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Defense Digest

Managing Stricter Case Management Orders

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023

March 1, 2023

Key Points:

  • Florida is moving to stricter adherence to case management orders.
  • Beware of tougher sanctions for non-compliance.

Florida is experiencing a recent push towards strict compliance with case management orders to impose more judicial control on current civil caseloads. This includes tougher sanctions for non-compliance, including sanctions affecting discovery, depositions, and continuances.

The Judicial Management Council’s Workgroup on Improved Resolution of Civil Cases is making an effort to manage civil cases and had proposed numerous changes to the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration. This focus on promoting judicial efficiency is due to the backlog of COVID-19 pandemic cases. The goal of the Workgroup is to improve the clearance rate of civil cases by reducing the length of time to litigate a case.

Some rule amendments or new rules proposed for the Florida Civil Procedure Rules relating to case management orders were: 1.200 (case management in general), 1.201 (complex cases), 1.440 (setting cases for trial), and 1.275 (to codify sanctions available to the courts for litigation-related offenses). For cases in the “case management in general” category:

The parties must meet and confer within 30 days after initial service of the complaint on the first defendant served (unless this deadline is extended by the court) and work out projected deadlines in seven categories, including discovery, potential dispositive motions, and anticipated trial readiness date. Within 120 days after the case is filed or within 30 days after service on the last defendant, whichever is earlier, the parties must file a joint case management report and proposed case management order based on the meet and confer, failing which the court will issue its own case management order. The contents of the joint case management report are delineated in [Rule 1.200] subdivision (e)(3)(C). The contents of the proposed case management order are listed in subdivision (e)(3)(D), which requires the parties to set numerous deadlines, to propose a trial period or a date for a case management conference to set the trial period, and to state the anticipated number of days for trial. The court must issue the case management order as soon as practicable after receiving the parties’ proposed order; the court may also call a case management conference before issuing the case management order. In short, the case management order sets a comprehensive master timetable for the remainder of the case’s pretrial proceedings.”

The Workgroup is concerned that case management orders are being looked at as guidelines or are being completely ignored by the parties. To prevent this, the proposal included plans to hold inflexible trial dates and rigid deadlines to be enforced, and to “impose sanctions without resort to a prefatory order to show cause, given that the parties are on notice, under the case management order, of what is required of them.” And the court, “if both parties fail to appear at a case management conference…may assume that the case has been resolved and dismiss it without prejudice.”

The Florida Supreme Court addressed these proposals and declined to adopt the Workgroup’s proposal to streamline Florida’s civil litigation system. However, it does not put to bed the push for stricter compliance, as the court noted, “[t]he Court declines to adopt the Workgroup’s proposed amendment at this time because additional refinements are necessary. Instead, the Court will make a series of phased referrals for the refinement and study of the Workgroup’s proposals, beginning with the attached referrals to the Civil Procedure Rules Committee, the Rules of General Practice and Judicial Administration Committee, the Florida Courts Technology Commission, and the Trial Court Budget Commission.” The Supreme Court’s order issued referrals for the refinement and study of the proposals submitted by the Workgroup on Improved Resolution of Civil Cases. It should be anticipated that the amendments will be back under review after the studies are completed.

The impact of inflexible deadlines will be felt mainly by the defense increased difficulties in obtaining experts and completing expert discovery within a strict time frame. While plaintiffs will have the chance to prepare their cases for trial prior to filing suit, the defense will be strapped with working under harsh deadlines. For this reason, it’s important to consider new defense strategies and onboarding experts early on in litigation. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.