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Case Law Alerts

County Court Rules in Favor of Insurer Regarding Application of the 2007 Medicare Part B Non-Facility Limiting Charge

Next Medical Florida, LLC a/a/o Marvin Jackson v. United Services Automobile Assoc., Volusia County Case No: 2022-11377-CODL (71)

October 1, 2023

This suit involved the legal issue of whether or not the insurer was required to reimburse the plaintiff pursuant to the 2007 non-facility limiting charge and, if so, whether this reimbursement would require the insurer to remove a budget neutrality adjustment when determining the amount to be paid. 

The defendant maintained that it correctly reimbursed the plaintiff pursuant to its policy and Fla. Stat. 627.736. In response to the defendant’s argument, the plaintiff argued that, in reimbursing CPT code 97012, the defendant should have paid at the higher 2007 Medicare Part B limiting charge rate as opposed to the 2020 Medicare Part B participating physicians rate, and that this reimbursement should also have the “budget neutrality adjustment” removed from the calculation of the physician’s fee schedule formula. 

In a supplemental memorandum of law, the defendant argued that it was not required to reimburse 97012 under the 2007 Medicare Part B limiting charge rate and that, even if it was required to reimburse under the 2007 Medicare Part B limiting charge rate, it would be incorrect to remove the “budget neutrality adjustment” from the published 2007 Medicare physician fee schedule formula. 

The court also noted that removing the budget neutrality adjustment from the published 2007 Medicare physicians fee schedule formula would be the only way that the 2007 Medicare Part B limiting charge rate would be higher than the 2020 Medicare Part B participating physicians fee schedule rate for CPT code 97012. 

The plaintiff’s argument—that the defendant improperly reimbursed it for CPT code 97012 by not issuing payment pursuant to the 2007 Medicare Part B limiting charge—relied on Priority Med. Centers, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 319 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021), in which the Third District held that the highest reimbursement allowable under the Medicare Part B fee schedule is the non-facility limiting charge for 2007. 

However, the defendant’s argument pointed to Progressive Select Ins. Co. v. In-House Diagnostic Services, 359 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed its previous position of aligning with the Third District in a unanimous, en banc decision and concluded that Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a)(2) requires an insurer to limit reimbursement to the fee schedules applicable to a given medical service and not the 2007 limiting charge rate. The defendant also pointed to a recent Sixth District decision in Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. SimonMed Imaging, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D990a (Fla. 6th DCA May 12, 2023), in which the Sixth District certified conflict with the Third District and ruled that, “[b]ased on the plain language of the statute, when read as a whole, the relevant benchmark for the floor amount under section 627.736(5)(a)2 is the Medicare Part B participating fee schedule, not the higher Medicare Part B limiting charge.” 

Citing these two decisions, the court agreed with the defendant in that there is nothing in Fla. Stat. 627.736 which requires an insurer to look beyond the three delineated fee schedules in section 627.736(5)(a)1, or that the limiting charge is somehow “silently” incorporated into the statute, and that section 627.736(5)(a)2 is not inclusive of the higher 2007 Medicare limiting charge and that the defendant correctly reimbursed Next Medical at the 2020 Medicare Part B non-facility participating physicians fee schedule amount for CPT code 97012. As the court ruled that the 2007 limiting charge is not the correct method for reimbursement, the court ruled that the issue of whether the budget neutrality adjustment was required to be removed from the 2007 Medicare physicians fee schedule formula when determining the 2007 Medicare Part B limiting charge rate was rendered moot. 

This ruling is significant as it reinforces the implications of the decisions made in Progressive Select Ins. Co. v. In House Diagnostic Services, 359 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) and Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. SimonMed Imaging, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D990a (Fla, 6th DCA May 12, 2023), in ruling that the 2007 limiting charge is not an applicable fee schedule pursuant to Fla. Stat. 627.736(5)(a)1. As most carriers have been paying the limiting charge rate on certain CPT codes for the past few years, it is important to note that such payments now constitute an overpayment outside of the Third District and, as such, carriers now have a potential claim for unjust enrichment against providers who were reimbursed the 2007 limiting charge rate.
 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.