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Results

  • Unanimous Decision Received from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

    We received a unanimous decision from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This decision both limits the use of offensive collateral estoppel in disciplinary matters and establishes that the standard of proof for disciplinary matters in Pennsylvania is clear and convincing evidence. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel had sought to utilize non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the respondent from disputing fact determinations by a bankruptcy judge when she sanctioned the respondent and his client. The Supreme Court determined that the burden of proof for the judge in issuing sanctions was something less than clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply. In making its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the previously expressed standard of “preponderance of clear and satisfactory evidence” was confusing and archaic but is the functional equivalent of “clear and convincing.” 

  • Successful Representation of Attorney in Disciplinary Board Matter

    We achieved an informal admonition, the lowest form of discipline which is non-public, for a lawyer client in a matter that involved alleged failures to appropriately represent clients and timely file appeals in six different criminal matters.

  • Dismissal of Disciplinary Complaint Involving IOLTA Funds

    We achieved dismissal of a disciplinary complaint brought against our attorney client who was the victim of a sophisticated scam and sent IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts) funds belonging to another client out of the country.

  • Dismissal of Ethics Grievance Against Attorney

    We obtained a dismissal of an ethics grievance against a matrimonial attorney in northern New Jersey. The ethics grievance alleged that money in the grievant’s trust account was improperly handled since the ledger cards were completed incorrectly. Upon interviewing our client, the ethics investigator determined that no ethical violation was present since the money at issue was fully accounted for in the Trust account, despite the allegations by the grievant.

  • Client Privacy Maintained in Disciplinary Board Matter

    In a highly unusual move in a case with potential national implications, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for allowance of appeal seeking to have the decision of the Disciplinary Board changed from a private reprimand to a public reprimand. The defense successfully defeated this petition, thus maintaining the client’s privacy.

  • Successful Representation of Attorney at Center of Ethics Investigation

    Our client represented a plaintiff in a personal injury action. The personal injury plaintiff had signed a lien letter, agreeing to repay her physical therapist from the proceeds of the personal injury claim. After the case settled, our client reimbursed the physical therapist for less than the amount billed by the therapist, who filed the ethics complaint. We successfully argued that our client was representing the best interests of his client, who claimed the bills were excessive. By doing so, the attorney increased the recovery for his client.

  • Dismissal of Ethics Grievance Filed Against Education Law Attorney

    We obtained a dismissal of an ethics grievance filed against our client, a school law attorney who represented a school board and a school district. The grievance included allegations of ex parte communications with the administrative law judge, undue influence over the court, and conflict of interest based on a mediator’s spouse being retained by this attorney’s firm. We successfully argued to the disciplinary investigator that the conversations this attorney had with the administrative law judge’s staff were rudimentary scheduling and routinely conducted in cases across New Jersey. In terms of the conflict of interest alleged, we also argued that this attorney was an associate with the firm and had no interactions or decision-making authority regarding hiring of attorneys in the firm. The disciplinary ethics investigator found by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony of the school law attorney was credible, and that there was no ethical misconduct by our client. 

  • Private Reprimand for Client in a Disciplinary Board Matter

    This case had potential national implications where the allegations by Disciplinary Counsel included 93 paragraphs and alleged violations of multiple Rules of Professional Conduct.

  • Dismissal of Ethics Grievance Against Condominium Association Attorney

    Our attorneys obtained dismissal of an ethics grievance filed against their client, the litigation counsel for a condominium association. In this case, the attorney was able to obtain a multi-million dollar settlement on behalf of the condominium association resulting from various construction defects caused by the developer, among others. After the settlement was reached, the developer’s vice president was able to assume control of the condominium association’s board and brought ethics charges against the attorney, alleging collusion with the board president and a property manager, who acted in concert to abscond with the settlement proceeds. The ethics grievance alleged the attorney should have notified the association board of the conspiracy and should have warned the association of the theft taking place. Upon responding to the ethics grievance filed against the attorney, the defense argued that the attorney had no involvement with the president of the association or the project manager and did not have any knowledge of the conspiracy. The attorney focused on the litigation and did not involve himself in anything related to the association’s business, other than the litigation, and focused on obtaining the best settlement possible for the association against the developer. After investigating this matter, reviewing the attorney’s response, as well as interviewing the attorney, the Office of Attorney Ethics dismissed all allegations against the attorney, finding that the allegations could not be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 

  • Successful Defense of Special Education Law Attorney

    We obtained the dismissal of an ethics grievance on behalf of a local special education law attorney. The grievant filed her ethics grievance based upon allegations of fraudulent and unethical practices, accusing the attorney of taking legal fees from a settlement, and alleging that the attorney was prohibited from doing so based on the terms of the settlement agreement. Specifically, the grievant alleged that the attorney failed to safeguard funds from an irrevocable trust for a special needs child, her son. In fully investigating this grievance, the District Ethics Investigator concluded that based on the evidence received, the interviews conducted and the submissions prepared on behalf of the attorney, the investigation did not reveal clear and convincing evidence that the attorney engaged in unethical conduct.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.