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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – RESULTS*

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – November 2024

November 1, 2024

Carly Edman (Pittsburgh, PA):

  • Obtained a dismissal with prejudice of all claims in a Dragonetti action in federal court in the Western District of Pennsylvania. Our clients, a family law attorney and her law firm, were sued after they filed a series of emergency motions on behalf of a mother embroiled in a contentious divorce. The emergency motions concerned the welfare of children and contained sensitive allegations relating to purported abuse. Following the disposition of these motions, the husband and his current partner sued our clients for wrongful use of civil proceedings, abuse of process and defamation. In a motion to dismiss, Carly successfully argued that all claims should be dismissed. Notably, the court’s opinion quoted Carly’s brief in support directly for its analysis of the controlling cases. The court dismissed all claims against our clients with prejudice. 

John ‘Jack’ Slimm (Mount Laurel, NJ):

  • In a case with $10 million in damages on the line, Jack was successful in having a complex legal malpractice action dismissed. The plaintiffs, a group of entities created for the estate planning of a married couple (now deceased), appealed the trial court’s decision to deny their request to extend the time for gathering evidence (discovery) and to dismiss their claims against several defendants, including lawyers and law firms. The plaintiffs accused these defendants of negligence, breach of trust, misuse of funds, and legal malpractice related to a previous settlement and the handling of family business matters. The court found that the plaintiffs did not provide the necessary evidence or expert testimony to support their legal malpractice claims. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the court used the wrong standard when denying their request to extend discovery and claimed they had valid reasons for needing more time and that the court unfairly dismissed their claims. However, the appeals court reviewed the trial court’s actions and found no mistake in how the court handled the case. In agreement with Jack, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, emphasizing that the plaintiffs’ inability to meet court requirements and present strong claims warranted the dismissal of their case.
  • The New Jersey Appellate Division’s decision came after a decade of litigation in various courts stemming from a judgment in a financial services division of a multinational conglomerate obtained against the plaintiff and his partners in which litigation ensued over debt collection. The plaintiffs alleged, as a result of the statements and arguments made by the defendant attorneys in the underlying litigation regarding the debt, the attorneys committed fraud and misrepresentation that led to the plaintiffs’ damages, which they claimed were well in excess of $10 million. Jack argued that the assignment agreement actually reduced the amount owed to the corporation and asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing that his client was protected by legal privilege, the statute of limitations had passed, and it had no legal duty to the plaintiff. The trial court agreed to dismiss the case, finding that the plaintiff’s claims were not supported by evidence. On appeal, the court once again agreed with Jack and upheld the decision, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments. The Appellate Division found that our clients owed no duty to the plaintiff-debtors as non-clients since the attorneys’ alleged misrepresentations were made during adversarial litigation and, thus, were not intended to induce reasonable reliance by a specific non-client. In addition, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) to sustain their cause of action since in New Jersey a violation of the RPC, standing alone, does not create a cause of action for damages. Further, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ request to permit malpractice claims by non-clients in the presence of fraud, collusion, or malicious acts. This decision is extremely important to the trial bar and provides attorneys with a level of protection/immunity in connection with statements and arguments they make as adversaries in litigation.

Aaron Moore (Philadelphia, PA and Wilmington, DE):

  • Obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than the policy limits. After five years of litigation, the court granted our summary judgment motion, concluding the plaintiff failed to adduce facts reflecting that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause. The court also held the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the underlying lawsuit was prosecuted for an improper purpose.
  • Obtained a dismissal of claims brought derivatively and directly by a corporation, including aiding and abetting, breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract, against our client, an out-of-state attorney who previously represented the corporation and its former director. The court granted our motion to dismiss, concluding the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts that would confer personal jurisdiction over the attorney under a conspiracy theory.

Matthew Flanagan and Jamie Sanderson (New York, NY):

  • Secured a decision granting our motion to dismiss in full in Orange County on an attorney malpractice matter. The plaintiff and daughter of co-defendants sued her parents and our client for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty denominated as promissory estoppel, and constructive trust. She sought damages of $800,000. The co-defendants allegedly purchased a property for the plaintiff to live and work in and had agreed to deed the property to the plaintiff once she paid the mortgage in full. Our client created a family trust for the family, naming the plaintiff as trustee, in which the property would be transferred to the plaintiff following the death of both parents. However, following a family dispute, the co-defendants replaced the plaintiff as trustee with our client. Upon the request of the co-defendants and in accordance with the terms of the trust, our client transferred the house to another beneficiary. We filed a motion to dismiss on all counts which the court granted in full. 

Dante Rohr (Orlando, FL):

  • Won a motion to dismiss in a case arising from our client’s representation of a plaintiff in a criminal matter. The plaintiff claimed that, due to his attorney's negligence in failing to notify him of his pretrial hearing, he was incarcerated for 437 days based on his failure to appear at the hearing, resulting in the revocation of his bond. The court granted Dante's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff could not establish a necessary element of his claim—actual innocence. Although the court released the plaintiff based on a showing that counsel failed to notify him of the hearing, thereby exonerating him from the failure to appear, the plaintiff could not meet the actual innocence element. Therefore, the State entered a nolle prosequi and dropped the case.

Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA):

  • Successfully defended on appeal the trial court’s grant of compulsory nonsuit in a legal malpractice action following the trial court’s rulings on various motions in limine. The trial court granted our clients’ motions in limine to preclude the plaintiff from introducing into evidence that its attorney sued the wrong parties, that its attorney obtained an uncollectable judgment, and that the plaintiff would have prevailed in a lawsuit against other parties. Following the motion in limine rulings, trial counsel moved for nonsuit—arguing the plaintiff could not carry its burden of proof without the precluded evidence. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the trial court’s evidentiary rulings violated the law of the case set forth in the Superior Court’s decision reversing the trial court’s order sustaining our clients’ preliminary objections and dismissing the amended complaint, and that the trial court erred in granting the motions in limine. The Superior Court rejected both arguments and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to remove compulsory nonsuit. The Superior Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motions and that it properly concluded the plaintiff failed to present evidence to meet its burden of proof.

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome 


 

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – November 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.