 

    • Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (J.D., 1993)
    • State University of New York at Binghamton (B.A., 1990)
    • New Jersey, 1993
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1993
    • New York, 1994
    • American Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association

Thought Leadership

SIU Spotlight

Top 10 Recommendations for Addressing Fraud in NJ PIP Arbitration: A DRP’s Perspective

May 15, 2026

New Jersey’s no fault PIP system presents a unique blend of statutory requirements, arbitration procedures, and evolving fraud schemes. For carriers, counsel, and SIU professionals, navigating this landscape effectively requires more than familiarity with the rules — it demands an understanding of how Dispute Resolution Professionals (DRPs) evaluate evidence, credibility, and patterns of abuse. Drawing on more than a decade as a Forthright PIP arbitrator and extensive experience investigating staged losses and systemic fraud, I offer ten practical recommendations for strengthening fraud detection and improving outcomes in PIP arbitration. 1. Understand the NJ PIP Landscape New Jersey’s PIP framework is unlike any other. Arbitration, not Superior Court, is the primary forum for resolving disputes, and Forthright’s DRPs adjudicate cases based strictly on the evidence presented. Appreciating the procedural nuances — including timelines, evidentiary expectations, and the limits of DRP authority — is essential for building a defensible case. 2. Spot the Red Flags Early Fraud often reveals itself in the details. Early indicators include: Overutilization of treatment Templated or boilerplate medical reports Conflicting timelines Identical documentation across unrelated claimants Identifying these patterns at the outset allows carriers to intervene before questionable treatment escalates. 3. Investigate Policy Level Fraud Fraud doesn’t always begin with the accident. Policy level misrepresentations  — such as false garaging locations, unlisted household residents, or misrepresented vehicle use — can undermine coverage entirely. Scrutinizing these issues early can support dismissal applications under the PIP rules. 4. Use the PIP Arbitration Rules to Your Advantage Rule 35 of the New Jersey No Fault PIP Arbitration Rules provides a mechanism for pre hearing dismissal when coverage requirements are not met. As the document notes: “If any party contends that… there is no coverage or Forthright lacks subject matter jurisdiction, such party may apply for an Order dismissing the case prior to hearing.” A well supported dismissal application — including policy provisions, factual support, and documentation — can resolve a dispute before it reaches a hearing. 5. Analyze Treatment Records for Patterns Fraud rarely occurs in isolation. Comparing CPT codes, treatment patterns, and provider behavior across multiple cases can reveal systemic issues. Reviewing prior arbitration awards involving the same providers can also uncover recurring credibility concerns or previously identified irregularities. 6. Use SIU Strategically SIU involvement is most effective when timed to coincide with treatment phases and targeted to specific concerns. Preparing SIU investigators with focused questions and clear objectives enhances credibility assessments and strengthens the evidentiary record. 7. Leverage the EUO Effectively Examinations Under Oath remain one of the most powerful tools in the investigative arsenal. Choosing between recorded statements and EUOs depends on timing and strategic goals. Records should be used to challenge inconsistencies in patient testimony and to test the reliability of the claimant’s narrative. 8. Prepare Your Arbitration Submission Thoughtfully A strong submission clearly identifies: The legal issues The evidence supporting your position How the facts align with your defense theory While written submissions are important, oral hearings often make the difference. DRPs value clarity, organization, and a well articulated argument. 9. Coach Your Witnesses Witness credibility can make or break a case. Preparing witnesses for cross examination ensures they present confidently and consistently. DRPs evaluate demeanor, clarity, and the ability to explain complex issues without overreaching. 10. Understand DRP Limitations — and Read Between the Lines DRPs decide cases based on the evidence presented, not investigative instincts. The civil burden of proof and limited credibility assessments shape outcomes. However, award language often contains subtle cues that can guide broader fraud detection efforts. Arbitration outcomes should be treated as investigative leads, not endpoints. Conclusion Fraud in New Jersey PIP claims continues to evolve, and carriers must adapt accordingly. By understanding the arbitration process, identifying red flags early, and presenting well supported cases, insurers can more effectively combat fraudulent activity while ensuring legitimate claimants receive the benefits they are entitled to. These ten recommendations reflect a DRP’s perspective — one grounded in thousands of cases, systemic investigations, and a deep understanding of how fraud manifests in the PIP environment. With thoughtful preparation and strategic execution, carriers can significantly improve their ability to detect, challenge, and prevent fraudulent claims.

SIU Spotlight

Is the Operator of a Low-Speed Electric Scooter a “Pedestrian” Under N.J.S.A. 39:6a-2(H) and Entitled to PIP Benefits?

