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SIU Spotlight

Florida Appellate Court Sets Record Straight on Longtime Misconception of Examinations Under Oath as Admissible Evidence

May 15, 2026

by Sean P. Greenwalt

The Florida Third District Court of Appeal recently overturned a long standing assumption regarding the admissibility of examinations under oaths (“EUOs”) as trial evidence in Universal X Rays, Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 422 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), reh'g denied (Nov. 3, 2025). For years, a longstanding mythos existed around EUOs in Florida that they could not be used in litigation because of a multitude of reasoning: hearsay, trustworthiness, due process, creation in anticipation of litigation, among other common critiques. Such was the situation that great evidence could be potentially unearthed in an EUO, but if it could not be independently verified by other means, certain evidence as to fraudulent or denied coverage claims would never see the light of day.

In Universal X Rays, the assignee and insured, Miguel LaRosa-Ferrer sat for an examination under oath per his insurance policy following a car accident. The EUO was conducted via videoconference with a court reporter and the insured had an attorney present. During the required examination, the insured admitted that he had moved to a new address shortly before applying for the insurance policy but continued to list his old address on the application. This resulted in a lower premium for the insured. Two months later, United Auto sent a letter to the insured rescinding the policy, citing material misrepresentation of the garaging address, and returned the premium.

Several months later, the appellant, Universal, sued United Auto for breach of contract after it denied a medical billing reimbursement request for no-fault personal injury protection benefits. United Auto eventually moved for summary judgment on the issue of material misrepresentation with its key piece of evidence being the EUO transcript. Universal argued that the EUO transcript was inadmissible as improper hearsay, an out of court statement by a declarant offered for its truth, and that it violated section 92.33, Florida Statutes (2025) because the insurer did not provide a copy of the transcript to the insured. However, Universal offered no actual evidence disputing that the insured committed a material misrepresentation.

The lower trial court disagreed with Universal’s legal arguments and because no evidence disputing the material misrepresentation was presented, entered final judgment for United Auto. Unsurprisingly, Universal promptly appealed, as there is a history of trial courts in Florida finding EUOs to be inadmissible for numerous reasons leading to a long fabled belief in the industry as to the same.

For example, in JJZ Medical Center, Inc., v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 32 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 432a, (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Cty. 2024), a Miami-Dade trial court declined to review an examination under oath demonstrating material misrepresentation after an insured signed an affidavit to the contrary and it was submitted as evidence. The court held that the EUO could not be admissible because there was no cross-examination of the witness making it “inherently untrustworthy.” The court went on to state that an EUO transcript met no exception to hearsay exclusions under Florida law either such as former testimony or a business records exception.

Another County Court in Miami-Dade excluded an EUO transcript involving a material misrepresentation summary judgment because it was not provided to the declarant nor adopted by the declarant per § 92.33 Fla. Stat, and would be considered hearsay. Manuel V. Feijoo, M.D., aao Andisleydis Sordo Perez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 382a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Cty. 2023). In this case, the court honed in on the argument that an examination under oath, while sworn, lacks personal knowledge of the declarant because it is not provided to them, nor do they adopt it after it is transcribed. § 92.33 Fla. Stat requires a written statement by an injured party to be provided to that individual or it may not be used in a later civil action. The court held this statute to applicable and, thus, excluded the EUO transcript.

Both of these common lower court arguments were then brought up on appeal by Universal. They argued to the Third District Court of Appeal that the EUO was inadmissible hearsay, violating Florida Statute § 92.33, which requires a copy of a written statement to be provided to the declarant. However, Third District Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and for a reason that seemed to catch the appellant off-guard.

First, the court cited Florida’s revised summary judgment standard, which in 2021, aligned Florida’s Rule 1.510 with the federal summary judgment standard Rule 56. Using the full benefit of federal case law, the court held that hearsay is permissible “as long as it can” be presented in admissible form at trial—such as through live testimony. In such instances, the proper response from an opposing party is to present conflicting evidence of the statement. However, in this case, Universal put forth no evidence that the insured’s garage address was not materially misrepresented, and, thus, they lost this issue.

The Third District rejected the argument that the insurer violated § 92.33 Fla. Stat., noting that the statute only requires “written statements” to be provide to an injured person. The court held that an EUO, which is a sworn transcribed statement, would not even be covered by § 92.33, and the appellant failed to provide any authority to the contrary. Given that appellant’s statutory argument did not apply and it presented no evidence to contradict the examination under oath, which could be reduced to admissible form at trial, the Third District affirmed the admissibility of the EUO in favor of the insurer.

The significance of the Universal X Rays opinion now means EUOs are an even stronger fraud deterrent in Florida. They can be taken with confidence and utilized to stem frivolous litigation and claims at much earlier phases than before. Rather than ignore the EUO transcript, opposing parties now must affirmatively disprove that fraud has occurred once it is admitted.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.