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Defense Digest

Multiple Entities, But One Claim – The Issue of Corporate Negligence

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

September 1, 2024

by Gabor Ovari

Key Points: 

  • Courts have wrestled with the issue of what types of entities may be liable under theory of corporate liability pursuant to Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
  • In Newlin v. Vita Healthcare Group, et al., the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas decided whether multiple entities may all be liable under a theory of corporate negligence, and whether the liability of multiple entities may be a basis to reduce a corporate liability award.

Corporate liability is a frequently pursued claim in the medical malpractice arena in Pennsylvania. It is used by plaintiffs because it gives them another mechanism to get a “deep pocket” involved in their case. Under this theory, plaintiffs can claim that a hospital itself was directly negligent. 

Pennsylvania courts have adopted this doctrine as a theory of hospital liability. Corporate negligence provides that the hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care owed the patient, which is to ensure the patient’s safety at the hospital. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991).

The Thompson case was the first to outline this theory, which creates a non-delegable duty that the hospital owes directly to a patient. It was a major departure from previous jurisprudence because a patient could directly pursue the hospital itself, rather than trying to tie the hospital to liability through the traditional theory of respondeat superior and vicarious liability. 

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania established that a hospital has a duty to (1) use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) select and retain only competent physicians; (3) oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care; and (4) formulate, adopt, and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients. 

For a hospital to be found liable under this theory of liability, the plaintiff must show that the hospital had actual or constructive knowledge of the issue that created the harm. Further, the hospital’s negligence must have been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to the injured party. 

However, there are limits to liability. Importantly, courts have wrestled with the issue of what types of entities may be liable under this theory of liability. Of course, since Thompson, a hospital can certainly be liable under this theory. Beyond that, the picture is not so clear. The answer to the question boils down to the similarity of the care provided by that entity compared to care in a hospital setting. Courts will examine whether an entity is responsible for a patient’s total health care. For example, nursing homes were found to owe a direct duty because the degree of involvement in the care of patients in skilled nursing home facilities is markedly similar to that of a hospital and, thus, subject to corporate liability. See Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57 A.3d 582, 584 (Pa. 2012).

But what happens when there are multiple entities named as defendants? Can they all be liable under a theory of corporate negligence? Can this be a basis for an argument to reduce an award? These issues were addressed by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas in a recent case. 

In Newlin v. Vita Healthcare Group, et al., the Court of Common Pleas entered an order on December 20, 2023, that reduced a $19 million verdict against four defendant entities. Two entities were operators of a skilled nursing facility and two other entities were providers of management services. 

The plaintiffs in Newlin alleged that a nursing home resident fell at the facility and sustained a hip fracture and subsequently developed pressure ulcers, leading to her death. The case involved multiple theories of recovery and also included a claim for punitive damages. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The jury awarded $4 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in punitive damages, including $7 million against the operators and $8 million against the management entities. 

Post-trial motions were filed following the verdict. As it relates to the concept of corporate negligence, the court analyzed the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Scampone. There, the Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff could not recover against both a management company and the operator of the facility because only the owner/operator could be liable for corporate negligence. The owner of the entity could not delegate the legal responsibility under this theory of liability to another corporate entity. The duty under corporate liability is a non-delegable duty, and the owner of the facility cannot pass this responsibility to someone else. This is different from vicarious liability, under which both entities could be found liable. 

Accordingly, the court held that, because the non-delegable duty of care under corporate liability lies with the licensed operator only, a plaintiff cannot recover against both the licensed operator of a skilled nursing facility and a management company as well. Because the court found that only the owner/operator of the facility could be liable under corporate negligence, it vacated the punitive damages awards against the management entity. 

Scampone is significant because it illustrates how corporate negligence has evolved in the Commonwealth. It also illustrates that just because plaintiffs name multiple corporate entity defendants in a case does not mean that, suddenly, the value of the case has increased. Corporate liability involves a non-delegable duty, and courts will not find multiple entities liable under it. 

This issue should be addressed early on in each case where corporate negligence has been pled. Preliminary objections should be used to highlight the issue at an early stage of the litigation, and if those are not successful, it is a good idea to revisit this with a motion for summary judgement or even with motions in limine. The Newlin case demonstrates that it is absolutely vital to outline the nature of various entities during the course of litigation in order to ensure that the court can distinguish between the roles of various defendant entities in order to preclude excessive recovery. 

Gabor is an associate in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.