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Director Emeritus, Professional Liability Department

Portrait of Craig S. Hudson

Defense Digest

Message From the Executive Committee

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021

June 1, 2021

by Craig S. Hudson

In the previous Defense Digest, you were provided with a link to a well-deserved and moving video tribute to Chris Dougherty, my predecessor as director of the Professional Liability Department and a member of the Executive Committee, who stepped down from both positions at the end of 2020. If you have not yet watched the video, I urge you to do so. I can envision no greater honor and privilege than to succeed my friend, Chris, as the director of the Professional Liability Department.

Settling into this new position has caused me to reflect on my 28 years at Marshall Dennehey. In 1993, I was a senior associate at the Liebert Short law firm. I was invited to join a group of the partners that had decided to join Marshall Dennehey. I was considering my options when Bob Coleman, who “ran” Marshall Dennehey at the time, called and asked me to meet with him. I did, and we spent an hour together. During our conversation, Bob told me of his vision for Marshall Dennehey’s future. When he was done, I knew that Marshall Dennehey was the firm for me. I said, “Yes.” To this day, I consider my decision to join the firm to be one of my best.

When I first started at Marshall Dennehey, I was part of the Casualty Department. Over the ensuing years, I was fortunate to work with and learn from some very fine attorneys, including Harry Short, Eric Weiss, Keith Heinold and Tom Brophy. I handled a mix of cases, ranging from motor vehicle product liability cases to defending Sesame Place (always an advantage to be representing Big Bird).

A couple of years into my time at Marshall Dennehey, Bob Coleman again called and asked that I come to his office. As I walked down the hall to meet him, I had more than a little bit of trepidation. Bob told me that he recalled from our initial meeting that I had told him that one day I would like to get involved in firm management and not just handle cases. Bob said he wanted to give me a chance to see if this was really something I wanted and could do. He asked if I would like to oversee the summer law clerk program. I followed my father’s advice to never turn down opportunities presented to you by your boss (and believe me, Bob was the boss). A couple of years later, I was asked to get involved in associate recruiting. Again, I said yes. I then worked closely with and later succeeded Howard Dwoskin as the firm’s attorney hiring coordinator. I have to admit I take some pride in the fact that some of the attorneys I recruited have become leaders in our firm.

A few years later, I was “recruited” to practice in the Professional Liability Department. Again, I agreed. A short while later, I started working with Phil Toran and Chris Dougherty, who was then the assistant director of the Professional Liability Department, on recruiting and hiring associates. I also was tasked with providing some oversight and direction to the department’s lawyers who practiced out of the Philadelphia office.

After several years in this role, a new opportunity arose. By then, the firm had entered the Florida market, and, by 2005, its four offices were growing. Marshall Dennehey’s base was solid, with Mark Thompson as the manager of the Orlando office, but there was a need to strengthen the firm’s additional offices in Fort Lauderdale, Jacksonville and Tampa. I just so happened to be part of a conversation among Phil Toran, Peter Miller and Tom Brophy, where it was stated that the Fort Lauderdale office might benefit from having a stronger connection to Philadelphia. Having recently returned from a business trip to our Florida offices, I somehow thought it was a good idea to suggest that I might be willing to go to Florida and take on that role. Phil, Pete and Tom were surprised and intrigued to hear that I would even consider doing so. Wisely, they suggested that I should first discuss the idea of moving to Florida with my wife, Connie. Good advice. That night I went home and told her what had transpired and what I was contemplating. Fortunately for me, Connie was supportive of the idea. And so, after 22 years of practicing in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, I took and passed another bar exam (with the same MBE score), and, in July of 2006, relocated to Fort Lauderdale where I became the managing attorney of the Fort Lauderdale office and the supervising attorney of the Florida Professional Liability attorneys.

In addition to my management duties, I also handled cases. When I first arrived in Fort Lauderdale, we had a small office. All of the attorneys had to handle a variety of cases. Over the next 13 years, I handled almost every type of professional liability case. I have represented lawyers, accountants, real estate and insurance agents, architects and engineers, debt collectors, and HOA and condominium boards. Over the last several years, I have also handled a number of employment matters. I have tried cases in state and federal courts in all four of the South Florida counties.

During the next 14 years, Marshall Dennehey emerged as one of the leading civil defense firms in Florida. Today, we have a combined 67 attorneys practicing out of our four Florida offices.

This bring us to 2020. Little did any of us envision what that year had in store for us. For me, startling and life-changing events of 2020 started a bit earlier than for many of you. You see, I turned 60 in January of 2020, and Connie planned a short vacation to celebrate. A day after my birthday, we were walking on the beach, talking about the past and future. Although we both missed certain things about Philadelphia, we liked living in Florida. I was enjoying my position as regional manager of the Florida offices, having succeeded Mark Thompson in that role following his elevation to president and CEO. I was looking forward to the upcoming years working with the attorneys in Florida as we continued to grow our presence in the state. While this may sound a bit too “new age” for me, I had reached a state of contentment. Little did we know that our world would change two days later. That was when Mark Thompson came to Fort Lauderdale for a surprise visit. Mark told me that the Executive Committee would like Connie and me to agree to return to Philadelphia so I could become the assistant director of the Professional Liability Department and eventually succeed Chris when he retired. Again, following my father’s advice, I agreed. Lucky for me, so did Connie.

Since February 2020, I have spent my time becoming re-acquainted with Philadelphia, reconnecting with long-term friends and colleagues, and getting to know the shareholders, associates, paralegals and staff who make up the Professional Liability Department. I have been busy—the department has 120 attorneys in 17 distinct practice groups covering a wide variety of specialties. This past year, I have come to appreciate, more than ever, those attorneys, paralegals and staff members—a group of talented men and women who are dedicated to providing our clients with top-notch legal representation. They care about the work they do and the services they provide.

Going forward, I pledge to continue the vision and drive for excellence first established by Phil Toran, and then honed by Chris Dougherty. Both of them set the standard for providing top-level service to our clients in a cost-effective manner. We strive to be effective advocates for our clients, while treating everyone, including opposing counsel and the judiciary, with respect. As the director of the Professional Liability Department, I bring my years of management and leadership experience and my 20+ years of legal experience gained from defending professionals and other entities in Pennsylvania and Florida.

As a member of the Executive Committee, I have the good fortune to work with my friends and colleagues, Howard Dwoskin and Mark Thompson. We share a commitment to providing clients with excellent legal representation and service, which has been, and will continue to be, the hallmark of our law firm. Doing so with a sense of humor and respect for one another is what makes Marshall Dennehey the place I am so glad I said “Yes” to 28 years ago.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.