July 1, 2024

By way of background, on November 22, 2021, David Goyco was operating a Segway low-speed electric scooter (LSES), which has a maximum speed of 15.5 miles per hour, when he was struck by an automobile. As a result of the collision, Goyco sustained bodily injuries and incurred expenses associated with his medical treatment. At the time of the accident, Goyco was insured under a policy of automobile insurance issued by Progressive Insurance Company. Goyco filed a claim for PIP benefits with Progressive Insurance Company. Progressive denied the claim stating that the LSES that Goyco was operating at the time of the accident did not meet the definition of a qualifying automobile pursuant to N.J.A.C. 39:6A-2(a) of the New Jersey Auto Insurance Law. Progressive further denied Goyco’s claim for PIP benefits arguing that the LSES that was being operated at the time of the accident does not qualify him for meeting the definition of a pedestrian. Pedestrian is defined as “[a]ny person who is not occupying, entering into, or alighting from a vehicle propelled by other that muscular power and designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks.” N.J.A.C. 39:6A-2(h).  In New Jersey, motorized scooters are generally categories as the same as motorcycles. As such, they are not subject to the statutory PIP benefits. See, Gerber v. Allstate Ins. Co., 161 N.J.Super. 543, 391 A.2d 1285 (Law Div.), holding that a motor scooter is a motorcycle. See also, Muto v. Kemper Reinsurance Co., 189 N.J.Super. 417 (App. Div. 1983), holding that motorcycle does not fall within the definition of an automobile. However, a person not using a motorized or self propelled bicycle fits the definition of a “pedestrian” for the purposes of pedestrian PIP. See, Harbold v. Olin, 287 N.J.Super, 35 (App. Div. 1996), where it was found that, “[a] person riding a bicycle is considered a pedestrian for purposes of [New Jersey] automobile insurance laws. See also, Nuang by Nuang v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 224 N.J.Super. 753, 758, 541 A.2d 306, 308 (App. Div. 1988), holding that mopeds are always to be considered vehicles propelled by other than muscular power.  On May 13, 2019, Governor Murphy issued a press release explaining that Bill S731 (N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) was passed so that “motorized scooters and e-bikes capable of traveling 20 miles per hour or slower [could] be regulated much the same as ordinary bicycles, allowing their operation on streets, highways, and bicycle paths in this State.” It was further explained that such bicycles and scooters will not require registration, insurance, or a driver’s license. Moreover, it was explained that “[t]he bill further provides that all statutes, rules and regulations that apply to ordinary bicycles will apply to low-speed electric bicycles and motorized scooters.” Goyco filed a lawsuit in Superior Court challenging Progressive’s denial of his claim. He argued that New Jersey law does recognize bicyclists as pedestrians for purpose of PIP coverage, and by extension, a LSES should be considered the equivalent of a bicycle pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g). The trial court dismissed Goyco’s complaint saying that the plaintiff was operating a scooter powered by motor at the time of the incident. As the scooter is clearly not considered a motor vehicle, neither in statute nor in the insurance policy, it must be determined if plaintiff would be considered a pedestrian. The trial court further found the plaintiff’s reliance on N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g) is misplaced as the Statute is not a part of the No-Fault statute and is not controlling over the New Jersey Auto Insurance Law. Moreover, the trial court found that the definition of pedestrian in N.J.S.A 39:6A-4 “clearly has no application to an LSES either...[t]he LSES was not muscular powered thus does not meet the requirements of the statute.”  Thereafter, Goyco filed an Appeal to the Appellate Division.  On Appeal, the panel noted that N.J.S.A. 39:1-1 expressly defines a LSES as having “an electric motor that is capable of propelling the device with or without propulsion.” As Judge Hudak found, the definition of pedestrian under N.J.S.A. 30A:6-4 is incompatible with the definition of a LSES and, therefore, N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g), by its terms, has no application here. The panel was also not persuaded that an LSES operator can be equated to a bicyclist, noting that the statute’s exception defeats this argument. They found that “[a]ll statutes . . . rules and regulations applicable to bicycles. . . shall apply to a LSES except those provisions which by their very nature may have no application to . . . a LSES.” As such, the Appellate panel affirmed the lower courts dismissal of the complaint. On October 6, 2023, The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Goyco’s petition for certification and has agreed to review this ruling and establish whether or not the operator of a low-speed electric scooter is a ‘pedestrian’ under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h), and therefore entitled to PIP benefits. On May 14, 2024, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the Appellate Division decision.  The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Mr. Goyco’s reliance on N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.16(g).  The Court held that by its very definition the electronic scooter is a vehicle propelled by other than muscular power (battery-power) and designed primarily for use on highway.  The Court affirmed that, “by their very nature,” a low-speed electronic scooter does not qualify for PIP benefits.  Therefore, Mr. Goyco was not a “pedestrian” for PIP benefits afforded to bicyclists as per the definition in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-2(h).   The Supreme Court declined to expand the definition of pedestrian without more explicit language in the statute. Additionally, the Supreme Court also found that the scooter was “designed primarily for use on highways, rails and tracks,” even though the device used by Mr. Goyco on November 22, 2021, could not go faster than 15.5 miles per hour. The Court noted that “highway” is defined broadly as any main route, free to the public, such as a public road.   Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, if a motor vehicle accident involves a motorized scooter being operated in New Jersey, the occupant of that scooter is not a pedestrian and will not be entitled to PIP medical expense benefits.   Gary has extensive experience in disputes involving Personal Injury Protection claims and bodily injury claims. He also handles matters as a member of the Fraud/Special Investigation Practice Group. Gary primarily deals with evaluating both medical provider fraud and intentional/staged losses. In this arena, Gary has significant experience conducting Examinations Under Oath as it relates to both specific claims and broader SIU investigations.    SIU Spotlight, Issue 1, Vol. 1, July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

