.

Connor is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he concentrates his practice on public entity and civil rights litigation. He handles all manner of public risk claims including disputes involving municipalities, police departments, zoning officers, school districts, public officials, and both private and public sector employees. 

Connor also has experience representing physicians, physician assistants, hospitals, and other health care providers and facilities in general and professional liability matters. 

Connor was born and raised in Chester County, Pennsylvania. He graduated from the University of Delaware with a Bachelor of Arts in Public Policy and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and went on to earn his juris doctor from Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law with a Health Law Concentration.

During law school, Connor was an active member in several organizations, including the Honor Board, Villanova Health Law Society, Villanova Sports Law Society, and the COVID-19 Legal Research Project. He also served as a Certified Legal Intern at Villanova Law School’s Interdisciplinary Mental & Physical Health Law Clinic, providing pro-bono representation on community health matters.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Connor worked at a civil litigation firm, representing clients primarily in the areas of premises, retail, and automobile liability.

Outside of work, Connor enjoys walking his dogs, spending time outdoors, and rooting for the Philadelphia sports teams.

Connor is admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 2022)
    • University of Delaware (B.A., 2019)
    • Pennsylvania, 2022
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2024
    • Spanish (conversational)
    • Chester County Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association

Results

Dismissal of Police Officers Secured Via Sanctions Imposed

We had our clients dismissed via sanctions imposed. On Jan. 6, 2011, Charles Sample was arrested by officers of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Narcotics Field Unit. The plaintiff alleged the officers seized $40,000 in cash from his vehicle, falsified a search warrant affidavit, disregarded proper procedures and withheld exculpatory evidence, leading to drug charges. The plaintiff entered a guilty plea for probation to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. On Jan. 6, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, and the charges were nolle prossed. The plaintiff filed his initial complaint on Jan. 4, 2019, alleging federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. Due to related litigation involving the Narcotics Field Unit, the case was placed in suspense on March 10, 2020, and restored to the active docket on Nov. 15, 2023. On April 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting six causes of action: § 1983 claims for fabrication of evidence, suppression of evidence, malicious prosecution, civil rights conspiracy, municipal liability (against the City of Philadelphia), and state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and conversion. On Aug. 5, 2025, Judge Gerald J. Pappert of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the individual police officer defendants under FRCP Rule 37(b) for failure to comply with discovery orders, with prejudice. Applying the Poulis factors, the court found the plaintiff personally responsible for nearly two years of non-communication with his counsel, which prejudiced the police officers by delaying trial preparation and demonstrated a history of dilatoriness without reasonable excuse. Lesser sanctions were deemed ineffective due to the plaintiff’s prolonged unresponsiveness, and the merits of his claims could not be evaluated, rendering this factor neutral. The City’s motion to join the police officers’ sanctions motion was denied, as they did not move to compel discovery or demonstrate the plaintiff’s violation of a related court order. 

Dismissal Secured in Defamation Matter Involving an American Legion Post

We successfully had a defamation matter against an American Legion Post and certain of its members dismissed. After joining the Post, the plaintiff supposedly found unpaid invoices, canceled insurance policies, and non-compliance with Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) and gaming license regulations. He fired the restaurant manager, processed payroll, secured new insurance, and attempted to renew the gaming license at the defendants’ direction. When the plaintiff urged compliance and stated he would cooperate with a potential PLCB investigation, he alleges that the defendants threatened him and accused him of misconduct, such as showing a video of a sexually explicit nature to another Post employee, failing to pay wages/vendors, making threats, removing a laptop, allowing unauthorized payroll access and making unauthorized purchases. He was permanently suspended from the Legion after a formal executive session. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit in York County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the various statements regarding his misconduct were false. The case was dismissed after the plaintiff failed to comply with two discovery orders and a subpoena for his counsel’s deposition, prompting Judge Menges to impose sanctions, dismissing the case.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

A Deadly Encounter: Court Clarifies Use of Force in Police Shooting of Mentally Ill Individual

