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Legal Updates for Asbestos and Mass Tort Litigation

New Jersey Appellate Division Strikes Down $117M Verdict in Talc/Asbestos Case Because Trial Court Did Not Properly Assess Plaintiffs’ Expert Opinions

Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – April 30, 2021

April 30, 2021

by Paul C. Johnson

In April 2018, a Middlesex County jury returned a verdict against Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. and Imerys Talc America, Inc., finding that the plaintiff, Stephen Lanzo, was exposed to asbestos from Johnson’s baby powder and Shower to Shower powder and that this exposure caused his mesothelioma. The jury awarded $30 million in compensatory damages to Stephen Lanzo, $7 million to Kendra Lanzo for loss of consortium, and subsequently entered punitive damages awards of $55 million against Johnson & Johnson and $25 million against Imerys, for a total verdict of $117 million.

Both defendants appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by admitting unreliable expert testimony. Johnson & Johnson also appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to sever the plaintiffs’ claims against them from the claims against Imerys based on an adverse inference jury charge against Imerys. The Appellate Division agreed with the defendants, reversing the trial court judgment and remanding the matter to the Law Division for a new trial. On the adverse inference issue, the Appellate Division held that the new trials should be conducted separately in order to avoid any potential prejudice to Johnson & Johnson caused by the adverse inference charge against Imerys.

Expert – Gatekeeper Role

Both defendants challenged the expert opinions expressed by two of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, Dr. Jacqueline Moline and Dr. James Webber, that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments from certain minerals could cause mesothelioma. The trial judge denied the defendants’ request for a Rule 104 hearing. The defendants contended that by permitting these experts to testify, the trial judge misapplied the well-established gatekeeping procedures required to be handled by the trial court and as required by In re Accutane Litigation (Accutane), 234 N.J. 340, 388 (2018). The Appellate Division noted that the Supreme Court decision in Accutane essentially reconciled New Jersey Rules of Evidence with the longstanding Federal evidence standard expressed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

An expert’s opinion on causation may be admitted when it is “based on sound, adequately founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field.” Accutane, at 349-350. The trial court is required to assess the soundness of the preferred methodology and the underlying data used to formulate the opinion in evaluating the qualifications of the expert and the conclusions. When a proponent fails to demonstrate “the soundness of a methodology, both in terms of its approach to reasoning and to its use of data, from the perspective of others within the relevant scientific community, the gatekeeper should exclude the proposed expert testimony on the basis that it is unreliable.” Lanzo v. Johnson & Johnson, (slip op. p. 34-35).

Here, both Drs. Moline and Webber testified that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments can cause mesothelioma. The trial judge only noted that “the issue of cleavage fragments was an area that’s highly contested between plaintiff’s experts and defense experts,” but the judge did not evaluate the issues in context. Lanzo, (slip op. p. 41). The trial judge also denied the defendants’ motion for a Rule 104 hearing on the experts’ opinions on this issue.

The Appellate Division found that the trial court did not assess the methodology or the underlying data used by these experts, noting that Dr. Webber had not conducted any studies and was not aware of any studies showing that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments could cause mesothelioma. Dr. Moline had previously testified that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments could not cause mesothelioma. At trial in this case, she testified that she had changed her opinion on this issue over time. However, she did not express any scientific basis for the change in her opinion.

The Appellate Division determined that the trial judge did not perform the required gatekeeping function by failing to evaluate the methodology or the data and information that formed the basis for the expert conclusions put forth by Drs. Webber and Moline. The Appellate Division also determined that those errors were clearly capable of producing an unjust result, which required a new trial.

Adverse Inference

In their discovery responses, Imerys certified that it did not have and was not aware of any historical talc samples or testing documents. At trial, however, Imerys’ representative confirmed that Imerys had, at one time, been in possession of historical talc samples and testing documents, but they had discarded the talc samples and documents.

The trial court determined that discarding these items was not intentional, however, recognized that spoliation does not require intent. The court noted that the purpose of an adverse inference charge is to level the playing field where evidence has been hidden or destroyed. To accomplish this levelling, the trial court included a jury charge that stated, “You may infer that the missing evidence may have been helpful to the plaintiffs’ case to the detriment of defendant Imerys.” The trial court also specifically charged that Johnson & Johnson was not involved in the spoliation conduct and that the adverse inference should not be drawn as to any other defendant in the case.

The Appellate Division noted that New Jersey court rules permit separate trials in order to prevent prejudice. R. 4:29-2 & R. 4:38-2(a). Severance may be appropriate “where a significant portion of the evidence to be adduced at trial is admissible only as to one defendant thereby causing prejudice to other defendants.” State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37, 53 (App. Div. 1997).

The Appellate Division found that, once the jury was permitted to draw an adverse inference that Imerys’ talc was contaminated with asbestos, it would likely be impossible for the jury to make a different finding as to Johnson & Johnson. The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in failing to sever the claims against Imerys from the claims against Johnson & Johnson and remanded the matter to the trial court for separate trials against each defendant.

 

 

Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – April 30, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tdrau@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

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Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.