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SIU Spotlight

Florida Appellate Court Sets Record Straight on Longtime Misconception of Examinations Under Oath as Admissible Evidence

May 15, 2026

The Florida Third District Court of Appeal recently overturned a long standing assumption regarding the admissibility of examinations under oaths (“EUOs”) as trial evidence in Universal X Rays, Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 422 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), reh'g denied (Nov. 3, 2025). For years, a longstanding mythos existed around EUOs in Florida that they could not be used in litigation because of a multitude of reasoning: hearsay, trustworthiness, due process, creation in anticipation of litigation, among other common critiques. Such was the situation that great evidence could be potentially unearthed in an EUO, but if it could not be independently verified by other means, certain evidence as to fraudulent or denied coverage claims would never see the light of day.

In Universal X Rays, the assignee and insured, Miguel LaRosa-Ferrer sat for an examination under oath per his insurance policy following a car accident. The EUO was conducted via videoconference with a court reporter and the insured had an attorney present. During the required examination, the insured admitted that he had moved to a new address shortly before applying for the insurance policy but continued to list his old address on the application. This resulted in a lower premium for the insured. Two months later, United Auto sent a letter to the insured rescinding the policy, citing material misrepresentation of the garaging address, and returned the premium.

Several months later, the appellant, Universal, sued United Auto for breach of contract after it denied a medical billing reimbursement request for no-fault personal injury protection benefits. United Auto eventually moved for summary judgment on the issue of material misrepresentation with its key piece of evidence being the EUO transcript. Universal argued that the EUO transcript was inadmissible as improper hearsay, an out of court statement by a declarant offered for its truth, and that it violated section 92.33, Florida Statutes (2025) because the insurer did not provide a copy of the transcript to the insured. However, Universal offered no actual evidence disputing that the insured committed a material misrepresentation.

The lower trial court disagreed with Universal’s legal arguments and because no evidence disputing the material misrepresentation was presented, entered final judgment for United Auto. Unsurprisingly, Universal promptly appealed, as there is a history of trial courts in Florida finding EUOs to be inadmissible for numerous reasons leading to a long fabled belief in the industry as to the same.

For example, in JJZ Medical Center, Inc., v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 32 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 432a, (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Cty. 2024), a Miami-Dade trial court declined to review an examination under oath demonstrating material misrepresentation after an insured signed an affidavit to the contrary and it was submitted as evidence. The court held that the EUO could not be admissible because there was no cross-examination of the witness making it “inherently untrustworthy.” The court went on to state that an EUO transcript met no exception to hearsay exclusions under Florida law either such as former testimony or a business records exception.

Another County Court in Miami-Dade excluded an EUO transcript involving a material misrepresentation summary judgment because it was not provided to the declarant nor adopted by the declarant per § 92.33 Fla. Stat, and would be considered hearsay. Manuel V. Feijoo, M.D., aao Andisleydis Sordo Perez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 382a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Cty. 2023). In this case, the court honed in on the argument that an examination under oath, while sworn, lacks personal knowledge of the declarant because it is not provided to them, nor do they adopt it after it is transcribed. § 92.33 Fla. Stat requires a written statement by an injured party to be provided to that individual or it may not be used in a later civil action. The court held this statute to applicable and, thus, excluded the EUO transcript.

Both of these common lower court arguments were then brought up on appeal by Universal. They argued to the Third District Court of Appeal that the EUO was inadmissible hearsay, violating Florida Statute § 92.33, which requires a copy of a written statement to be provided to the declarant. However, Third District Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and for a reason that seemed to catch the appellant off-guard.

First, the court cited Florida’s revised summary judgment standard, which in 2021, aligned Florida’s Rule 1.510 with the federal summary judgment standard Rule 56. Using the full benefit of federal case law, the court held that hearsay is permissible “as long as it can” be presented in admissible form at trial—such as through live testimony. In such instances, the proper response from an opposing party is to present conflicting evidence of the statement. However, in this case, Universal put forth no evidence that the insured’s garage address was not materially misrepresented, and, thus, they lost this issue.

The Third District rejected the argument that the insurer violated § 92.33 Fla. Stat., noting that the statute only requires “written statements” to be provide to an injured person. The court held that an EUO, which is a sworn transcribed statement, would not even be covered by § 92.33, and the appellant failed to provide any authority to the contrary. Given that appellant’s statutory argument did not apply and it presented no evidence to contradict the examination under oath, which could be reduced to admissible form at trial, the Third District affirmed the admissibility of the EUO in favor of the insurer.

The significance of the Universal X Rays opinion now means EUOs are an even stronger fraud deterrent in Florida. They can be taken with confidence and utilized to stem frivolous litigation and claims at much earlier phases than before. Rather than ignore the EUO transcript, opposing parties now must affirmatively disprove that fraud has occurred once it is admitted.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.