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Defense Digest

Plaintiff Does Not Have to Pay for It and Neither Should You: Preventing Plaintiff’s Introduction of Past Medical Expenses that Have Been Adjusted and/or Written Off by Collateral Source Payments

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023

Key Points:

  • Evidence of past medical bill charges that have been paid, adjusted, or written off are not relevant. 
  • Florida case law establishes that Medicare/Medicaid recipients are precluded from showing evidence of medical damages above the Medicare/Medicaid subrogation/lien amount.
  • The principles for limiting evidence of medical damages that have been paid, adjusted, or written off should apply regardless of the source of payment.

It is the eve of trial, and evidentiary issues are being evaluated. For attorneys trying personal injury cases, one issue that must be evaluated involves the damages that the plaintiff will be able to present to the jury. Plaintiff’s counsel will inevitably try to present every single last penny charged by medical providers, irrespective of any payments, adjustments, or write-offs. On the other hand, defense counsel is undoubtedly crunching the numbers, trying to determine what bills should be excluded. Everyone knows that the decisions on this issue will have a significant impact on the verdict. Everyone understands what is on the line. 

Until recently, Florida plaintiffs essentially had free reign to present to the jury medical bills and charges that were already paid, already adjusted, or even written off. In such a scenario, a jury would award a verdict based on numbers that were more than the amount paid by the insurer, Medicare/Medicaid, or any collateral source, and the verdict amount would be set-off after the fact. However, in 2022, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Dial v. Calusa Palms Master Ass’n, Inc., 337 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 2022) changed the playing field. The court established that it is proper to prevent the plaintiff from presenting the full charges for past medical expenses that Medicare already paid or were adjusted or written off based on a Medicare/Medicaid payment. 

The holding in Dial is founded upon the principle that: 

[T]he touchstone for admissibility of medical bills under Florida law is an individual’s obligation to pay them… [w]here a Plaintiff is not obligated to pay the full amount of the medical bills, the full amount of the medical bills becomes irrelevant and should be excluded. 

Sensini v. MTD Sw. Inc., 2019 WL 2015957, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan 7, 2019). The court explained that Florida Statute 768.76 prohibits any set-off of Medicare/Medicaid benefits and, therefore, a post-verdict set-off for Medicare/Medicaid recipients is not an option. 

And so, when a plaintiff is a Medicare/Medicaid recipient, defense attorneys can now successfully argue:

  • The medical providers are prohibited by federal and/or state statute from seeking additional payment after accepting payment from Medicare/Medicaid. 
  • The plaintiff will only ever be liable for the Medicare/Medicaid subrogation/lien amount that corresponds to the payments actually made to the medical providers.
  • The difference between the initial gross charge and the payment amount is not relevant to any issue because the plaintiff will never have to pay that difference and the provider cannot seek payment of that difference from any person or entity. 
  • The plaintiff should be precluded from presenting any evidence of the full charges submitted by providers and should only be allowed to present evidence of the amount Medicare has paid and which the plaintiff may ultimately be responsible for paying.

Defense counsel should not be timid in their quest to push for additional limitations on evidence of payments, adjustments, and write-offs that medical providers accept from other collateral sources. Florida policy is clear that “a Plaintiff… is not entitled to recover compensatory damages in excess of the amount which represents the loss actually inflicted by the action of the Defendant.” Dial, 337 So. 3d at 1232. This is a fundamental principle for the recovery of compensatory damages and should apply regardless of the source of the payment. 

For cases filed after March 24, 2023, defense counsel will rely on House Bill 837, “Civil Remedies,” which establishes that the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages for past medical bills that have already been satisfied is limited to the evidence of the amount actually paid, regardless of the source of payment. However, for all those very-many cases filed before this monumental tort reform, defense counsel should consider the following:

  • To be admissible, evidence must be relevant; it must tend to prove or disprove a material fact. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 402.1, at 222 (2021 ed.). 
  • The inflated gross amount of a charge is irrelevant as a proper measure of compensatory damages because it was subsequently paid by the plaintiff’s collateral source or adjusted and/or written off. 
  • The original charge does not tend to prove or disprove that the claimant has suffered any loss by reason of the charge. Dial, 337 So. 3d at 1232 (citing Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). 
  • Therefore, the plaintiff should be limited to presenting evidence of the amount actually paid. 

Whether Florida’s courts will take up the issue of limiting evidence of past medical bills, regardless of the source of payment, for cases filed before House Bill 837 is unknown…after all, the days of it being an issue appear to be numbered. But, Florida courts are inundated with cases that are not subject to House Bill 837, and defense attorneys need to gear up with every tool available to advocate for their clients and prevent excessive awards.

*Amara is an associate in our Tampa, Florida, office. She can be reached at 813.898.1820 AXRodriguez@mdwcg.com.
 

 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

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