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SIU Spotlight

Florida Appellate Court Sets Record Straight on Longtime Misconception of Examinations Under Oath as Admissible Evidence

May 15, 2026

The Florida Third District Court of Appeal recently overturned a long standing assumption regarding the admissibility of examinations under oaths (“EUOs”) as trial evidence in Universal X Rays, Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 422 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), reh'g denied (Nov. 3, 2025). For years, a longstanding mythos existed around EUOs in Florida that they could not be used in litigation because of a multitude of reasoning: hearsay, trustworthiness, due process, creation in anticipation of litigation, among other common critiques. Such was the situation that great evidence could be potentially unearthed in an EUO, but if it could not be independently verified by other means, certain evidence as to fraudulent or denied coverage claims would never see the light of day.

In Universal X Rays, the assignee and insured, Miguel LaRosa-Ferrer sat for an examination under oath per his insurance policy following a car accident. The EUO was conducted via videoconference with a court reporter and the insured had an attorney present. During the required examination, the insured admitted that he had moved to a new address shortly before applying for the insurance policy but continued to list his old address on the application. This resulted in a lower premium for the insured. Two months later, United Auto sent a letter to the insured rescinding the policy, citing material misrepresentation of the garaging address, and returned the premium.

Several months later, the appellant, Universal, sued United Auto for breach of contract after it denied a medical billing reimbursement request for no-fault personal injury protection benefits. United Auto eventually moved for summary judgment on the issue of material misrepresentation with its key piece of evidence being the EUO transcript. Universal argued that the EUO transcript was inadmissible as improper hearsay, an out of court statement by a declarant offered for its truth, and that it violated section 92.33, Florida Statutes (2025) because the insurer did not provide a copy of the transcript to the insured. However, Universal offered no actual evidence disputing that the insured committed a material misrepresentation.

The lower trial court disagreed with Universal’s legal arguments and because no evidence disputing the material misrepresentation was presented, entered final judgment for United Auto. Unsurprisingly, Universal promptly appealed, as there is a history of trial courts in Florida finding EUOs to be inadmissible for numerous reasons leading to a long fabled belief in the industry as to the same.

For example, in JJZ Medical Center, Inc., v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 32 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 432a, (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Cty. 2024), a Miami-Dade trial court declined to review an examination under oath demonstrating material misrepresentation after an insured signed an affidavit to the contrary and it was submitted as evidence. The court held that the EUO could not be admissible because there was no cross-examination of the witness making it “inherently untrustworthy.” The court went on to state that an EUO transcript met no exception to hearsay exclusions under Florida law either such as former testimony or a business records exception.

Another County Court in Miami-Dade excluded an EUO transcript involving a material misrepresentation summary judgment because it was not provided to the declarant nor adopted by the declarant per § 92.33 Fla. Stat, and would be considered hearsay. Manuel V. Feijoo, M.D., aao Andisleydis Sordo Perez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 382a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Cty. 2023). In this case, the court honed in on the argument that an examination under oath, while sworn, lacks personal knowledge of the declarant because it is not provided to them, nor do they adopt it after it is transcribed. § 92.33 Fla. Stat requires a written statement by an injured party to be provided to that individual or it may not be used in a later civil action. The court held this statute to applicable and, thus, excluded the EUO transcript.

Both of these common lower court arguments were then brought up on appeal by Universal. They argued to the Third District Court of Appeal that the EUO was inadmissible hearsay, violating Florida Statute § 92.33, which requires a copy of a written statement to be provided to the declarant. However, Third District Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and for a reason that seemed to catch the appellant off-guard.

First, the court cited Florida’s revised summary judgment standard, which in 2021, aligned Florida’s Rule 1.510 with the federal summary judgment standard Rule 56. Using the full benefit of federal case law, the court held that hearsay is permissible “as long as it can” be presented in admissible form at trial—such as through live testimony. In such instances, the proper response from an opposing party is to present conflicting evidence of the statement. However, in this case, Universal put forth no evidence that the insured’s garage address was not materially misrepresented, and, thus, they lost this issue.

The Third District rejected the argument that the insurer violated § 92.33 Fla. Stat., noting that the statute only requires “written statements” to be provide to an injured person. The court held that an EUO, which is a sworn transcribed statement, would not even be covered by § 92.33, and the appellant failed to provide any authority to the contrary. Given that appellant’s statutory argument did not apply and it presented no evidence to contradict the examination under oath, which could be reduced to admissible form at trial, the Third District affirmed the admissibility of the EUO in favor of the insurer.

The significance of the Universal X Rays opinion now means EUOs are an even stronger fraud deterrent in Florida. They can be taken with confidence and utilized to stem frivolous litigation and claims at much earlier phases than before. Rather than ignore the EUO transcript, opposing parties now must affirmatively disprove that fraud has occurred once it is admitted.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.