March 1, 2025

Key Points: Use of Deadly Force: The court upheld the police officers’ use of deadly force, which is relevant for insurance coverage in similar incidents. Municipal Liability: No liability for the defendant as there was no constitutional violation, impacting municipal coverage decisions.  State-Law Claims: Dismissal of wrongful death and emotional distress claims highlights the importance of reasonable officer actions in defending state-law claims.  Ongoing Appeal: The case is under appeal, potentially influencing future police liability coverage and claims. On August 3, 2021, Plymouth Township police officers responded to a crisis involving Michael Paone, a 22-year-old with a history of mental illness, which tragically resulted in his death. The case addressed the complex intersection of mental health, police use of deadly force, and constitutional rights. Judge Joshua Wolson granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding the law enforcement officers acted within their rights when responding to a perceived deadly threat, thus providing crucial guidance on police decision-making in such high-stakes encounters. The Facts of the Case On the evening of August 3, 2021, Michael Paone was exhibiting erratic behavior and appeared to be armed with a firearm outside an apartment complex. Paone had previously been diagnosed with multiple mental health disorders, including bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Paone’s sister called 911, reporting he was armed with a knife and experiencing a mental health crisis, and she informed the dispatcher that Michael had a “fake toy gun.” Police arrived at the scene and found Paone positioned between two buildings. Officers took positions at varying distances and instructed Paone to drop the weapon. Paone initially complied and dropped the BB gun, but when officers moved closer, he appeared to bend toward the weapon. Fearing for their safety, and believing the object was a real firearm, Officer Doe 1 fired three shots at Paone, who then briefly rose to reach for the weapon, prompting additional shots from Officer Doe 1 and other officers. Following the incident, Paone was transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead from multiple gunshot wounds. Legal Standard for Use of Deadly Force The central issue was whether the officers’ use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, including excessive force. The court applied the Graham v. Connor standard, which assesses the reasonableness of force based on the circumstances at the time. Judge Wolson found no factual dispute that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the officers violated Paone’s rights. Citing Lamont v. New Jersey, Judge Wolson emphasized that officers must prioritize their safety when faced with a lethal threat. Paone’s actions of raising and pointing a weapon—whether real or not—created an objectively reasonable belief that deadly force was warranted. The Mental Health Factor The plaintiff argued that Paone’s mental illness should have influenced the officers’ response. Judge Wolson acknowledged Paone’s mental health issues but clarified that mental illness does not eliminate the possibility that an individual can pose a deadly threat in a high-stress situation. Judge Wolson explained, the case was not about Paone’s mental health or whether he had a toy gun, but whether the officers’ use of deadly force was justified. He noted that Paone’s mental illness did not grant him additional constitutional protection or remove the potential danger posed by his actions. The Constitution does not require officers to “gamble with their lives” in situations involving mental illness, especially when facing a perceived deadly threat. Dismissal of Remaining Claims Having determined that the police officers’ use of deadly force was justified, Judge Wolson dismissed several remaining claims. The municipal liability claim against Plymouth Township failed because there was no underlying constitutional violation. Under Section 1983, a municipality can only be held liable if a constitutional violation occurred. The state-law claims—survival and wrongful death, assault and battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—were also dismissed. The survival and wrongful death claims failed as the officers’ actions were deemed reasonable. The assault and battery claim was dismissed because the use of force was justified. Similarly, the emotional distress claims were dismissed for lack of an underlying tort or extreme conduct. Implications and Conclusion  The court’s decision in this case highlights the critical balance law enforcement must strike when responding to high-risk situations, especially those involving individuals with mental health disorders. The case reinforces that police officers must act based on their assessment of an immediate threat, without the benefit of time for detailed evaluations. While mental illness is an important factor, it does not negate the potential danger posed by an individual holding a weapon. This ruling emphasizes the need to protect both the constitutional rights of individuals and the safety of law enforcement officers. The court’s decision ensures that officers are able to make split-second decisions in the face of perceived threats, with a focus on their safety and the safety of others.  The case is now being appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, where it may further shape legal standards surrounding police use of force in similar encounters *Connor is a member of Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group and works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.