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Defense Digest

Plaintiff Does Not Have to Pay for It and Neither Should You: Preventing Plaintiff’s Introduction of Past Medical Expenses that Have Been Adjusted and/or Written Off by Collateral Source Payments

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023

Key Points:

  • Evidence of past medical bill charges that have been paid, adjusted, or written off are not relevant. 
  • Florida case law establishes that Medicare/Medicaid recipients are precluded from showing evidence of medical damages above the Medicare/Medicaid subrogation/lien amount.
  • The principles for limiting evidence of medical damages that have been paid, adjusted, or written off should apply regardless of the source of payment.

It is the eve of trial, and evidentiary issues are being evaluated. For attorneys trying personal injury cases, one issue that must be evaluated involves the damages that the plaintiff will be able to present to the jury. Plaintiff’s counsel will inevitably try to present every single last penny charged by medical providers, irrespective of any payments, adjustments, or write-offs. On the other hand, defense counsel is undoubtedly crunching the numbers, trying to determine what bills should be excluded. Everyone knows that the decisions on this issue will have a significant impact on the verdict. Everyone understands what is on the line. 

Until recently, Florida plaintiffs essentially had free reign to present to the jury medical bills and charges that were already paid, already adjusted, or even written off. In such a scenario, a jury would award a verdict based on numbers that were more than the amount paid by the insurer, Medicare/Medicaid, or any collateral source, and the verdict amount would be set-off after the fact. However, in 2022, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Dial v. Calusa Palms Master Ass’n, Inc., 337 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 2022) changed the playing field. The court established that it is proper to prevent the plaintiff from presenting the full charges for past medical expenses that Medicare already paid or were adjusted or written off based on a Medicare/Medicaid payment. 

The holding in Dial is founded upon the principle that: 

[T]he touchstone for admissibility of medical bills under Florida law is an individual’s obligation to pay them… [w]here a Plaintiff is not obligated to pay the full amount of the medical bills, the full amount of the medical bills becomes irrelevant and should be excluded. 

Sensini v. MTD Sw. Inc., 2019 WL 2015957, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan 7, 2019). The court explained that Florida Statute 768.76 prohibits any set-off of Medicare/Medicaid benefits and, therefore, a post-verdict set-off for Medicare/Medicaid recipients is not an option. 

And so, when a plaintiff is a Medicare/Medicaid recipient, defense attorneys can now successfully argue:

  • The medical providers are prohibited by federal and/or state statute from seeking additional payment after accepting payment from Medicare/Medicaid. 
  • The plaintiff will only ever be liable for the Medicare/Medicaid subrogation/lien amount that corresponds to the payments actually made to the medical providers.
  • The difference between the initial gross charge and the payment amount is not relevant to any issue because the plaintiff will never have to pay that difference and the provider cannot seek payment of that difference from any person or entity. 
  • The plaintiff should be precluded from presenting any evidence of the full charges submitted by providers and should only be allowed to present evidence of the amount Medicare has paid and which the plaintiff may ultimately be responsible for paying.

Defense counsel should not be timid in their quest to push for additional limitations on evidence of payments, adjustments, and write-offs that medical providers accept from other collateral sources. Florida policy is clear that “a Plaintiff… is not entitled to recover compensatory damages in excess of the amount which represents the loss actually inflicted by the action of the Defendant.” Dial, 337 So. 3d at 1232. This is a fundamental principle for the recovery of compensatory damages and should apply regardless of the source of the payment. 

For cases filed after March 24, 2023, defense counsel will rely on House Bill 837, “Civil Remedies,” which establishes that the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages for past medical bills that have already been satisfied is limited to the evidence of the amount actually paid, regardless of the source of payment. However, for all those very-many cases filed before this monumental tort reform, defense counsel should consider the following:

  • To be admissible, evidence must be relevant; it must tend to prove or disprove a material fact. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 402.1, at 222 (2021 ed.). 
  • The inflated gross amount of a charge is irrelevant as a proper measure of compensatory damages because it was subsequently paid by the plaintiff’s collateral source or adjusted and/or written off. 
  • The original charge does not tend to prove or disprove that the claimant has suffered any loss by reason of the charge. Dial, 337 So. 3d at 1232 (citing Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). 
  • Therefore, the plaintiff should be limited to presenting evidence of the amount actually paid. 

Whether Florida’s courts will take up the issue of limiting evidence of past medical bills, regardless of the source of payment, for cases filed before House Bill 837 is unknown…after all, the days of it being an issue appear to be numbered. But, Florida courts are inundated with cases that are not subject to House Bill 837, and defense attorneys need to gear up with every tool available to advocate for their clients and prevent excessive awards.

*Amara is an associate in our Tampa, Florida, office. She can be reached at 813.898.1820 AXRodriguez@mdwcg.com.
 

 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.