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Case Law Alerts

Ohio Civil Rule 15(A) discourages a prompt motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Weiler v. Osborn Engineering Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112023, 2023-Ohio-619

July 1, 2023

by Jillian L. Dinehart

In a surprising win by a pro se plaintiff against a large law firm, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reminded counsel of a plaintiff’s absolute right to amend their complaint. In this case, the appellate court held that the trial court improperly granted judgment on the pleadings on the initial complaint when the plaintiff had filed an amended complaint within 28 days of the answer. 

On June 3, 2022, the plaintiff alleged a claim of “tortious interference with prospective business relationships” that accused the defendant, her former employer, of providing bad references that destroyed her reputation. The employer filed an answer on July 5, 2022, then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on July 28, 2022. The basis for the motion for judgment on the pleadings was that there was no set of facts plead in the complaint that described causation. In response to the motion, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint (without leave of court) that set out very few additional facts and named a new defendant. 

On August 16, 2022, the date its answer to the amended complaint would have been due, the employer filed a motion to strike the amended complaint as being improperly filed without leave of court, pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A). On September 8, 2022, the trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings to the original complaint without ruling on the motion to strike. 

The plaintiff appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court was without jurisdiction because the motion for judgment on the pleadings was mooted by the amended complaint. In response, the employer argued that Civ. R. 15(A) limited the right to amend without leave of the court to only the first 28 days following service of the complaint unless a counterclaim is filed (as a pleading that requires a responsive pleading from plaintiff). Thus, the amended complaint was a nullity because it was filed without leave. Alternatively, the employer argued that the amended complaint offered the same frivolous and futile allegations as the original complaint, and leave should not have been granted to file the amended complaint, or that the failure to consider the allegations of the amended complaint was harmless error. 

Civil Rule 15(A) states that a plaintiff may amend its complaint “once as a matter of course within twenty-eight days after serving it or, if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required within twenty-eight days after service of a responsive pleading or twenty-eight days after service of a motion under Civ.R. 12(B), (E), or (F), whichever is earlier.” The appellate court made clear that the responsive pleading referred to in Civ. R. 15(A) is the answer to a complaint (in a scenario like this one) and that the futile nature of the allegations in the complaint are not considered when making a determination as to whether leave was needed to file an amendment. Though not expressed in the employer’s brief, the employer plausibly could have argued that the “whichever is earlier” language refers to both 28 days after service as well as 28 days after a responsive pleading or relevant motion. This argument was not raised. 

The holding underlines that a dispositive motion filed within 28 days of a responsive pleading does not disrupt the plaintiff’s right to amend their pleading as a matter of course. The lesson to be learned from this case is that a defendant should not rush to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings. A motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be filed until more than 28 days after the answer is filed. Waiting this brief period will prevent the plaintiff from automatically curing the deficiencies of the complaint with an amendment as a matter of course. Forcing the plaintiff into requesting leave, albeit freely given, will allow the defendant to argue that the amendment would be futile to give the court the opportunity to deny leave.
 

 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.