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Dylan T. Trochtenberg

Portrait of Dylan T. Trochtenberg

In his role in the Health Care Department, Dylan’s practice focuses on defending claims of medical malpractice and nursing home negligence.

Dylan is experienced in the many facets of litigation, having participated in dozens of arbitrations and hundreds of depositions, and having argued countless matters on behalf of his clients. He uses this experience to effectively litigate every matter, often resulting in favorable outcomes for his clients.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Dylan practiced at a small but well-respected firm in Central Jersey, where he litigated hundreds of cases on behalf of one of the largest insurance carriers in New Jersey. He previously served as a Committee Chair in the New Jersey Defense Association.

Dylan lives in Mount Laurel, New Jersey, with his wife.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2021)
    • University of Missouri (B.A., 2018)
    • New Jersey, 2021
    • New Jersey Defense Association, Expert Database Committee Chair (2023-2025)

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Claims of Future Medical Expenses Must Be Examined Carefully During Discovery to Avoid Unnecessary Surprise at Trial

July 21, 2026

Often in actions involving injuries in New Jersey, a claim for future medical damages is made in tandem with any injury claim. Luckily, in January of 2026, the Appellate Division in the unpublished decision of Terrell v. Chitra provided insight as to when a plaintiff may actually recover future medical expenses. Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident wherein she claimed injuries to the neck, back, and right shoulder, with specific claims of cervical disc herniation. Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon recommended she undergo a cervical discectomy and fusion, though she never took any substantial steps towards receiving the surgery. However, at the time of trial, Plaintiff testified that she wanted to have the surgery and the trial court permitted medical expert testimony regarding the need for surgery and the cost of same. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict of $1,300,000 - $1,000,000 for pain and suffering and $300,000 for future medical costs. On appeal, Defendant argued that the future medical costs were inadmissible due to: 1. plaintiff’s failure to disclose her intention on having the surgery; and 2. the introduction of the cost of the speculative future surgery tainted the jury’s pain and suffering award. The Appellate Division agreed and found that the plaintiff never made a definitive statement pre-trial that she would have the surgery, thus prejudicing the defendant. The court also found that the plaintiff expert’s opinion testimony regarding the future costs of the surgery were improper and tainted the overall value of the injuries and pain/suffering. Ultimately, the matter was remanded back to the trial court for an entirely new trial on damages, with a bar on introducing evidence of speculative future medical expenses. On June 2, 2026, the Supreme Court of New Jersey entered an order denying a petition for certification. See Terrell v. Chitra, 2026 N.J. LEXIS 536 (2026). At its core, the holding in Terrell is a reminder that trial counsel must proactively file motions in limine to bar claims for speculative future medical expenses. While Terrell is a motor vehicle accident case, the holding is equally as applicable to medical malpractice and long-term care matters where plaintiffs make claims regarding future care. Defense counsel should be certain to question plaintiffs at their deposition regarding any future surgeries and make specific evaluations of medical expert reports for the claimed costs of future treatment.

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – New Jersey

February 25, 2026

New Jersey Supreme Court Eases Affidavit of Merit Standard for Multi-Specialty Physicians in Medical Malpractice Cases Wiggins v. Hackensack Meridian Health, et al., 259 N.J. 562 (2025) A landmark decision with widespread implications for New Jersey medical malpractice law addresses whether an Affidavit of Merit from a board-certified internal medicine physician is sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss when the defendant doctor holds multiple specialties. The trial judge denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and opined that, when a physician practices multiple specialties, an Affidavit of Merit from any at-issue specialty is sufficient, in accordance with Buck v. Henry, 207 N.J. 377 (2011). The Appellate Division reversed that decision, arguing that an Affidavit of Merit from physicians certified in each of the defendant’s specialties was required. Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the Appellate Division and reaffirmed the trial court’s ruling—an Affidavit of Merit from any specialty at issue suffices when the defendant has multiple specializations. Obviously, this holding was based largely on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41, which requires that an Affidavit of Merit come from an “appropriate licensed person” with specialization in the relevant field of the defendant physician. Interestingly, the Supreme Court reasoned that the statute’s language “specialist or subspecialist” specifically includes the operative word, OR; thus, an expert need only share a “singular” specialty as the defendant physician. At its core, Wiggins effectively eases a plaintiff’s burden in cases where the defendant has multiple specialties. In practice, should a defendant physician hold specialties in oncology, radiology and pediatrics, with board-certifications in same, and should the plaintiff offer an expert with a specialty in oncology, this would be sufficient under the statute to overcome a Motion to Dismiss, so long as the issue at hand involved the specialty of oncology.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.