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SIU Spotlight

Changes to NJ’s Open Public Records Act and Implications for SIU

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Matthew J. Burdalski

In June 2024, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signed into law Senate Bill 2930, enacting significant amendments to New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act (OPRA). These changes, effective September 3, 2024, were made with the stated intent to modernize public records access, enhance transparency, and protect personal information. As access to public records is often a tool for SIU in investigating insurance claims, it will be important to understand the changes and how they may impact your investigation. 

The New Jersey Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et. seq., was passed in 2002. It replaced New Jersey’s former Right to Know Law and also expanded the definition of a public record. The amendments passed late last year enacted changes to everything from the method to obtaining public records to which records can be provided and how. Some of the most relevant and important changes which should be noted by SIU follow.

Attorney Fees
Previously, requestors who were successful in court with respect to denied records requests were entitled to recover attorney’s fees. The new law limits the right to recover fees only upon a showing that the public agency “unreasonably denied access, acted in bad faith, or knowingly and willfully violated” OPRA. Further, if the records are provided within seven days of a lawsuit, attorney’s fees may be awarded only if the agency “knew or should have known” that the denial violated OPRA. 

Protective Orders Against Disruptive Requests
Public agencies can now seek protective orders against individuals or entities whose records requests are intended to “substantially interrupt the performance of government function.” This was previously unavailable to public agencies. This potentially allows courts to issue orders to limit the scope or number of records requested. 

Public Records on Websites
Agencies are now required to make records available on publicly accessible websites “to the extent feasible.” These websites must include a search function, and custodians must assist requestors in locating records online. This has the benefit of potentially streamlining the process of accessing public records, assuming the records are properly and fully placed online. Further, agencies may now be in compliance of specific records requests by directing the requestor to the online source provided they offer assistance in locating the records. 

Model Request Form
There will now be a model request form that must be utilized by each public agency and used when requesting public records. The new model request form will include additional questions regarding commercial purpose, whether the records are being sought in connection with litigation, and the addition of new exemptions in the Exemptions Checklist section. 

Definition of “Commercial Purpose”
The amendments introduce a new category of requestor—those seeking records for a “commercial purpose.” In addition to commercial entities, this category covers individuals who intend to use the records for the sale, solicitation, rent or lease or a service, or any use by which the user expects to profit either through commission, salary, or fee. Importantly for SIU, those requestors must certify that the records are for a commercial purpose and must provide the intended use of the records. The failure to do so can result in fines. Exemptions apply to journalists, educational institutions, and certain non-profits. The commercial purpose definition is not currently well defined and will likely be the subject of future litigation for clarification. 

Limitations on Use During Legal Proceedings
The amendments to the OPRA law restricts parties to a legal proceeding from requesting records that are the subject of a court order, including pending discovery requests. Requestors must now certify whether their request is connected to a legal proceeding. In short, once litigation has been commenced, requestors will be foreclosed from seeking public records through the OPRA process. Notably, legal proceeding is not specifically defined in the statute, and this provision will apply regardless of whether the agency is a party to the proceeding or not. This is especially important for SIU. Requests for needed records or information important to your investigation must be made as early as possible and prior to any litigation being filed. 

Expanded Definition of Personal Identifying Information
This definition now includes birth dates, personal email addresses, debit card and bank account information, home addresses, personal telephone numbers, personal information of juveniles under 18 (excepting MVC and elections information), HIPPA data, and indecent graphic images, all with the stated intent of enhancing the protection of personal data. 

Responses and Response Time
Agencies must respond to proper requests, in writing, “as soon as possible but not later than seven (7) days after receipt of the request.” The response must address each item requested by either: granting access; denying access; seeking clarification of the request; or requesting an extension of time.

Other Relevant Changes

  • Identical Request: Agencies are no longer required to respond to identical requests for the same information from the same requestor if no information has changed.
  • Appeal Timeframe: Requestors must appeal the denial of their request within 45 days.
  • Records Kept by Others: Agencies are not obligated to respond to requests for records kept by separate public agencies. 
  • Vague Requests: Agencies are not required to respond to a request if it does not identify with specificity the information/documentation sought. 
  • Security Footage: Footage of public buildings is exempt unless the request identifies a specific incident that occurred, or a specified date and limited time period at a particular building.

These amendments were enacted with the stated purpose of balancing the public’s right to access information with the need to protect personal privacy and prevent the misuse and abuse of the records request process. However, from a SIU perspective, the changes may have the effect of limiting access and transparency on the part of the agencies. 

It is crucial for the SIU community to familiarize itself with the new provisions to ensure compliance and maintain the ability to access public records necessary for effective and efficient claims investigations and determinations.

SIU should take care to familiarize itself with the OPRA process and the new potential limitations and roadblocks to accessing public records. Additional care should be taken to ensure compliance with the updated processes and regulations when making records requests as well as the remedies available when encountered with failures to full comply or respond. 

*Matthew is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, NJ office and a member of the Insurance Fraud/SIU Practice Group. (856) 414-6035 | MJBurdalski@mdwcg.com 



 

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.