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Case Law Alerts

NJ Appellate Division Addresses Applicability of Arbitration Provisions in Two Separate Decisions Involving Amusement Parks

Matullo v. Skyzone Trampoline Park, A-2813-20, Decided May 16, 2022 and Perez v. Skyzone, LLC, Superior Court of New Jersey, App. Div., Jan. 12, 2016, 443 N.J.Super. 359, 128 A.3d 1139

July 1, 2022

by Sara W. Mazzolla

First, in Matullo v. Skyzone Trampoline Park, the New Jersey appellate division addressed whether an arbitration provision contained in a participation agreement signed by a 15-year-old was enforceable. The appellate panel, in reversing and remanding the trial court’s ruling to compel arbitration, held that the provision was unenforceable because the minor had a right to disaffirm the contract and found that the estoppel exception did not apply based on the facts of this case. 

In Matullo, the minor listed himself both as an adult and as a minor with two different birthdates. He signed a participant agreement, including an arbitration provision for minors, although not being the requisite 18-years-old in order to enter into the agreement. Despite the minor’s fraudulent act in providing a fake birthdate in order to gain access to the trampoline park, the court found that the elements of estoppel did not apply to enforce the contract because the defendants could not have reasonably relied on the plaintiff’s misrepresentation where any of the defendant’s employees could have reviewed the agreement and would have seen that the plaintiff listed himself with the same name and two different birthdates. 

Second, in Perez v. Skyzone, LLC, the trial court’s order to compel the arbitration provision as to the trampoline park was upheld. However, the appellate panel reversed and remanded, in part, where the two other co-defendants were not parties to the agreement and the record did not establish those entities as affiliates or agents of the trampoline park. Thus, as to the two other defendants, the matter was stayed, pending the conclusion of the arbitration. As to the selection of an appointed arbitrator who was unavailable, the appellate panel found the provision enforceable because, in that event, both the governing acts—FAA and NJAA—permit the court to appoint a substitute arbitrator. 
 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.