Legal Update for Special Education Law: Recent Positive Outcomes From the Group

Hearing Officer Confirms District Acted Appropriately Under IDEA and Section 504 William J. McPartland (Scranton) obtained a finding in favor of our client, a school district, on all issues following a due process hearing. The parent had filed a due process complaint alleging that the school district had breached its child find duty under the IDEA and Section 504, that the school district had discriminated against the student on the basis of disability in violation of Section 504, and that the school district had denied a free and appropriate public education to the student both by developing inadequate IEPs and via an actionable procedural violation.  Specifically, the student had received a Section 504 evaluation in October 2023, after a number of behavioral infractions culminating in a fight in September 2023, was identified as having anxiety and a sleep disorder, and received appropriate Section 504 accommodations. The student had never previously demonstrated signs of a learning disability, and the parent denied the school district permission to evaluate the student for special education needs in November 2023, and January 2024. The parent granted the district permission to evaluate the student in October 2024, after a private psychologist diagnosed the student with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, possible Oppositional Defiance Disorder, a learning disorder, and anxiety. The school district issued a special education evaluation report in December 2024, finding that the student had an emotional disturbance and other health impairment, and an IEP providing an itinerant level of emotional support, as well as instruction in academics and social skills, was issued in January 2025, and amended in February, March, and April 2025. The student withdrew from the school district in April 2025, to attend a cyber charter school. The hearing officer determined that the school district had not violated its child find duty to the student in violation of either the IDEA or Section 504 where the district developed a Section 504 plan for the student within a month and a half of the parent’s first request for a Section 504 evaluation and where the parent repeatedly denied consent to conduct an IDEA evaluation of the student. The hearing officer noted that the student’s sporadic record of behavioral infractions prior to September 2023, did not suggest that the student had a disability prior to the parent’s initial request for an evaluation. The hearing officer further determined that no evidence had been produced to suggest that the student was discriminated against on the basis of disability in violation of Section 504. Additionally, the hearing officer determined that the IEP offered to the student was substantively adequate and that, to the extent the social and emotional programming offered by the school district was not received by the student, this resulted from the parent’s refusal to accept the same. The hearing officer finally determined that the school district did not commit an actionable procedural violation by delaying development of an IEP for the student where the parent repeatedly denied consent to evaluate the student. Court Dismisses Three of Four Claims Against School District Christopher J. Conrad and Daniel P. McGannon (Harrisburg) achieved a significant early victory on behalf of a school district client in. The team successfully obtained dismissal of three of the four claims asserted in the plaintiff’s amended complaint. The former district superintendent brought multiple claims arising out of his alleged “forced resignation,” including age discrimination under the ADEA, a Section 1983 Equal Protection claim, a Pennsylvania Whistleblower claim, and breach of contract. On behalf of the district, the defense team moved to dismiss the complaint in part, arguing: The plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a prima facie case of age discrimination. The equal protection claim was barred because the ADEA provides the exclusive federal remedy for age-based employment claims. The breach of contract claim could not stand because the underlying employment agreement had expired prior to the alleged breach. The court agreed, dismissing the ADEA, equal protection, and breach of contract claims in their entirety. As a result, only a single claim under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law remains pending. This outcome substantially narrows the scope of the litigation and positions the client for a more efficient defense moving forward.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.