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Defense Digest

The Nature of Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

Key Points: 

  • The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clarified that the standard of proof required for a finding of attorney misconduct is “clear and convincing evidence.” 
  • Attorney disciplinary matters “are in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings.” 

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania earlier this year issued an opinion examining the standard of proof to be applied in attorney disciplinary proceedings to establish that misconduct has occurred. In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney, 331 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2025), the court not only clarified that the standard of proof required is “clear and convincing evidence” but, also, that attorney disciplinary matters “are in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings.” Id. at 525. 

The attorney in ODC v. Anonymous Att’y had previously represented a corporate creditor which had been assigned a loan guaranteed by debtors. After the creditor sued to collect on the loan, the parties attempted to negotiate a settlement over some years. The debtors eventually filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which generally automatically stays all related civil proceedings and enforcement of judgments. Id. at 526. 

The respondent would later file a claim against the debtors in the bankruptcy proceeding. One of the filings in support of the claim included “an edited photograph of one of the debtors to show that the debtors had an expensive lifestyle, as the debtor was wearing a watch worth more than $26,000 in the photograph.” Id. at 527. The debtors then filed a motion to enforce the automatic stay and for sanctions against the creditor and the respondent. The debtors contended that the date of the photo had been cropped to make it seem as if it were a more-recent photo. The respondent replied that “he had edited the photo to protect the privacy of the unknown individual who was standing with one of the debtors.” After two days of hearings, the Bankruptcy Court held the respondent jointly and severally liable for $354,777.75 in damages. 

The Pennsylvania Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) then filed a petition for discipline, contending the respondent had “violated several Rules of Professional Conduct.” The ODC later filed a motion to preclude the respondent from re-litigating findings of fact in the bankruptcy proceeding. The respondent objected, arguing, essentially, “…that the ‘clear and satisfactory’ standard required to establish attorney misconduct was more stringent than that required to find a willful violation of an automatic stay by the bankruptcy court judge.” Id. at 528. The Hearing Committee ultimately granted the ODC’s motion. 

In adopting much of the Hearing Committee’s findings, the Disciplinary Board concluded that the respondent had not actually been prevented from litigating the issue of whether his conduct violated the rules of professional conduct. Id. at 528-29. Only one lone Disciplinary Board member dissented, “explaining that the Hearing Committee should not have applied collateral estoppel in light of the differing burdens of proof between the disciplinary and bankruptcy proceedings.” Id. at 529. The respondent then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

The existence of differing standards of proof does not necessarily preclude application of collateral estoppel; however, where “the standard of proof in a prior proceeding is a lesser burden of proof than what is required in the subsequent proceeding, the outcome in the subsequent proceeding may not be the same as the first.” In deciding for the respondent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that articulation of the burden of proof (“a preponderance of the evidence through clear and satisfactory evidence”) was heretofore confusing because the words “preponderance of the evidence” are used “in conjunction with the phrase ‘with proof that is clear and satisfactory’.” Amazingly, this standard utilized language applicable to widely different standards recognized at the time. The court further explains that additional confusion arose over a decade ago due to a “scrivener’s error” in the case ODC v. Cappuccio, 48 A.3d 1231 (Pa. 2012), which unintentionally omitted the portion of the rule statement that requires that proof of the conduct at issue “must be clear and satisfactory.”

In concluding that “preponderance of the evidence” is unacceptable for attorney disciplinary proceedings, and that the correct standard is “clear and convincing evidence,” the court fascinatingly reiterates that “[d]isciplinary proceedings are not strictly civil nor criminal in nature, but rather have been styled quasi-criminal.” Id. at 535. One can see how this might be, given that such proceedings are not “civil disputes for money damages,” and the interests in play are simply not minimal. The very ability to practice is itself at issue in such a case. But beyond the ability to practice, one’s professional reputation is on the line. Our reputation follows us everywhere, well beyond any office space or courtroom.

On the one hand, the court’s decision may be taken as positive news, as renewed guidance in application of a standard can lead to improved clarity with respect to litigation strategy. On the other hand, the decision may provide for some unpredictable consequences down the line. 

The case adds weight to the notion that an attorney disciplinary proceeding lands squarely between standards of review and burdens of proof necessary in civil and criminal proceedings. Such a notion may draw prosecutors to scrutinize instances of both public and anonymous discipline more deeply. There could also be attempts during a prosecution to utilize findings in disciplinary cases for some level of heightened persuasive effect based on the “quasi-criminal” nature of the proceedings. 

As discussed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, attorney disciplinary proceedings “…are not lawsuits between parties but are in the nature of an inquest or inquiry as to the conduct of an attorney…[and] the proceedings can have a severe impact on the attorney’s career and livelihood.” Id. at 534. The Supreme Court reasonably took issue with the notion that a mere preponderance of the evidence standard is all that it should take to subject an attorney to discipline. ODC v. Anonymous Att’y cements for the foreseeable future the notion that a heightened standard of proof is what is required to establish attorney misconduct in Pennsylvania. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.